


اسناد لائف جاسوسی

شماره (۱۸)



دانشجویان مسلمان پیرو خط امام

استاد لانه چا سوسی

شماره (۱۸)



دانشجویان مسلمان پیرو خط امام

طی اردلان

CONFIDENTIAL
PROG 7/24/79
CHG:LBLAINGEN
ECON:MJOHNSON
NONE
ECON-3 CHG, POL RF CHRON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, PRIORITY

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/24/85 (JOHNSON, MARK) OR-E
TAGS: EFIN, EGEN, PEPR, IR
SUBJECT: CALL ON MINISTER OF FINANCE ARDALAN

1. (C- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. CHARGE, ACCOMPANIED BY VISITING DEPTOFF, CALLED ON MINISTER OF FINANCE ALI ARDALAN JULY 23. ARDALAN WAS JOINED BY DEPUTY MINISTER DR. IBRAHIM-ZADEH WHO INTERPRETED.

3. CHARGE OPENED CONVERSATION BY EXPLAINING OUR UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVOLUTION. WE WERE WILLING TO WORK WITH IRAN IN THE TASK OF REBUILDING OUR RELATIONS AND STOOD READY TO COOPERATE IN THOSE AREAS WHERE IRAN FELT WE COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE. CHARGE SAID WE SHARED COMMON INTERESTS AND ASSETS, SUCH AS OUR COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, WHICH COULD AID THIS REBUILDING.

4. ARDALAN REPLIED BY OFFERING HIS VISITORS A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE LONG AND FRUITFUL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. THE MEMORIES OF THOSE AMERICANS WHO WORKED IN IRAN IN THE EARLY YEARS AFTER IRAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL UPRISING WERE CHERISHED BY IRANIANS. ARDALAN SPOKE FONDLY OF DR. JORDAN, AN AMERICAN WHO HELPED ESTABLISH ALBORZ COLLEGE WHERE MANY IRANIANS HAD GOTTEN THEIR FIRST TASTE OF HIGHER EDUCATION. SIMILARLY, IRANIAN PATRIOTS REMEMBERED PEOPLE LIKE MORGAN SHUSTER AND HOWARD BASKERVILLE IN TABRIZ WHO SYMPATHIZED WITH THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. HE AGREED THAT THESE PAST RELATIONSHIPS WOULD INFLUENCE THE FUTURE. ARDALAN HOPED THAT THE NEW GROUP OF AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD HAVE THE SAME FEELING TOWARD IRAN.

5. TURNING TO SUBJECT OF BANK NATIONALIZATIONS, THE MINISTER EMPHASIZED THAT FOREIGN INTERESTS WOULD BE PROTECTED AND RESPECTED. THIS WAS REQUIRED BY BOTH

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ISLAMIC TRADITION AND GOVERNMENT LAW, HE SAID. NO TIME-TABLE EXISTED YET FOR THIS COMPENSATION AS THE PGOI, WORKING THROUGH A SPECIAL INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE, WAS STILL INVESTIGATING THE VARIOUS BANKS. IBRAHIM-ZADEH ADDED THAT THE COMMITTEE IS NOW IN THE VERGE OF MERGING THE NATION'S 36 BANKS INTO A FEW MAJOR BANKS, PERHAPS FIVE OR SIX.

6. CHARGE THEN RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF REACTIVATING THE U.S.-IRAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OR THE BUSINESS COUNCIL AS A WAY OF IMPROVING THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN AMERICAN AND IRANIAN FIRMS. ARDALAN SAID HE WAS IN FAVOR OF DOING THIS ALTHOUGH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MATTERS LIKE THE CHAMBER OR COUNCIL RESTED WITH THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE. ARDALAN'S MINISTRY WOULD BE WILLING TO BACK UP ANY PROPOSAL PUT FORTH BY THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE. LOOKING FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD, DID THE MINISTER SEE ANY ROLE FOR THE JOINT COMMISSION? THE CHARGE SAID WE WERE NOT PUSHING THE COMMISSION BUT WANTED TO SEEK ARDALAN'S VIEWS. THE MINISTER FELT THAT IDEA WAS BASICALLY GOOD, BUT HE HAD NO PARTICULAR VIEWS ON TIMING. THIS SUBJECT WOULD NEED STUDY BY THE INTERESTED PARTS OF THE PGOI.

7. CHARGE USED CASE OF GTE AS ILLUSTRATION OF WHAT WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO AVOID. MINISTER WAS BASICALLY AWARE OF PROBLEM BUT HAD NO REAL INVOLVEMENT IN THIS DISPUTE, WHICH HE HOPED COULD BE SOLVED THROUGH DIALOGUE RATHER THAN COURTS. ARDALAN THEN WENT ON TO MAKE WHAT WAS PROBABLY HIS CENTRAL MESSAGE DURING MEETING: U.S. SHOULD AVOID FORMING IMPRESSIONS OR DRAWING CONCLUSIONS ABOUT IRAN BASED ON THE RUMORS BEING FLOATED IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE BY IRANIANS WHO HAD FLED DURING THE REVOLUTION. ARDALAN SAID THESE PEOPLE--"ANTI-REVOLUTIONARIES"-- WERE TRYING TO UNDERMINE IRAN'S CREDITWORTHINESS BY SPREADING LIES. ARDALAN EMPHASIZED THAT "WE ARE GOING TO PAY EVERY PENNY WE OWE."

8. REFERRING TO ARDALAN'S COMMENTS ON "IMAGE," CHARGE EXPRESSED REGRET OVER EXPULSION OF NEW YORK TIMES CORRESPONDENT YUSSEF IBRAHIM. CHARGE SAID THIS KIND OF ACTION CANNOT CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE. THE PICTURE OF THE REVOLUTION WILL BECOME LESS BALANCED IF IRAN CONTINUES TO EXPEL JOURNALISTS. ARDALAN TOOK NOTE OF THESE REMARKS BUT OFFERED NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLY, SAYING ONLY THAT IT SHOULD BE RAISED WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY.

CONFIDENTIAL

3

9. ALTHOUGH MEETING WAS SOMEWHAT SHORT ON SUBSTANCE, IT WAS VERY CORDIAL IN TONE. THE MINISTER CONVEYS A PROFESSIONAL IMAGE AND DOES NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING A FORCEFUL PERSONALITY. WE SUSPECT THAT HE LOOKS TO HIS ARTICULATE AND ENERGETIC DEPUTY, IBRAHIM-ZADEH, FOR DIRECTION. ZADEH, FOR INSTANCE, SEEMED MORE POSITIVE ON THE WORK OF THE BANKING COMMITTEE AND ON THE REJUVENATION OF THE BUSINESS COUNCIL.

10. COMMENT: MEETING ENDED ON A PERSIAN NOTE. AS WE WERE TAKING OUR LEAVE, IBRAHIM-ZADEH DREW DEPTOFF ASIDE. HE SAID HE HAD SOME FRIENDS. THEY NEEDED VISAS. COULD WE DO ANYTHING FOR THEM... END COMMENT. LAIGEN##

مهدی بازرگان - ۱

Post Tehran

Date of preparation June 21, 1951

CONFIDENTIAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Note.—Consult *Diplomatic Serial 5355 of April 10, 1941*, and references therein. Forms are to be prepared on typewriter in triplicate, one copy for files and two for Department.

Name BAZARGAN Mehdi
(Surname) (Given names)
Nationality Iranian Title, if any Engineer
Date and place of birth about 1907, in Tehran
Head of Provisional Board of Management,
Position Nationalization Board Date appointed June 6, 1951
Party affiliations National Front
Previous career See below

Language(s) spoken Persian, French

Attitude toward and service in the United States

Family details Father is Hajj Abbas Gholi Bazargan, prominent bazaar merchant.
Family highly religious. Married, one son.

REMARKS: (Should present a brief word picture of the individual, including race, religion, fraternal affiliations, education, reputation, personality, influences, attitude toward other nations, etc.)

Education: School of Technology, University of Tehran.
Central Technical College, France.

Career:

1931: Completed his studies in Iran and left for France.
1931-36: Studied at Central Technical College, France.
1936-date: Professor of Higher Engineering, University of Tehran.
1942-date: Dean of Engineering College, University of Tehran.
1943-45: President of the "Union of Engineers," Iran.
May 16, 1950: Under-Secretary of Education (Technical)
May 13, 1951: Elected to head Provisional Board of Management, Nationalization Board.

Remarks:

Bazargan is a highly religious man, almost verging on fanaticism, who observes all Moslem rites assiduously and writes profusely on religious matters. He is a devotee of Keshani and is close to other members of the National Front.

Though narrow-minded on subjects relating to Islam and its precepts, Bazargan is otherwise an intelligent man of some vision, well-versed in engineering and conscientious about his work. One British source who had worked with him at the University reported that he was easy to work with, receptive to new ideas, and constructive in his own ideas.

Bazargan has no strong antipathies toward foreigners, but is considered anti-Communist, interested in ridding the University of Tudeh influences.

Prepared by Mary Ruth Parrish/ Kurish Shahbazi

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SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA

May 8, 1952

BAZARGAN, Mehdi

Supplementing Embassy's CRD of June 21, 1951.

Career:

May 7, 1952: Resigned as Head of Provisional Board of Directors, NIOC.

Remarks:

Bazargan's resignation reportedly came about as a result of serious differences with Hosein MAKI, member of the Joint Oil Committee and influential in the entire nationalization movement. It is believed that the two men had been at odds for some time, and that in meetings of the Committee MAKI accused Bazargan of incompetence and inefficiency. MAKI reportedly also resented the fact that Bazargan was supporting Dr. Baghai's candidate for election to the Majlis from Abadan rather than his own.

Bazargan remains in his position as Dean of the Engineering College, University of Tehran.

Referral/any
May 8, 1952

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SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA

October 28, 1952

BAZARGAN, Mehdi

Supplementing Embassy's CBD of June 21, 1951; and Embassy's Supplement of May 8, 1952.

Career:

While Bazargan was serving on the Provisional Board of Directors of the NIOC, Abdel Hosein Khalili officiated for him as Dean of the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Tehran. In the Spring of 1952 it was decided that Khalili should hold this position on a permanent basis; consequently Bazargan is now simply a member of the Engineering Faculty.

Organizations:

President, Union of Engineers of Iran.

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BAZARGAN, Mehdi

thus lost all credit in the clerical milieu but still has some prestige as a former leading deputy; Dr. Ali Akbar Afsar FAYAZ, a former Dean of the Faculty of Letters in Isfahan and former deputy, who is regarded as a good scholar; Mohammad SHAKIBI-LESLI, who teaches principles of Sunni jurisprudence and whose influence is limited by his Sunni background; Dr. Hajjtaba KILABI, regarded as one of the best Islamic scholars in Iran but also as erratic and eccentric; and Dr. Abol Hossain ZARINKOUB, an honest, hard-working scholar with no outside interests and respected as such.

5. Other Faculties: The most "political" faculty at the University of Tehran has long been the Faculty of Technology whose stormy petrel, Professor Mehdi BAZARGAN, leader of the Freedom Movement of Iran, is currently in jail after having been convicted on charges of treason. According to all reports, Bazargan is still highly popular at the Faculty of Technology, even among students who generally remain aloof from political matters. Two other professors at that faculty, Abol Hossain SHIRAZI and Hossain SHIRAZI, have also been identified as National Fronters (A-351). On the other hand, Professor Ahmad HAJI, who broke with Khomeini in 1952 and became one of his leading opponents, is also respected for professional competence and personal courage.

The university has a Council for Scientific Research on which are found some of its more important scientists. Its chairman is Ghassemlou Jahed and its vice chairman is Professor Hossain Firda (see Law Faculty). One of the most respected members is Professor Mohammad Hossain KATIBI-SHAKIBI, a research scholar in parasitology and head of the Institute of Public Health Research. A modest man, he does not on brief acquaintance give evidence of the exceptional qualities that some of our university contacts attribute to him. (One of them said he is "very popular and highly respected," another said "you can put him in charge of any organization.") Dr. Amanatollah ROCHANI-FAR, another member of the Council, and the head of the Department of Physics, is said to be much respected and interested in socio-political ideas. Dr. Ali Asgar AZAD, Professor of the Science College and Chief of the Atomic Center of the University, is a respected scientist but a poor administrator. Dr. Nader SHARI, Dean of the Faculty of Pharmacology, is a respected constitutionalist and may speak out if the climate changes even slightly. Dr. Hossain RAHMATIAN of the Cancer Research Institute, is said to have latent influence due to his integrity, his courage, and his known interest in political and social problems. Professor Hossain KASHTRUDI, a leading mathematician and member of the Council, has philosophical interests extending beyond his discipline. He has been noted, and continues to be noted, as one professor who has repaid the hostility shown to him in the Soviet Union with panegyrics about the advanced state of mathematics in that country, comparing that progress favorably with the status of the science in the United States.

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page 9, Desp. No. 486
from: AmEmbassy Tehran

Mehdi BAZARGAN was active in the petroleum affairs of the Mosadeq government and in a number of other projects involving his engineering talents. Today he is one of the four or five most active and trusted nationalists and should be classified in the young activist group. He is a partner in three construction firms: No Kar, YAD and the new Arbel Company. All three companies hire many of the active nationalists among Tehran's engineers. The YAD Company title is an abbreviation for the Farsi which means Eleven "University Professors and is an excellent example of the nationalist ties between the old Mosadeqists, the construction industry and the University. Bazargan is a strongly religious man and is a leader of the Anjomane Fatimate Islami (Society for Islamic Instruction), an organization which meets for religious observances from time to time and which has obvious political undertones. Finally, Bazargan is again on the engineering faculty of the University of Tehran. He was one of a group of about a dozen professors removed from the faculty for political reasons in 1954, but he was reinstated and has been teaching again for almost three years.

BAZARGAN, Mehdi

p8

مهدی بازرگان - 7 CONF

See A-351 from Tehran Dec. 21, 1963: The Iranian
Intellectual Community (filed under Mahdavy, Hossein)

FORM: PG-486
4-23-67

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Chief, Political Section

7 November 1963
P-21/63

CAS

Trial of FNI Leaders

The following is for your information and whatever use you may wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information need not cite CAS as the source. The source is a former official (S) in the Mosadeq government with good contacts among opposition leaders from a Freedom Movement of Iran leader (F).

1. Since the government was not allowing outsiders to attend the trial against Mehdi Basmagha, Ayatollah Sayed Mahmud Taleqani, Yadollah Sahabi, and others, the Freedom Movement of Iran (FNI) leaders refused to speak anymore at the trial. They also told their lawyers that they were not to defend them anymore. The FNI leaders were particularly unhappy about the lack of newspaper coverage.

2. The government then brought in a few newspapermen from small newspapers, who reported only what the prosecutor said. The FNI leaders decided to continue their silence. The government insisted that in a military trial the accused had no right to dismiss their defense lawyers. At this point, retired General Baharnast, lawyer for the defense, said that inasmuch as the FNI leaders had dismissed him he would be unable to defend them anymore. At this point the trial was recessed. (Comment: See P-19/63 for an account of the trial session on 27 October in which the FNI leaders refused to speak or allow the defense counsels to speak for them.) General Hossein Zamanli, who is chief judge, continues to express sympathy for the FNI leaders and complain that he must do his duty.

3. The government continues to put out feelers to the FNI prisoners, and has said that if they would forget their opposition to the Shah, the government might let the trial wither away. Basmagha, Taleqani, and Sahabi have rejected such proposals.

4. During the trial, Taleqani has not spoken at all. Basmagha has spoken only about the court's being incompetent to try them and has condemned the lack of a jury. (Comment: A number of sources report that the FNI leaders are gaining popularity in opposition circles through this trial and their uncompromising attitude toward the government.)

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مهدی بازرگان - ۷

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum NOFORN/INTERNAL USE ONLY

TO : Chief, Political Section

DATE: 21 January 1964

P-50/64

FROM : CAS *h*


SUBJECT: Refusal by Dr. Mehdi Bazargan of Special Visiting Privilege

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control NOFORN but need not cite CAS as the source. The source is a former member of the National Front Central Council.

On 20 January 1964 it was arranged through Police Chief General Nasiri that Mrs. Mehdi Bazargan and her five children, the youngest one ten months of age, could go to the jail and meet with Dr. Mehdi Bazargan, recently sentenced to ten years in solitary confinement in the Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI) trials. Mrs. Bazargan and children went to the jail and waited to see Dr. Bazargan. After over an hour of waiting Dr. Bazargan sent the family a note stating that there were nine persons sentenced for FMI activities, and if he visited with his family, it would mean that he had accepted a special privilege, which he refused to do. None of the prisoners have been permitted visitors.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

21-11-80

S.C. 11860: CBS 1/20/80 (SULLIVAN, ILLINOIS) -
 TIME: 1:55, PM
 S.C. 11860: DISCUSSION WITH PRINCE (SULLIVAN) OF
 11/20/80 "MISSION"

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ONE OF PRINCIPAL ITEMS WHICH I RAISED IN MARCH 19
 RELATION WITH BAZARGAN AND ENTEZAM WAS STATUS AND FUTURE
 OF OUR ARMISH-MAAG MISSION. I REMINDED THEM THAT IN
 OUR LAST CONVERSATION BAZARGAN HAD ASKED ME TO RETAIN
 THE NUCLEUS OF THE MISSION HERE IN TEHRAN WHILE HIS
 GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED HOW IT WISHED TO PROCEED. NEARLY
 FOUR WEEKS HAD GONE BY WITHOUT ANY ACTION AND I SAID
 I WOULD APPRECIATE HIS CURRENT THOUGHTS.

3. I POINTED OUT THAT GENERAL GAST AND MR. LAMARCA
 HAD MET WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO
 DISCUSS THIS SAME SUBJECT, BUT RECEIVED NO HP, NO CLEAR
 INDICATIONS OF GOI THINKING. I REVIEWED FRUSTRATION
 AND HARASSMENT MILITARY MISSION WAS UNDERGOING IN ITS
 EFFORTS TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO ITS RECORDS, U.S. GOVERN-
 MENT PROPERTY AND PERSONAL POSSESSIONS, AND SAID THESE
 MATTERS NEEDED SPEEDY RESOLUTION.

4. BAZARGAN SAID HE REALIZED HE HAD BEEN SLOW IN GIVING
 ME SOME GUIDANCE ON THIS SUBJECT AND THANKED ME FOR OUR
 PATIENCE. HE PERSONALLY FELT THAT IRAN NEEDED TO HAVE
 SOME SORT OF CONTINUING MILITARY LOGISTICS RELATIONSHIP
 WITH THE UNITED STATES, BUT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NOT
 YET DECIDED WHAT FORM IT SHOULD TAKE. HE ASKED ME TO
 RETAIN OUR SMALL ARMISH-MAAG GROUP THROUGH THE NEW RUZ
 HOLIDAY PERIOD AND PROMISED TO HAVE SOME FURTHER DIS-
 CUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT AFTER THAT PERIOD.

5. HE THEN EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT ARMISH WAS STILL
 HAVING PROBLEMS ON ACCESS AND OTHER SIMILAR MATTERS.
 HE GAVE ENTEZAM SOME INSTRUCTIONS IN FARSI AND TOLD ME
 THAT HE HOPED TO HAVE AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF OUR PROBLEMS.

6. HE AND ENTEZAM THEN SAID THEY WERE HAVING GREAT
 DIFFICULTY GETTING A HANDLE ON OUTSTANDING CONTRACTUAL
 OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. ON MILITARY EQUIP-
 MENT. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE TRUST
 FUND AND HOW IT WORKED. IT SEEMED THAT SOME "KOMITAY"
 HAD TAKEN ALL THE RECORDS FROM GENERAL TOUFANIAN'S
 OFFICE AND NOBODY IN THE GOVERNMENT KNEW WHERE THEY WERE.

7. I SAID THAT GENERAL GAST HAD DISCUSSED THESE SUBJECTS
 WITH MINISTER MADANI AND HAD LEFT HIM SOME DOCUMENTS.
 HOWEVER, UNTIL ARMISH COULD HAVE ACCESS TO ITS FILES,
 IT COULD NOT BUT NOT PROVIDE GREATER DETAILS.

SULLIVAN

-13-

22

PP RUEHC
DE RUONHR #2846 2701325
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111145Z MAR 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 282
BT
UNCLAS TEHRAN 2846

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PDIP, ASMR, AFIN, IR
SUBJ: ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DAMAGES SUSTAINED DURING
FEB 14 ATTACK ON EMBASSY

WE RECEIVED ON MARCH 11 A LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER
BAZARGAN DATED MARCH 1 EXPRESSING REGRETS FOR THE FEB 14
ATTACK ON THE EMBASSY AND GOI WILLINGNESS TO REIMBURSE
US OFR THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED. THE FULL TEXT OF THE
LETTER, COMPLETE WITH SPELLING AND OTHER ERRORS, FOLLOWS:

QUOTE THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF IRAN
PRESENT THEIR COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, AND WHILE EXPRESSING THEIR DEEP REGRET
AT THE INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON FEB 14, 1979, WOULD
LIKE TO STATE THAT THE SAID REGRETTABLE OCCURRENCE WAS
INSTIGATED BY ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS. THE GOVERN-
MENT HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO PREVENT SERIOUSLY THE
REPETITION OF SUCH INCIDENTS.

QUOTE IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE REGRETS OF THIS GOVERN-
MENT BE COMMUNICATED TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

QUOTE FURTHERMORE, THIS GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO DECLARE
THEIR READINESS TO INDEMNIFY THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE
ABOVE INCIDENT.

QUOTE THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF IRAN
AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW THE
ASSURANCES OF THEIR HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. END QUOTE.

(SIGNED) MENDI BAZARGAN, PRIME MINISTER.

SULLIVAN

BT
#2846

مدي بازگشت ۱۱-۰۸-۸۵

CONFIDENTIAL 003103 DRAFTER:GBLambra

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 449
E.O. 12065: GDS 3/20/85 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, IR

SUBJECT: March 30th Referendum

1. C - entire text.
2. During meeting with Prime Minister March 19, Ambassador asked if timing and form of forthcoming referendum will remain as advertised, ~~██████████~~ ██████████. Bazargan replied affirmatively ~~██████████~~ ██████████ but noted he himself is not involved in preparations for the referendum. They are being handled by Interior Minister with the assistance of a special commission. He implied that he could not be absolutely categoric but believed the referendum would go through on March 30th with a single question to which voters would be asked to reply Yes or No.
3. Bazargan agreed there were many people sniping at the format of the referendum, but he said as far as he knew referenda are always Yes or No propositions to a single question. He hoped to explain all this to the critics and reduce the political controversy on the question.

SULLIVAN

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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
FROM: AMEMBASSY, TEHRAN
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC (ACT 100-100000)
FROM: AMEMBASSY TEHRAN (ACT 100-100000)
SUBJECT: AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 100-100000
100-100000
100-100000
100-100000

LINE 15

100-100000 (SULLIVAN, WILLIAM)
100-100000, PERS, IN, PERS, US, PERS
100-100000 WITH PHILIP D. ZABRAN, MARCH 10

1. (S - WIRE TEXT.)

2. I MET FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR AFTERNOON MARCH 10
MINISTER ZABRAN. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM AND I BROUGHT ALONG
POLITICAL COUNSELOR LAMBRANIS.

3. WE WERE SURPRISED ON OUR ARRIVAL TO FIND TWO
PHOTOGRAPHERS AND AN MTV CAMERAMAN IN ATTENDANCE.
IN AN OBVIOUSLY PRE-ARRANGED MOVE, ZABRAN DRESSED ME
EFFUSIVELY "ON CAMERA" AND CLEARLY WENT OUT OF HIS WAY
TO DEMONSTRATE WARM PERSONAL RELATIONS. WHILE THE
CAMERAMEN WERE STILL IN THE ROOM, ZABRAN CONGRATULATED ME
ON HIS SUCCESS IN STOPPING SUMMARY EXECUTIONS. BUT
I DO NOT YET BELIEVE THERE WAS A SOUND RECORDING
OF OUR CONVERSATION.

4. OUR DISCUSSION THEN RANGED OVER A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS
WHICH WILL BE REPORTED BY SEPARATE TELEGRAMS. HOWEVER,
ONE OF MY PRINCIPAL POINTS CONCERNED THE NEED FOR ASSISTANCE
IN PHYSICAL SECURITY OF EMBASSY CONTINGENTS AGAINST
ATTACKS GENERATED BY PLO AND FEDAYEEN IN THE WAKE OF
AN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY. ZABRAN SAID HE
COULD PASS WORD "INDIRECTLY" TO LOCAL PLO REPRESENTATIVE
THAT GOVERNMENT DID NOT WANT ANY VIOLENCE AGAINST
AMERICAN EMBASSY. HE ALSO SAID THAT IN THE EVENT
FORCES WERE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO REMOVE AMERICAN
AND PREVENT DIFFICULTIES.

5. AS OTHER REPORTING CABLES WILL INDICATE, CONVERSATION
WAS FRIENDLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE THROUGHOUT. ZABRAN
ZABRAN AND ENTEZAM DISPLAYED A STRONG OPPOSITION
TO SOVIETS AND DESIRE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE RELATIONS WITH U.S.
AT SAME TIME, DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT MAJOR CONCERN IS THE
GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL OVER EMBASSY AND LOCAL POLICE
IS ITS FUTURE. SULLIVAN

12-05-1979
CONFIDENTIAL

000,11
DRAFTER:GBLambrakis

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 455
INFO: AMEMBASSY AMMAN 005 RUEHAM
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 002 RUEHMBE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 012 RUEHFC
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 005 RUEHDM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 011 RUEHRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON 020 RUDETC
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 004 RUEHTV

TAGS: PEPR, XF, IR
LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 3/20/99 (Lambrakis, G.B.) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR, IR, XF
LIMDIS

SUBJECT: Iranian Position on Middle East Negotiations

1. C - entire text.
2. During meeting with Prime Minister Bazargan and his deputy Amir Entezam, March 19, Ambassador adverted to President Carter's efforts in the Middle East and said he had been asked to inform the Prime Minister that chances were good for signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in the coming week or so. Bazargan replied that he and his government have been too busy with internal affairs to keep up even with the newspapers and therefore have not really taken a position on the treaty. Amir Entezam broke in to say he had not yet had a chance to brief the Prime Minister because of the press of business, but Amir Entezam, as spokesman, had told the press this morning that Iran opposes any treaty or other moves which are against the interests of the Palestinians.
4. The Ambassador then went over the arguments in favor

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of the peace process, noting that the PLO and some others do not seem to appreciate the value of an autonomous Palestinian state on the West Bank as a step toward permanent solution of the Arab-Israeli problem. Bazargan did not reply directly, but asked what provisions this treaty process would make for the plight of the Shias in southern Lebanon who feel themselves between the Palestinian and Israeli guns and are getting hurt. The Ambassador noted that Pol Counselor Lambrakis, who was accompanying him, had spent time in Lebanon and was aware of the Shia problem there. The Ambassador and Lambrakis then noted that, while there nothing specific about the Shias in Lebanon ~~in~~ in the present negotiations, ~~their success~~ ^{a Treaty} will help create an environment which should minimize friction in southern Lebanon, we hope. In any case, we are aware of Iran's interest in the Shia situation in Lebanon.

Bazargan said in passing that another reason GOI has not focused on the problem has been the illness of Foreign Minister Sanjabi. He has a slipped disk in his back and tried coming back to work March 18, but has had to return to his bed, where he needs a long rest. (This appears to conflict ~~with~~ with newspaper reports that Sanjabi delivered a speech as planned at the NIOC Building in Tehran March 19, and with ~~other reports~~).

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3

from head of MFA American Dept. that Sanjabi worked a full day (until 2:00 p.m.) at MFA March 19 and may 'be delivering a political speech March 20. Is Bazargan misinformed, or is he anxious to squelch reports of Sanjabi's tendered resignation?)

6. Comment: Awareness in GOI of Lebanese Shias is something USG should keep in mind. It is possible this will give us a handle to interest GOI in the Middle East problem on behalf of the ongoing peace process, countering to a certain degree the hold Palestinians have gained over the Islamic movement here.

SULLIVAN 

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STATE
CHG: CWNAAS
POL: JDSTEMPEL
NONE
POL(3) CHG ECON ICA OR

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANANA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USLO RIYADH
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINCPAC

E.O. 12065: XDS-4 5/6/09 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, PINS, IR
SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) THIS IS A REPORTING CABLE.
2. SUMMARY: CHARGE REVIEWED U.S. DESIRE TO NORMALIZE U.S.-IRAN TIES, NOTED PROPAGANDA AGAINST USG, AND STRESSED U.S. IS NOT IN ANY WAY INTERVENING IN IRANIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. BAZARGAN STRESSED HIS PERSONAL

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COMMITMENT TO GOOD U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS, AND STRESSED PGOI DESIRE FOR GOOD, EVEN EXPANDED, ECONOMIC TIES WITH U.S. PM SOUGHT FAVORABLE USG ATTITUDE TOWARD PROBLEMS OF CONTRACT TERMINATION AND CONTINUANCE. BAZARGAN OPINED IT WOULD TAKE ANOTHER ONE/TWO MONTHS TO HAVE A DRAFT CONSTITUTION READY, BUT SAID ELECTORAL LAW FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY HAS JUST BEEN COMPLETED. BAZARGAN-ENTEZAM BIO NOTE. END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE, ACCOMPANIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS STEMPER CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN MORNING MAY 6. DEPUTY PM AMIR ENTEZAM WAS PRESENT AND TRANSLATED, THOUGH IT WAS APPARENT THAT BAZARGAN UNDERSTOOD MOST OF WHAT WAS BEING SAID IN ENGLISH. MEETING OPENED ON WARM NOTE OF GREETING ALL AROUND. CHARGE SPOKE IN TERMS TO THOSE HE HAD USED WITH OTHER MINISTERS: U.S. ACCEPTS RESULTS OF IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND WISHES NEW PGOI SUCCESS. USG STRONGLY DESIRES TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS TO EXTENT AND AT PACE PGOI DESIRES. U.S. SUPPORTS IRAN'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC STABILITY.

4. NOTING THAT THERE HAS BEEN MUCH ANTI-U.S. PROPAGANDA IN SPEECHES AND MEDIA, CHARGE STRESSED THAT U.S. IS NOT INTERVENING AND WILL NOT INTERVENE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN. PRIME MINISTER WELCOMED CHARGE'S STATEMENT WITH THANKS. CHARGE SAID IF EVER DOUBT AROSE ON THIS SCORE, BAZARGAN OR SENIOR OFFICIALS SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO CALL CHARGE OR AMBASSADOR, WHEN HE ARRIVES. TIMELY FRANKNESS WAS GOOD WAY TO MINIMIZE MISUNDERSTANDING.

5. BAZARGAN RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORED GOOD U.S.-IRAN TIES, ALLUDING TO VALUE OF HIS PREVIOUS MEETINGS WITH AMB SULLIVAN AND POLOFF. GOOD RELATIONS WITH U.S. WERE PERSONAL BELIEF FOR PRIME MINISTER, AND WHEN FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI'S APPOINTMENT WAS BEING CONSIDERED, PM HAD QUESTIONED YAZDI ON THIS POINT HIMSELF UNTIL HE WAS ASSURED THAT YAZDI SUPPORTED FRIENDLY TIES WITH U.S. PGOI FEELS U.S. DOES INDEED WANT IRAN TO BE A STRONG POWER, AND BAZARGAN JUDGED U.S. WAS SINCERE IN WANTING GOOD RELATIONS. IF U.S. AGREES THAT IRANIAN INTERPRETATION OF U.S. INTENTIONS IS CORRECT, QUOTE WE BELIEVE THAT YOUR NEW AMBASSADOR WILL BE ABLE TO HELP US. UNQUOTE BAZARGAN THEN SAID IF USG HAD ANY INFORMATION THAT WOULD HELP IRAN DEFEND ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM ITS ENEMIES, QUOTE WE WILL APPRECIATE IT IF YOU CAN PASS IT TO US. UNQUOTE HE INDICATED DEPUTY

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PM ENTEZAM SHOULD BE CONTACT FOR THIS PURPOSE.

6. PM NOTED THAT U.S. AND IRAN HAD HAD GOOD ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS. NEW PGOI WANTED SAME, PERHAPS EXPANDED, ECONOMIC TIES. MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WOULD OF COURSE CHANGE. WEAPONS PURCHASES WOULD STOP, BUT PGOI NEEDED TECHNICAL HELP AND SPARE PARTS. PGOI HOPED AND EXPECTED TO HAVE FAVORABLE USG HELP IN SETTLING QUESTIONS OF CONTRACT TERMINATION AND RENEWAL. ENTEZAM ADDED THAT PGOI WANTED USG QUOTE NOT TO BE AGAINST US UNQUOTE ON DECISIONS WHETHER TO RENEW CONTRACTS OR NOT. ENTEZAM NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION; THAT \$8 MILLION IN SPARE PARTS WAS STILL WAITING IN TEXAS FOR SHIPMENT TO IRAN, AND URGED SOME ACTION ON THIS MATTER. CHARGE SAID HE WOULD CHECK ON IT, BUT THOUGHT SHIPMENT OF WHOLE \$8 MILLION WORTH HAD BEGUN SOME DAYS EARLIER. (MISSION BELIEVES AT LEAST ONE PLANELOAD HAS ALREADY ARRIVED; DETAILS WILL BE FORWARDED TO PGOI.) ENTEZAM ASKED FURTHER QUESTION ABOUT REPORTED ARRIVAL OF NINE U.S. MILITARY PLANES. CHARGE SAID THESE WERE NINE CARGO PLANES TO TAKE OUT BACKLOG OF HOUSEHOLD SHIPMENTS AND THAT PLANES WERE COMING AT RATE OF ONE OR TWO PER DAY, NOT ALL AT ONCE. ENTEZAM NOTED THIS WITH SATISFACTION.

7. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM CHARGE, PM DEVOTED A FEW MINUTES TO BROAD BRUSH OVERVIEW OF REVOLUTION, NOTING THAT HE WAS MERELY ELABORATING ON HIS RECENT TV TALK. IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAS SUCCEEDED VERY RAPIDLY. THIS BROUGHT MANY DIFFICULTIES, BUT PGOI WAS TRYING TO GET TOGETHER AND BEGIN TO MEET ITS PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY SECURITY. ENTEZAM ADDED THAT PGOI HAD SUPPORT OF QUOTE 99 PERCENT OF PEOPLE UNQUOTE WHO ARE WILLING TO GIVE UP A GREAT DEAL TO MAKE REVOLUTION SUCCEED. CONCERNED THAT RECENT KILLINGS OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENT LEADERS (GEN QARANI AND AYATOLLAH MOTAHARI) HAD INCREASED ANXIETY, BAZARGAN SAID THESE PROBLEMS WOULD BE OVERCOME. NEW DRAFT CONSTITUTION WAS BEING WORKED ON, BUT IT WOULD TAKE ONE TO TWO MONTHS FOR IT TO BE READY FOR RELEASE TO PUBLIC IN FINAL FORM. MEANWHILE, NEW ELECTORAL LAW HAD JUST BEEN COMPLETED, SO ADMINISTRATIVE PREPARATIONS FOR ELECTIONS OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WERE WELL ALONG. TWO OR THREE MONTHS MORE WOULD PROBABLY BE

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NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THIS PROCESS; THIS WAS EXAMPLE OF PROBLEM WHICH GREW FROM RAPID SUCCESS OF REVOLUTION. (COMMENT: BAZARGAN AND ENTEZAM APPEARED SINCERELY POSITIVE, BUT THEY WENT TO SOME MODEST PAINS TO PAINT GOOD PICTURE OF REVOLUTION GRADUALLY CONSOLIDATING ITS GAINS. SINCE DISCUSSION CAME AT END OF MEETING, CHARGE DID NOT PUSH FOR THEIR REACTION TO HARD QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. VIEW GIVEN ABOVE IS PROBABLY AS CLOSE TO AN APPROVED QUOTE PARTY LINE UNQUOTE FOR THE ISLAMIC PGOI AS CAN BE FOUND.)

8. ENTEZAM AND BAZARGAN: ENTEZAM IS NOW CLEARLY PM'S RIGHT HAND MAN. HE HAS BEEN CLOSE TO BAZARGAN FOR SOME YEARS, BUT REALLY CAME INTO HIS OWN JUST BEFORE AND JUST AFTER SUCCESS OF REVOLUTION. DEPARTURE OF YAZDI FROM PRIME MINISTERIAL ENTOURAGE HAS GIVEN ENTEZAM GREATER ROLE IN GENERAL POLITICS OF PGOI, INCLUDING FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHICH WERE VIRTUAL YAZDI PRESERVE. ENTEZAM IS ABOUT 48, A 1963 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY PHD IN ECONOMICS, AND HAS HAD HIS OWN PRIVATE CONSULTING FIRM FOR SEVERAL YEARS. WITHIN LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) HE ROSE TO POSITION ON CENTRAL GOVERNING BODY OVER PAST TWO YEARS AND WAS ONE OF THOSE CHOSEN BY BAZARGAN FOR GOVERNMENTAL POSITION BECAUSE OF HIS MODERATE VIEWS. HE WAS CHIEF CHALLENGER OF CURRENT TEHRANMAYOR TAVAKOLI, WHO REPRESENTED THE LEFTIST FACTION OF THE LMI. BAZARGAN CHOSE ENTEZAM TO REPLACE TAVAKOLI AS THE LMI'S PRINCIPAL DAY TO DAY CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSY SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTIONS SUCCESS.

9. BOTH ENTEZAM AND BAZARGAN SHARE A WESTERN INTELLECTUAL VIEW OF THE WORLD AND THE WAY OF LIFE SHOULD BE ORIENTATED. THOUGH RELIGIOUS (BAZARGAN MORE SO THAN ENTEZAM), BOTH IMPLICITLY BELIEVE MORE IN WESTERN RATIONALIST CONCEPTS THAN THEIR THEOLOGICAL ALLIES IN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. DURING THIS MEETING BAZARGAN LOOKED HEALTHY AND ALERT. NAAS##

مهدی بازرگان-۱۵

Tehran, Iran

May 24, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As you know, a series of large demonstrations to protest the recent resolution by the United States Senate are planned for this afternoon and tomorrow. I am deeply disturbed that at no time since the preparations of the demonstrations were announced have I seen any action or appeal by the Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure that the public actions will be peaceful. I urge that the Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran take whatever steps are necessary to call for calm and a peaceful atmosphere.

Your Government is aware that the U.S. Administration has been making a maximum effort to improve relations, restore our ties to a normal course, and limit to the extent possible emotional or misinformed responses. We have no ability to control statements from the American press or the U.S. Congress. We have done our best, however, to present a factual picture of events in Iran and to describe to all interested American parties the mutual interest and concerns we share with Iran.

We are concerned by the phenomenon of increasing anti-Americanism in Iran, much of which seems to be based on a popular misunderstanding of the attitude of this Administration.

I have been instructed by my Government to express its concern that the demonstrations today and tomorrow

His Excellency,
Eng. Mehdi Bazargan,
Prime Minister,
Tehran.

may threaten the safety of American Embassy personnel in Tehran. We would like the Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to consider additional measures to provide protection in the emotionally-charged circumstances. The United States Government expects the Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to fulfill its internationally recognized responsibilities to protect the lives and property of foreign diplomatic personnel.

In order to reduce the possibility of violence, I would like to suggest that the demonstrations be routed away from the Embassy and prevented from approaching the walls of the Embassy.

Mr. Prime Minister, as I had expressed to you personally, our two countries and peoples have much in common to provide a firm foundation for a good relationship in the future based on mutual respect. I sincerely hope that your Government will take whatever steps are necessary to cool the present atmosphere so that both of us can go about our work in improving our relations in the interest of both of our peoples.

With high esteem,

Sincerely,

Charles W. Naas
Charge d'Affaires, a. i.

CONFIDENTIAL ۱۷-۵۰۰-۱۷

TEHRAN 4703

R 070839Z MAY 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1289
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 04703

CHRG: STATE
APPRV: CHG: CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL: JDSTMPPL
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL(3) CHG OR
ICA ECON RF

NEA FOR AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN

E.O. 12865: IDS-4 5/7/89 (STMPPL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, IR
SUBJ: MEETING WITH BAZARGAN

REF: TEHRAN 4579

DURING CHARGE MEETING WITH BAZARGAN (REFTEL), PRIME
MINISTER ASKED ABOUT AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN AND SAID HE
HAD WANTED TO SEE AMBASSADOR BEFORE HE LEFT. HE
REMINISCED BRIEFLY ON HIS MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR IN
VERY FLATTERING TERMS, WAS GENUINELY PLEASED THAT
AMBASSADOR HAD RETURNED SAFELY, AND ASKED AMBASSADOR
BE GIVEN HIS PERSONAL BEST WISHES. NAAS
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TEHRAN 4703

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 3424
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 179918

E.O. 12865 N/A

TAGS: PDIP, US, IR

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO FOURTH OF JULY MESSAGE TO THE
PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM PRIME MINI-
STER BAZARGAN FOR THE PRESIDENT: QUOTE ON BEHALF OF THE
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN I
WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, MY SINCERE
CONGRATULATIONS ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES. THE FOURTH OF JULY INVOKES THE MEMORY OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AN OCCASION THAT I DEEM FIT TO
SEIZE TO CONVEY, THROUGH YOU, OUR GOOD WISHES FOR THE
PROSPERITY AND WELL-BEING OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. UNQUOTE

2. FOLLOWING RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER SHOULD BE
DELIVERED TO PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN: QUOTE DEAR MR. PRIME
MINISTER: YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF BEST WISHES TO COMMEMORATE
THE ANNIVERSARY OF OUR INDEPENDENCE IS DEEPLY APPRECIATED.
THANK YOU-ON BEHALF OF THE-AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR YOUR THOUGHT-
FUL EXPRESSION OF FRIENDSHIP AND GOODWILL. SINCERELY,
JIMMY CARTER. UNQUOTE

3. NO RELEASE INTENDED, BUT NO OBJECTION IF RECIPIENT
WISHES TO DO SO. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL. VANCE
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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-293-323

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مهدی بازرگان-۱۸

Tehran, July 15, 1979.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver to you the following text of President Carter's response to your gracious message of congratulations on my country's Independence Day:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your kind message of best wishes to commemorate the anniversary of our independence is deeply appreciated. Thank you, on behalf of the American people, for your thoughtful expression of friendship and goodwill.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

I take this opportunity, Mr. Prime Minister, to express my own appreciation of your message and to record my gratitude for the warm welcome I have had since my arrival from both the government and people of Iran.

Sincerely yours,

L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Mehdi Bazargan,
Prime Minister of Iran,
Tehran.

پیام ۱۹-۸۶۰۸

TEHRAN 08970

TEHRAN 08970

Cherian

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHARGE: STATE 8/12
APPRV: CH3:LBIAIN31
DPRFD: POL:VL10MSELH/31H
CLAR: NONE
DISTR: POL CH3 RF

... 08970/1 221 44

NY 08970 22F

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3172

INFO RUEXJCS/SECDEF WASH DC IMMEDIATE

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 08970

P.O. 12065: GIS 8/12/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR, SOPN, MASS, CVIS, IR, ASEC

SUBJ: MEETING WITH PM BAZARGAN

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: I CALLED ON PM BAZARGAN AUGUST 11. FM YAZDI WAS PRESENT AS TRANSLATOR. FOLLOWING OPENING REMARKS ON OUR MUTUAL DESIRE FOR A FRUITFUL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, BAZARGAN SAID THAT THE PCOI IS DISAPPOINTED THAT U.S. PROMISES HAVE NOT BEEN BACKED UP BY ACTIONS. HE RAISED THREE PROBLEM AREAS: MILITARY SPARE PARTS, VISAS AND LACK OF A REPLACEMENT FOR AMBASSADOR CUTLER. I RESPONDED BY DETAILING WHAT WE HAVE DONE IN THE MILITARY SUPPLY AREA, POINTING OUT THAT THERE ARE ACTIONS WHICH THE PCOI MUST ALSO TAKE TO RESUME THE FLOW. I SAID THAT WE, TOO, ARE DISAPPOINTED BY OUR CONTINUING INABILITY TO GAIN ACCESS TO PROPERTIES AND RECORDS RELATED TO OUR PAST MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAN AND ASKED FOR HIS HELP IN THIS REGARD. ON VISAS, I TOLD BAZARGAN WHAT WE HAD BEEN DOING AND WHAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DO, BUT AGAIN SAID WE NEEDED PCOI COOPERATION IN REMOVING THE IRREGULAR SECURITY PRESENTLY ON OUR COMPOUND. I RAISED PCOI TREATMENT OF U.S. CORRESPONDENTS AS AN IRRITANT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. YAZDI RESPONDED WITH HIS NOW FAMILIAR CHARGES OF A CONSPIRACY IN THE U.S. MEDIA TO SLANDER THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. BAZARGAN WAS MORE DISPASSIONATE IN HIS VIEW OF THE PRESS. THE MEETING ENDED WITH AN APPEAL FROM BAZARGAN FOR CONCRETE ACTS ON OUR PART TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. GOODWILL TOWARD IRAN. I SAID WE HAD TRIED AND WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO DO THIS, BUT URGED IRAN TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE RATHER THAN TO DWELL ON THE PAST AND TO STATE WHAT ITS REVOLUTION WAS FOR AS WELL AS WHAT IT WAS AGAINST. END SUMMARY.

3. I BEGAN BY THANKING BAZARGAN FOR RECEIVING ME AS CHARGE WHICH I TOOK AS AN INDICATION OF THE PCOI'S DESIRE TO WORK WITH THE USG TO BUILD A BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP THAT TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE NEW REALITIES IN IRAN. I EXPRESSED MY GOVERNMENT'S WARMEST REGARDS AND RESPECT FOR HIM PERSONALLY AND THE PCOI. WE WANTED TO WORK WITH IRAN, I TOLD HIM, ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WOULD TAKE TIME AND PATIENCE TO DEVELOP A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP. WE HOPED THAT IN PURSUING THAT GOAL THERE WOULD BE RESTRAINT AND UNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES. I SAID THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT WE WERE READY TO HELP IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE THAT MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO IRAN'S STABILITY AND THE WELL-BEING OF ITS PEOPLE. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT WE COULD MAKE PRO-

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 08970/1

DESS IN BUILDING OUR RELATIONSHIP BECAUSE IT WAS THE DESIRE OF BOTH OUR PEOPLES THAT WE DO SO. WHILE WE HAD SOME PROBLEMS TO WORK OUT, WE HAD STRONG CONTINUING MUTUAL INTERESTS. ON OUR SIDE WE REGARDED THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE STABILITY OF IRAN AS IMPORTANT TO US BEFORE THE REVOLUTION AND JUST AS IMPORTANT TO US IN ITS AFTERMATH. I WOULD BE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON TOWARD THE END OF AUGUST AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO CARRY ANY MESSAGE HE MIGHT HAVE.

4. BAZARGAN RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM OTHERS IN THE PGOI WHOM I HAD SEEN THAT I HAD SHOWN UNDERSTANDING AND GOODWILL TOWARD THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND HIS GOVERNMENT. HE ESPECIALLY WELCOMED HEARING OF OUR SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. HE, TOO, HAD BEEN OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE RESTORATION OF GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. HE AND MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET, HE TOLD ME, HAD ALWAYS BEEN IN AGREEMENT ON THE DESIRABILITY OF CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE U.S., AND CONSEQUENTLY HAD BEEN PREPARED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS TO STAND UP PUBLICLY TO DEFEND IRAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH US, NOTWITHSTANDING THE HIGH LEVEL OF EMOTIONALISM IN THE REVOLUTION'S AFTERMATH AND ACCUSATIONS ABOUT U.S. INTERFERENCE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

5. UNFORTUNATELY, FROM IRAN'S POINT OF VIEW, BAZARGAN SAID, THE U.S. HAD NOT RESPONDED IN ANY POSITIVE WAY THAT THE PGOI COULD USE TO DEMONSTRATE THE WORTH OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH US TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. "YOU HAVE ONLY GIVEN LIP SERVICE TO BETTER RELATIONS," HE SAID, "AND WE HAVE ONLY HEARD PROMISES FROM YOU." AS AN EXAMPLE, HE CITED ASSURANCES GIVEN BY AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN AND CHARGE NAAS THAT MILITARY SPARE PARTS WOULD BE DELIVERED. "NOTHING HAS HAPPENED," HE SAID, "NOT EVEN A DATE WHEN WE MIGHT EXPECT DELIVERY HAS BEEN GIVEN US. THERE WAS ALSO A PROBLEM INVOLVED IN CLEARING IRAN'S MILITARY ACCOUNTS. IRAN HAD RECEIVED NO INVOICES ON WHAT IT HAD BOUGHT AND PAID FOR SINCE 1966, HE CLAIMED. THE PGOI CONSEQUENTLY HAD NO IDEA OF WHAT ITS FINANCIAL POSITION WAS IN THIS AREA. SOME FIGURES HAD BEEN PRO-

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TEHRAN 8970/1

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUEHC/SPCSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3173

INFO RUEFJCS/SPCIEF WASH DC IMMEDIATE

BT

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

CPAGE: STATE 1/12

APPRV: CHG:151A1A25A

PRETD: POL:VLTO4SETH/301

CLEAR: NONE

DISTR: PCI CHG: RF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF TEHRAN 09270

VIDED IN FEBRUARY, BUT THERE WERE STILL CASES OUTSTANDING FROM 13 YEARS BEFORE.

6. TURNING TO ANOTHER AREA, HE SAID THAT WE WERE NOT MEETING VISA NEEDS OR EVEN INDIVIDUALS NEEDING MEDICAL ATTENTION. SOME PEOPLE WHO HAD HAD OPEN HEART SURGERY AND WHO HAD MADE APPOINTMENTS FOR CHECK-UPS IN THE U.S. HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET VISAS. YAZDI INTERCEPTED TO SAY THE P301 WAS UNDER GROWING PRESSURE TO ALLOW STUDENTS TO GO TO THE USSR FOR STUDY. THIS WAS SOMETHING THE P301 DID NOT WANT TO DO, HE SAID, BUT WHICH IT MIGHT HAVE TO ACCEDE TO (IF WE DID NOT ISSUE VISAS TO THEM TO GO TO U.S. SCHOOLS BEING THE THREAT LEFT UNSAID). BAZARGAN SAID THAT THERE WAS ALSO THE QUESTION OF OUR FAILURE TO NAME A REPLACEMENT FOR AMBASSADOR CUTLER. YAZDI REPEATED HIS EARLIER CONTENTION THAT YOUR CHARGE TOLD US WITHIN 24 HOURS THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD ACCEPTED OUR DECISION, ADDING THAT THEY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD THAT IT WOULD TAKE ONLY FIVE OR SIX WEEKS TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS.

7. I RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT I WELCOMED BAZARGAN'S FRANKNESS, PARTICULARLY SINCE SOME OF THE THINGS HE RAISED I HAD PLANNED BRINGING UP MYSELF. I WAS UNAWARE THAT IRAN HAD RECEIVED NO INVOICES FOR ITS MILITARY PURCHASES SINCE 1966; QUITE FRANKLY I FOUND SUCH A CONTENTION HARD TO BELIEVE. I NOTED THAT IN EARLIER DISCUSSIONS WITH FM YAZDI AND MOND RIAHI I HAD DEALT AT SOME LENGTH ON THE COMPLICATED NATURE OF OUR PAST MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. I ASSURED HIM THAT OUR PURPOSE WAS NOT TO STOP THE FLOW OF ESSENTIAL SPARE PARTS TO IRAN, BUT RATHER TO DEAL WITH THE ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO JEOPARDIZE OUR ABILITY TO BE IN POSITION TO PROVIDE THE KIND OF SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP IRAN MIGHT WANT FOR THE FUTURE.

8. THROUGH PATIENT EFFORT WE HAD REACHED A POSITION WHERE WE WERE NOW ABLE TO RESUME DELIVERY OF SPARE PARTS IN THE PIPELINE. THIS HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE MOND AND THE NEA TWO WEEKS AGO, AND WE WERE NOW WAITING FOR IRAN TO MAKE SHIPPING ARRANGEMENTS SO THAT DELIVERIES COULD BE EFFECTED. SEVERAL PLANE LOADS OF SPARE PARTS HAD BEEN DELIVERED DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS THROUGH ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE MAAG AND THE IIAF AND, FURTHER, WE WERE READY TO CONSIDER NEW ORDERS, INCLUDING THAT FOR COBRA/TOW CALIBRATION SERVICES. I SAID THAT AN OFFICER WOULD BE HAND CARRYING AN LOA FOR THIS CASE TO IRAN ON AUGUST 13.

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TEHRAN 09270/2

10. I ALSO SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN URGING A MEETING OF
1301, MAFS AND EMBASSY OFFICIALS CONCERNED WITH THE
MILITARY SUPPLY ISSUE FOR SOME TIME. SUCH A MEETING,
WHICH WOULD DEAL WITH PROCEDURES, WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, HELP
DEVELOP BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS COMPLICATED SUBJECT.
(BAZARGAN GOT ON THE PHONE--TO RIYAH I BELIEVE--AND
AFTER A BRIEF CONVERSATION AGREED THAT SUCH A MEETING
SHOULD BE CONVENED. HE AND YAZDI SET AUGUST 14 AT THE
MFA AS THE DATE AND VENUE.) ON THE MATTER OF ACCOUNTING,
I TOLD BAZARGAN THAT THERE WAS A MEETING SCHEDULED IN
WASHINGTON AUGUST 22-24 FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF
DELIVING INTO THIS MATTER. A GREAT DEAL OF WORK WAS
GOING INTO PREPARATIONS FOR THIS MEETING AND WE FELT WE
THE PGOI TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO IT. THE MEET WOULD
BE REPRESENTED IN ANY EVENT, AND COULD BRIEF PGOI OFFICIALS
LATER, BUT WE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE FAR PREFERABLE FOR THE
PGOI TO HAVE ITS OWN REPRESENTATIVE PRESENT. I URGED
BAZARGAN TO CONSIDER THIS.

US GOVERNMENT EMBASSY OFFICE 1977-744-13

10. BOTH BAZARGAN AND YAZDI APPEARED TO BE TAKEN ABACK
BY MY STATEMENT THAT IT WAS UP TO THE PGOI TO MAKE
ARRANGEMENTS FOR DELIVERY OF ITS SPARES. YAZDI ASKED IF
WE DID NOT DELIVER THESE ITEMS FOR IRAN. I EXPLAINED
THAT WAS ONLY IN CERTAIN INSTANCES, AND THAT THE USUAL
PRACTICE WAS FOR THE PURCHASER TO MAKE ITS OWN ARRANGE-
MENTS. I AGAIN SAID THAT THE MEETINGS I HAD REFERRED TO
WOULD BE USEFUL IN HELPING THE PGOI TO UNDERSTAND THIS
WHOLLY VERY COMPLICATED SUBJECT AND URGED THAT IT SEND
SOMEONE TO WASHINGTON IN ADDITION TO PARTICIPATING IN
THE PROCEDURAL MEETING ON AUGUST 14.

11. I THEN RAISED A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS ON OUR SIDE.
I NOTED THAT WE HAD RETAINED A SMALL MILITARY MISSION IN
IRAN AND THAT THE BULK OF THOSE MEMBERS STILL LEFT HAD
BEEN INVOLVED IN TRYING TO WIND UP IN AN ORDERLY WAY OUR
PAST MILITARY PROPERTIES IN IRAN. WE HAD HAD ONLY VERY
LIMITED SUCCESS IN GETTING ACCESS TO RECORDS AT GULF
DISTRICT, IN RECLAIMING COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND OTHER
PROPERTIES THAT BELONGED TO US, IN DISPOSING OF COMMISS-
ARY STORES, EVEN IN RESOLVING SUCH MINOR MATTERS AS THE
IT
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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 8976/2

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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
INFO RUEKJCS/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3174
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF TEHRAN 29672

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CG: STATE 5/12
APPROV: CH3:LELAINGEN
REFID: POL:VLTCMSET/
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL CH3 RF

MAIL ABANDONED AT THE APO. IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF THE MONETARY VALUE OF WHAT WE ARE AFTER, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SEVERAL MILLION DOLLARS INVOLVED IN THE COMMISSARY STOCKS ISSUE; WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRINCIPLE INVOLVED IN OUR CONTINUING INABILITY TO GAIN ACCESS TO WHAT IS OURS. I ASKED FOR BAZARGAN'S COOPERATION IN RESOLVING THESE ISSUES, NOTING THAT I WOULD BE SENDING A LETTER TO YAZDI IN A FEW DAYS ON THIS SAME SUBJECT RECOUNTING WHERE WE STOOD--WHICH, UNFORTUNATELY, WAS NOWHERE.

12. ON VISAS, I TOLD BAZARGAN THAT IT WAS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO STOP THE FLOW OF PEOPLE BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. I NOTED THAT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE ATTACK ON THE EMB WE HAD CONFRONTED A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS IN RESUMING FULL-SCALE CONSULAR OPERATIONS. THESE INCLUDED LACK OF AN ADEQUATE PHYSICAL FACILITY, A SHORTAGE OF STAFF AND INADEQUATE SECURITY. NONETHELESS WE HAD REDOUBLED OUR EFFORTS TO SEE THAT EVERY QUALIFIED AMERICAN WOULD GET A VISA IN TIME TO REACH HIS SCHOOL IN THE U.S. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE PRESENTLY PROCESSING 100 STUDENT VISA CASES A DAY AND THAT WE HAD PUT ON TWO SHIFTS TO COMPLETE NEW CONSULAR FACILITIES THAT WILL BE AMONG THE MOST MODERN IN THE WORLD. I EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THERE COULD BE INSTANCES OF INDIVIDUALS REQUIRING MEDICAL ATTENTION NOT BEING ABLE TO GET VISAS, SINCE WE HAD MADE EVERY EFFORT TO SEE THAT GENUINE MEDICAL EMERGENCIES RECEIVED ATTENTION. I ASSURED BAZARGAN WE DID NOT WANT TO BE AN OBSTACLE IN THIS AREA, AND ASKED YAZDI TO LET ME KNOW OF ANY SUCH INSTANCES IN THE FUTURE.

13. I WENT ON TO POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT WE HAD BEEN FORCED TO WORK WITHIN CERTAIN CONSTRAINTS IN OUR EFFORTS TO RESUME FULL-SCALE CONSULAR OPERATIONS, INCLUDING THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF AN IRREGULAR SECURITY FORCE ON OUR COMPOUND. WE WERE GENUINELY APPRECIATIVE OF THE HELP ITS MEMBERS HAD PROVIDED, ESPECIALLY IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE FEBRUARY ATTACK ON THE EMB. BUT CONDITIONS HAD NOW CHANGED. IN OUR VIEW, THEIR PRESENCE WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE. INDEED THE DANGER TO WHICH THEY HAD INVOLVED THEMSELVES IN OUR INTERNAL OPERATIONS WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO OUR ABILITY ACCORDINGLY, WE THOUGHT IT IMPERATIVE THAT THEY BE REMOVED AND REPLACED BY A REGULAR SECURITY FORCE OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND.

14. YAZDI SAID THE HEAD OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WAS SUPPOSED TO TALK TO MASHALLAH KASHANI THAT VERY DAY WITH A VIEW TO HAVING HIM AND HIS PEOPLE LEAVE. THEY WOULD

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14. REPLACED WITH ANOTHER GROUP OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND.
I SAID THAT PERHAPS IT MIGHT ULTIMATELY BE POSSIBLE
TO REMOVE EVEN THAT GROUP. I SAID THAT WHILE WE WOULD
TAKE CARE OF SECURITY ON THE INSIDE, WE WOULD NEED SOME
KIND OF FORCE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE CROWD CONTROL OUTSIDE
THE CONSULAR SECTION WHEN IT OPENED.

15. I THEN RAISED TREATMENT OF U.S. CORRESPONDENTS BY
THE PGCI, SAYING THAT I UNDERSTOOD THE PGCI CONCERN
THAT THE AMERICAN PRESS WAS NOT PRESENTING A BALANCED
PICTURE OF IRAN. I HAD NOT COME TO LODGE AN OFFICIAL
COMPLAINT ABOUT THE EXPULSION OF AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS
BUT I DID WANT TO EXPRESS MY CONCERN ABOUT THE IMPACT
SUCH ACTIONS WERE HAVING ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.
WHILE OUR PRESS WAS NOT PERFECT, WE DID ALL WE COULD TO
ENCOURAGE BALANCED REPORTING. I SUGGESTED THAT CORRES-
PONDENTS ARE MOTIVATED BY VERY HUMAN CONSIDERATIONS.
THEY FOCUS ON THE SENSATIONAL BECAUSE THEY KNOW THAT IS
WHAT SELLS. BUT, WHILE A FREE PRESS MAY NOT ALWAYS
PRINT WHAT WE MIGHT WANT IT TO, THE ONLY THING WORSE WAS
A CONTROLLED PRESS.

16. I TOLD BAZARGAN THAT TO OUR PEOPLE THERE APPEARS
TO BE AN EFFORT DIRECTED SPECIFICALLY AGAINST THE
AMERICAN PRESS, A PERCEPTION THAT DOES NOT HELP THE
CLIMATE IN WHICH THE PGCI AND WE MUST WORK IN OUR EFFORT
TO REBUILD OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. I CITED THE
REMARKS BY DR. MOMEN OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL
GUIDANCE TO THE EFFECT THAT AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS IN
IRAN OFTEN SEEM TO BE SPIES FIRST AND JOURNALISTS SECOND.
SUCH A STATEMENT, WITHOUT ANY FOUNDATION AND BY A SENIOR
PGCI OFFICIAL, WAS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST.

17. WITHOUT WAITING FOR BAZARGAN TO RESPOND, YAZDI SAID
THAT THE "PROBLEM WITH YOUR PRESS IS THAT IT IS MISIN-
FORMING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC; IT IS SLANDERING US." HE
CITED AN INTERVIEW HE HAD GIVEN TO GREGORY ROSE UNDER THE
IMPRESSION THAT HE REPRESENTED NEW YORK MAGAZINE WHICH
ROSE SUBSEQUENTLY BILLED AS AN INTERVIEW WITH BOTH YAZDI
AND KHOMEINI AND SOLD TO PENTHOUSE MAGAZINE. ANOTHER

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TEHRAN 8970/3

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3175
INFO RUEHCS/SECDEF WASH DC IMMEDIATE
BT

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
TAGS: STAFF 1/12
PRV: CH7:LEDAINGTA
DREAD: POL:VLDOW'SFIR/4
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL CH3 AF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF TEHRAN 08270

EXAMPLE WAS THE NEWSWEEK FEATURE, "THE JOYLESS REVOLUTION." "DID YOU READ IT?" HE ASKED. WHILE YAZDI TURNED TO TRANSLATE FOR A SEEMINGLY PUZZLED BAZARGAN I BEGAN TO RESPOND TO HIS SPECIFIC REMARKS ONLY TO HAVE HIM RETURN TO THE SUBJECT WITH RENEWED HEAT. "SHOULD WE TELL ONE WHO REEL CARPET FOR THESE PEOPLE?" HE ASKED. "THEY HAVE NEVER TREATED US FAIRLY. THEY CALL US FANATICS AND BACKWARD. THIS SAME U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (SIC) CALLED ME A COMMUNIST. I WROTE THEM A LETTER REBUTTING THE CHARGE, AND THEY WOULDN'T EVEN PRINT IT."

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-248-857

17. AT THAT POINT BAZARGAN QUIETLY OBSERVED THAT THERE WAS A TIME WHEN THE FOREIGN MEDIA HAD BEEN VERY SYMPATHETIC TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. EVEN BEFORE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAD DECIDED TO STOP SUPPORTING THE SHAH. HE SAID, THE FOREIGN PRESS WAS PORTRAYING THE SITUATION IN IRAN AS IT REALLY WAS. AFTER THE REVOLUTION, TOO, REPORTING WAS FAIR. I SUGGESTED THAT THE TIME ARTICLE ON KHOMEINI, A COPY OF WHICH I HAD SENT TO YAZDI, SURELY HAD BEEN REASONABLY BALANCED. I ALSO SUGGESTED THAT "ABC," A VERY RESPECTABLE NEWS ORGANIZATION, WOULD HAVE TRIED TO BE BALANCED HAD IT BEEN GIVEN THE CHANCE.

18. YAZDI COUNTERED THAT THE NBC TEAM HAD BEEN EXPELLED BECAUSE IT HAD VIOLATED IRANIAN REGULATIONS GOVERNING FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS. I SAID THAT CORRESPONDENTS TRIED TO KNOW WHAT THE REGULATIONS WERE IF THEY WERE TO ABIDE BY THEM. YAZDI CLAIMED THAT THE NBC TEAM LEADER HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY DR. BEHZADNIA OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE THE LAST TIME HE HAD BEEN TO IRAN, BUT THAT HE CHOSE TO IGNORE THE RULES AND GO TO QOM INSTEAD WHERE HE GOT A LETTER FROM THE LOCAL COMMITTEE AUTHORIZING HIM TO GO TO KURDESTAN. I RESPONDED THAT THE PCOI, HAVING MADE ITS POINT, SHOULD NOW INVITE NBC BACK.

19. YAZDI IGNORED THIS, ASKING INSTEAD IF I DID NOT SEE A CLEAR PATTERN IN THE AMERICAN PRESS TREATMENT OF IRAN. I SAID I DID NOT, ALTHOUGH I DID SEE A CLEAR PATTERN OF ACCUSATION IN THE IRANIAN MEDIA THAT THE U.S. WAS INTERFERING IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. SUCH ACCUSATIONS WERE WITHOUT BASIS. YAZDI CONCEDED THAT. BUT QUICKLY ADDED THAT THERE IS A HISTORICAL BASIS FOR IRANIAN JOURNALISTS' SUSPICIONS. TO MAKE HIS POINT HE RECITED A PERSIAN SAYING: "ONE BITTEN BY A SNAKE IS THEN AFRAID OF EVERY BLACK AND WHITE ROPE HE ENCOUNTERS RETURNING TO THE OFFENSIVE, YAZDI SAID, "THE U.S. PRESS IS AGAINST US."

20. TO PUT AN END TO THIS FRUITLESS LINE OF DISCUSSION,

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1. I THANKED BAZARGAN FOR HIS GENEROSITY IN RECEIVING ME AND STATED MY OFFER TO CONVEY ANY MESSAGE HE MIGHT HAVE TO WASHINGTON WHEN I RETURNED FOR CONSULTATIONS. I APPEALED TO HIM AGAIN FOR HIS HELP IN GAINING ACCESS TO U.S. MILITARY RECORDS AND PROPERTY AT THE GULF DISTRICT AND EXTENDED MY BEST WISHES TO HIM PERSONALLY AND TO HIS GOVERNMENT. BAZARGAN SAID HE APPRECIATED MY WIFES AND ASSURANCES. HE THEN TOLD A STORY ABOUT HOW IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AFTER WW II EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED IN IRAN, EVEN A BABY'S CRYING, WAS BLAMED ON BRITISH AGITATION. LATER, DURING THE TIME OF MOSSADEGH, THE U.S. ENJOYED GREAT PRESTIGE AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE GOOD WORKS AMERICANS HAD PREVIOUSLY DONE IN AND FOR IRAN, BUT WHEN MOSSADEGH WAS OVERTHROWN IRANIANS BEGAN TO BLAME EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED IN THE COUNTRY ON THE U.S. JUST AS EARLY HAD ONCE BLAMED THE BRITISH. THIS PERCEPTION MAY NOT BE ACCURATE, BAZARGAN SAID, BUT IT IS A REALITY TO BE DEALT WITH. ACCORDINGLY, THE U.S. MUST DO SOMETHING TO BACK UP ITS GOOD INTENTIONS, TO SHOW THAT IT IS NOT AGITATING AGAINST IRAN'S INTERESTS.

22. I SAID I THOUGHT WE WERE ALREADY SHOWING OUR SINCERITY IN THIS REGARD AND ASSURED HIM THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO DEMONSTRATE OUR GOODWILL. AS FOR IRAN AND THE PCOI, I SUGGESTED THAT, WHILE WE HAD TO LIVE WITH THE PAST, WE SHOULD NOT DWELL ON IT. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE, JUST AS IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE REVOLUTION TO STATE WHAT IT WAS FOR AS WELL AS WHAT IT WAS AGAINST.

23. COMMENT: IT WAS CLEAR FROM MY DISCUSSION WITH BAZARGAN THAT YAZDI HAD BRIEFED HIM THOROUGHLY JUST BEFORE MY ARRIVAL. BAZARGAN'S COURTLINESS DID NOT STOP HIM FROM SPEAKING FRANKLY, ALTHOUGH YAZDI'S TRANSLATION OF WHAT HE SAID OFTEN HAD A ROUGHER EDGE THAN BAZARGAN'S ACTUAL REMARKS. INDEED, THE DIFFERENCES IN THE IMPORTANCE EACH MAN ATTACHED TO THE SUBJECTS THAT WERE DISCUSSED AND THE APPROACHES THEY TOOK TO THEM WERE PERHAPS ALMOST AS SIGNIFICANT AS THE SUBJECTS THEMSELVES. BAZARGAN WAS CLEARLY PREOCCUPIED BY THE VISA QUESTION, PRESUMABLY BE-

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CAUSE OF ITS IMMEDIACY AS A DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE. SEVERAL TIMES HE CAME BACK TO THIS WITH QUESTIONS DIRECTED TO YAZDI WHICH THE LATTER EITHER ANSWERED PERFUNCTORILY OR IGNORED.

24. YAZDI, ON THE OTHER HAND, FOCUSED ON THE OVERALL PIATAPAL RELATIONSHIP AND ON WHAT HE HAS PREVIOUSLY EMPHASIZED AS A NEED ON OUR PART TO PROVE THAT WE ARE WORTH IRAN'S FRIENDSHIP. HE AGAIN SHOWED THAT HE IS NOT ABOVE ENGAGING IN EXAGGERATION (HIS CONTENTION--STATED THROUGH BAZARGAN--THAT IRAN HAD NOT RECEIVED AN INVOICE SINCE 1966 FOR ITS MILITARY PURCHASES). OR EVEN CRUDE THREATS (THAT IRAN WILL SEND ITS STUDENTS TO RUSSIA IF WE DO NOT TAKE THEM) FOR THE PURPOSE OF GAINING NEGOTIATING ADVANTAGE. TO THE EXTENT THAT HE COOLY USES SUCH TACTICS IN A COORDINATED FASHION TOWARDS HIS ULTIMATE STRATEGIC GOAL, ONE MUST AT LEAST ADMIRE HIS CONCEPTUAL ABILITIES IF NOT HIS ACTUAL METHODS. ON THE ISSUE OF THE PRESS, HOWEVER, YAZDI DOES NOT SEEM CAPABLE OF REASON. THERE, IT WAS BAZARGAN WHO SHOWED AN ABILITY TO EXAMINE THE ISSUE MORE DISPASSIONATELY. LAINGEN

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TEHRAN 28970/5

مهدی بازرگان -- ۲۰

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CN 724

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 215670

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PPDC, IR

SUBJECT: EID-E FETR MESSAGE

POL

CHG

RF

CHRON

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN AT APPROPRIATE TIME:

QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER, I AM PLEASED TO EXTEND
TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF IRAN BEST WISHES ON THE OCCASION
OF EID-E FETR. MAY YOU AND YOUR COUNTRYMEN BE BLESSED
WITH HEALTH AND HAPPINESS, AND MAY GOD GUIDE YOU AND
YOUR COLLEAGUES TO SUCCESS IN YOUR GREAT EFFORTS FOR YOUR
PEOPLE. WE IN AMERICA STAND READY TO COOPERATE WITH THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND TO STRENGTHEN THE LONG-
STANDING TIES OF FRIENDSHIP THAT HAVE EXISTED BETWEEN
OUR TWO PEOPLES. WITH BEST WISHES, JIMMY CARTER.
HIS EXCELLENCY DR. MEHDI BAZARGAN, PRIME MINISTER OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, TEHRAN. UNQUOTE.

2. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT BUT
HAS NO OBJECTION IF PGOI WISHES TO DO SO. CHRISTOPHER

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مهدی بازرگان - ۲۱

Tehran, Iran

August 19, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am honored to be able to extend, on behalf of the entire American community in Iran, our best wishes on the great festival of Eid-e-Petr. We rejoice with you in the joy and festivity of this occasion. We take this opportunity also to wish you and your people all success in your efforts to build a new and strong Iran, a country and people whose friendship matters greatly to all Americans.

Sincerely,

L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Mehdi Bazargan
Prime Minister of Iran,
Tehran.

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TEHRAN 9710

DE RUQMHR #9710 245 **

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3584

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC

RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC

RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0254

RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0245

RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0260

RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0226

RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0293

RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JILDA 0288

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0297

RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0258

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0365

RUQHAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0224

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0279

RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0152

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0313

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09710

*E.O. 12065: GDS 9/2/85 (SWIFT, E. ANN) OR-P

TAGS: PGOV, IR

SUBJECT: BAZARGAN SPEECH

REFS: (A) TEHRAN 9663, (B) TEHRAN 9653

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. BAZARGAN SPEECH AUGUST 31 WAS CLEARLY MORE A REACTION TO MOUNTING CRITICISM OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS INEFFECTIVE THAN A SERIOUS ATTEMPT AT RESIGNATION. THE SPEECH ALSO GIVES AN INTERESTING VIEW OF HOW BAZARGAN VIEWS THE LACK OF POWER OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND HIS SUBSERVIENT RELATIONSHIP TO KHOMEINI.

3. IN THE SPEECH BAZARGAN DEFENDS HIS GOVERNMENT AGAINST CHARGES OF INDECISIVENESS, INACTION AND LACK OF REVOLUTIONARY ATTITUDE, AND CALLS ON HIS CRITICS TO ASK KHOMEINI TO DISMISS HIM IF THEY THINK HE SHOULD NOT BE PRIME MINISTER. AT THE END OF THE SPEECH, BAZARGAN POINTS OUT THAT HE TAKES NO PLEASURE FROM HIS POSITION AS PRIME MINISTER AND THAT HE HAS SENT A LETTER TO KHOMEINI OOOERING HIS RESIGNATION. IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR WHEN OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THIS LATEST BAZARGAN OFFER OF RESIGNATION WAS SENT, BUT IT DOES SEEM CLEAR THAT KHOMEINI HAS NO INTENTION OF TATING BAZARGAN UP ON HIS OFFER.

4. BAZARGAN SPEECH IS A GOOD REFLECTION OF THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN IRAN'S DUAL-SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND OF THE GROWING POWER OF THE UNOFFICIAL SIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS REPORTED IN REF B. BAZARGAN DESCRIBES HIS GOVERNMENT AS "A KNIFE WITHOUT A BLADE": MEANING

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

CHRG: STATE 9/2/79

APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH

DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO

CLEAR: NONE

DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA

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IT APPEARS THAT HIS GOVERNMENT CAN MAKE LAWS BUT THE

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AUTHORITY TO CARRY THEM OUT RESTS IN THE HANDS OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES. THE POWER KHOMEINI HOLDS
OVER BAZARGAN'S GOVERNMENT IS ALSO GRAPHICALLY
DESCRIBED: "ALL OUR AFFAIRS ARE IN HIS HANDS, AT HIS
OWN COMMAND, INCLUDING THE POWERS OF DISMISSAL,
APPOINTMENT, DECISION-MAKING, ISSUING ORDERS, EVERYTHING.
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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976-353-344

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TEHRAN 12132/1

DE RUQMHR #0138/01 260 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3809
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RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANZARA 0268
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0281
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0256
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0320
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0319
RUSBLA/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0324
RUQMCA/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0298
RUQDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0392
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0255
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0281
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0173
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0346
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 12138

L.O. 12065: GDS 9/17/85 (LIMBERT, JOHN) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: PM BAZARGAN CRITICIZED

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STAT 9/17/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
ERFPTD: POL:JLIMBERT:GO
CLZAR: POL:EASWIFT; POL:
TAHERN
DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
ECON CHRON RT

1. (C) SUMMARY: DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS, PM MEHDI BAZARGAN HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF CRITICISMS FROM VARIOUS SIDES. HE HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF ANTI-CLERICALISM, OF INEFFECTIVENESS, AND OF GENERAL BUNGLING. BAZARGAN HAS ANSWERED THESE ATTACKS BY CLAIMING THAT THE SAME PERSONS WHO WERE CRITICIZING HIM ARE NOT ALLOWING HIS GOVERNMENT TO FUNCTION. DESPITE THESE ATTACKS, IT APPEARS THAT BAZARGAN STILL ENJOYS THE SUPPORT OF KHOMEINI AND WILL NOT BE REPLACED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
END SUMMARY.

2. (C) THE FIRST ATTACK ON BAZARGAN CAME FROM AYATOLLAH DR. MOHAMMAD BEHESHTI, VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS, MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH PARS NEWS AGENCY IN QOM ON SEPTEMBER 14, DR. BEHESHTI BLAMED THE GOVERNMENT AND PM BAZARGAN FOR FAILING TO IMPLEMENT A BILL ON THE FORMATION OF LOCAL COUNCILS. ACCORDING TO BEHESHTI, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TWO MONTHS BEFORE HAD APPROVED A BILL CALLING FOR THE FORMATION OF COUNCILS AT PROVINCE, CITY, DISTRICT, AND VILLAGE LEVELS. BEHESHTI SAID DR. BAZARGAN'S GOVERNMENT HAD FAILED TO IMPLEMENT THIS BILL, EITHER BECAUSE OF DELIBERATE PROCRASTINATION OR BECAUSE OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE WEAKNESS. (DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER BANI-ASSADI TOLD CHARGE SEPT 17 THAT BAZARGAN'S OFFICE, IMMEDIATELY AFTER RECEIVING THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL'S BILL, HAD SENT A LETTER TO THE COUNCIL TELLING THEM THAT THE BILL AS DRAFTED WAS UNREALISTIC

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BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD WORK OUT A FEASIBLE BILL ALONG THOSE LINES.)

3. (C) LATER THE SAME DAY, THE MONOTHEISM PARTY (HEZB-E-TOWHIDI) ISSUED A SEVEN-POINT STATEMENT CRITICIZING THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT FOR NEGLECT AND INDIFFERENCE. LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT THE HEZB-E-TOWHIDI EXCEPT THAT IT IS AN ISLAMIC POLITICAL GROUPING WITH POSSIBLE TIES TO AYATOLLAH SADEQ ROWHANI. THE CRITICISMS DIRECTED AT BAZARGAN INCLUDED:

- (A) GOVERNMENT INDIFFERENCE TO CRITICISMS OF IRAN IN THE FOREIGN PRESS, BOTH WESTERN AND NON-ALIGNED.

- (B) SEEKING POPULARITY BY PLAYING WITH WORDS AND BY OPPOSING THE ADVICE OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS. "PERHAPS YOU HAVE FORGOTTEN THAT THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IS LED BY THE CLERGY."

- (C) DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL'S BILL ON FORMATION OF LOCAL COUNCILS.

- (D) NEGLECTING TO FOLLOW AYATOLLAH ROWHANI'S ADVICE ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF PURGING THE GOVERNMENT OF ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS.

4. (U) THESE ATTACKS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ATTACK ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 15 BY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND COUNCIL OF EXPERTS MEMBER ABU AL-HASAN BANI-SADR. SPEAKING TO AN AUDIENCE IN YAZD, BANI-SADR ATTACKED BAZARGAN'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND ACCUSED HIM OF HINDERING THE WORK OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. BANI-SADR ALSO ACCUSED BAZARGAN OF:

- (A) REFUSING TO ACCEPT CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM.

- (B) BUNGLING IN KURDESTAN AND THEN TRYING TO CLAIM CREDIT FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION THERE.

- (C) OPPOSING THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BANKS, A FAVORITE PROGRAM OF BANI-SADR.

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- (D) BURYING HIMSELF IN TRIVIA AND NOT ORGANIZING HIS WORK PROGRAM.

5. (U) IN AN ATTACK APPEARING IN THE ENGLISH AND PERSIAN-LANGUAGE PRESS OF SEPTEMBER 16, TEHRAN REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR AYATOLLAH AHMAD AZARI-QOMI CRITICIZED BAZARGAN FOR ALLEGEDLY ANTI-CLERICAL STATEMENTS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S EULOGY FOR AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY ON SEPTEMBER 11. AZARI-QOMI (WHO ANNOUNCED HIS RESIGNATION FOR HEALTH REASONS) SAID THAT BAZARGAN HAD SAID THAT TALEGHANI, UNLIKE THE MAJORITY OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS, WAS NOT OPPOSED TO THE MANIFESTATIONS OF MODERN CIVILIZATION. ACCUSING BAZARGAN OF WEAKENING REVOLUTIONARY UNITY, AZARI QOMI SAID, "IT IS VERY STRANGE THAT A DISTINGUISHED FIGURE AS MR. BAZARGAN WOULD MAKE AN UNFAIR ACCUSATION AGAINST THE CLERGY. WAS IT NOT TALEGHANI'S GOAL TO UNITE ALL GROUPS, THE FOREMOST OF WHICH WAS A COMMITTED AND ACTIVE CLERGY? HOW CAN HE (BAZARGAN) PRAISE TALEGHANI BY STIRRING UP THE PEOPLE AGAINST THE CLERGY AND BY CONDEMNING THIS PROGRESSIVE AND ACTIVE GROUP AS REACTIONARY?"

6. (C) LOCAL PRESS ACCOUNTS OF BAZARGAN'S SPEECH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENTS WHICH OFFENDED AZARI-QOMI. EMBASSY WILL CHECK FULL TEXT OF SPEECH (WHEN AVAILABLE) TO ESTABLISH EXACTLY WHAT PRIME MINISTER SAID.

7. (C) ALTHOUGH THE PRESS HAS BEEN GIVING WIDE PUBLICITY TO THESE ATTACKS, BAZARGAN'S REACTION HAS SO FAR BEEN LIMITED TO A STATEMENT AT AN ECONOMIC SEMINAR (REPORTED BY ETTELAAT OF SEPTEMBER 16) THAT THE SAME (UNNAMED PERSONS WHO WERE CRITICIZING HIS GOVERNMENT FOR ITS INEFFECTIVENESS WERE THE SAME ONES WHO WERE INTERFERING IN GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS AND PREVENTING HIS CABINET FROM OPERATING.)

8. (C) THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME (NOR WILL IT BE THE LAST TIME) THAT BAZARGAN HAS BEEN UNDER ATTACK FROM MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. ALTHOUGH THE ATTACKS COMING FROM VARIOUS DIRECTIONS AND FROM VARIOUS PERSONALITIES, NOT NECESSARILY PART OF ANY CONCERTED ANTI-BAZARGAN CAMPAIGN, THERE ARE ENOUGH COMMON THEMES IN THE CRITICISMS TO INDICATE THE COMMON INTERESTS OF HIS OPPONENTS. THESE THEMES INCLUDE:

- (A) IGNORING THE ADVICE OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS.
- (B) IGNORING THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.
- (C) GENERAL INEFFECTIVENESS AND BUNGLING.

9. (C) IT IS WORTH NOTING, HOWEVER, THAT NONE OF THESE ATTACKS MENTION AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI BY NAME AND THAT

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TEHRAN 10138/2

NONE OF THE ATTACKERS NOTE ANY CLAIM TO SPEAK FOR HIM. IN PREVIOUS DISAGREEMENTS OF THIS KIND, BAZARGAN HAS HAD ENOUGH SUPPORT FROM THE IMAM TO OVERCOME CALLS FOR HIS DISMISSAL. IT IS LIKELY THAT AS LONG AS BAZARGAN CONTINUES TO HAVE KHOMEINI'S SUPPORT (AND THERE IS NO SIGN OF HIS LOOSING IT) HE WILL BE ABLE TO SURVIVE SUCH ATTACKS. BAZARGAN'S SURVIVAL, HOWEVER, IS UNLIKELY TO MAKE HIS GOVERNMENT ANY MORE EFFECTIVE IN DEALING WITH THOSE WHO HAVE ALREADY TAKEN OVER MOST OF ITS FUNCTIONS. LAINGEN

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3979.

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10466

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/29/85 (SWIFT A.) OR-P

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: BILATERAL PROBLEMS

RIY: STATE 253666

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. ACTING ON A LETTER (UNDATED BUT PROBABLY LATE FEBRUARY) FROM PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN STATTHAT PGOI "WOULD LIKE TO DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO INDEMNIFY THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE ABOVE INCIDENT" (I.E. ATTACK ON EMBASSY), EMBASSY HAS SENT THREE DIPLOMATIC NOTES TO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. FIRST TWO OF MAY 29 AND JUNE 17, 1977 GAVE EMBASSY STATUS REPORT ON CONTINUING ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES. NOTE OF AUGUST 9, 1979 GAVE FINAL ESTIMATE OF DAMAGES AND LOSSES THAT OCCURRED DURING THE ATTACK.

3. THIS FINAL REPORT OF AUGUST 9 REQUESTED PGOI PAYMENT TO EMBASSY OF \$1,041,588 FOR DAMAGES TO ICA BUILDING AND EQUIPMENT, EMBASSY BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT, PERSONAL PROPERTY LOSSES AND LOSSES AT TABRIZ. EMBASSY HAS NOT YET FOLLOWED UP ON THIS MATTER IN ANY DIRECT APPROACH WITH EITHER YAZDI OR OTHER MFA OFFICIALS

4. EMBASSY SUGGESTS SECRETARY MAY WISH TO RAISE VARIOUS QUESTIONS OF ACCESS TO MILITARY PROPERTIES AND DAMAGES TO EMBASSY PROPERTY WITH YAZDI IN BROAD BRUSH MANNER IN CONTEXT OF AN EFFORT TO CLEAN UP THE PAST. THIS COULD BE FOLLOWED BY MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN LEPT. OFFICERS AND YAZDI OR OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UNGA SUCH AS BAYANDOR.

5. RE IAS BUILDING AT SHIRAZ, EMBASSY SUGGESTS WE NOT INCLUDE THIS IN LIGHT OF CURRENT CONTACTS WITH IRANIANS INVOLVED IN IAS BOARD IN SHIRAZ WHICH APPEAR TO OFFER SOME PROMISE. LAINGEN

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TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 5181
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 231950

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PPDC, IR

SUBJECT: EID-E GHORBAN MESSAGE

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN AT APPROPRIATE TIME:

QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: IT IS MY PLEASURE TO
EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF IRAN MY BEST WISHES ON
THE HOLY OCCASION OF EID-E GHORBAN. MAY YOU AND YOUR
COUNTRYMEN BE BLESSED WITH HEALTH AND HAPPINESS AND MAY
YOUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF YOUR COUNTRY MEET WITH SUCCESS.
WE IN AMERICA SEEK TO WORK WITH YOU AND YOUR ASSOCIATES IN
DEVELOPING AN ENVIRONMENT OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND POSITIVE
COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES AND COUNTRIES. WITH
BEST WISHES, JIMMY CARTER. HIS EXCELLENCY, DR. MEHDI
BAZARGAN, PRIME MINISTER OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,
TEHRAN. UNQUOTE.

2. THE WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT BUT HAS
NO OBJECTION IF GOI WISHES TO DO SO. VANCE

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#1850

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978-258-344



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tehran, Iran

October 28, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The President has asked me to convey the following message to you:


"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

It is my pleasure to extend to you and to the people of Iran my best wishes on the holy occasion of Eid-E Ghorban. May you and your countrymen be blessed with health and happiness and may your efforts on behalf of your country meet with success. We in America seek to work with you and your associates in developing an environment of mutual respect and positive cooperation between our two peoples and countries.

With best wishes,

Jimmy Carter"

Sincerely,



L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

His Excellency
Dr. Mehdi Bazargan,
Prime Minister of the Islamic
Republic of Iran,
Tehran.

Mehdi BAZARGAN
(Phonetic: bazarGAHN)

IRAN

Member, Executive Committee, National Front (since at least August 1978)

OFFICE OF
CENTRAL REFERENCE



A professor, politician and businessman, Mehdi Bazargan has a long history of opposition to the Shah. He is one of the leaders of the Iran National Front--usually referred to as the National Front (NF)--and a member of the seven-man NF Executive Committee. The front is a revival of the NF of the 1950s, a coalition that supported Prime Minister (1951-53) Mohammad Mosadeq in his power struggle with the Shah. After Mosadeq was overthrown, many NF members fled the country and moved to Europe or the United States; Bazargan, who had been an active supporter of Mosadeq, stayed in Iran and continued to work against the Shah, using his flair for injecting religious themes into his demagogic rabble-rousing. (C)

In mid-1978 Bazargan emerged from a period of relative political inactivity. He spoke at several rallies, during which he called for a return of truly constitutional government, expanded freedom of the press, total independence of the judiciary, and free elections. In October 1978 Bazargan went to Paris to see exiled religious opposition leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Bazargan is a moderate compared to Khomeini, who calls for the end of the Shah's rule and the Pahlavi dynasty. Bazargan heads the Liberation Movement of Iran and the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedom. (C)

A Career in Opposition

The son of an Azerbaijan merchant, Bazargan was born in 1905. He attended school in France for eight years. After receiving a degree in thermodynamics from the University of Paris, he returned to Iran in 1936 and subsequently served as assistant professor, then professor, and

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finally dean of the Engineering Faculty of Tehran University. He was appointed technical and parliamentary under secretary in the Ministry of Education in May 1951. The following month he was named chairman of the board of the National Iranian Oil Company, charged with implementing Mosadeq's oil nationalization program; he served until May 1952. In February 1953 Bazargan became director general of the Tehran water system, but after the downfall of Mosadeq, he was dismissed in 1954 and imprisoned briefly in 1955. (C)

In 1957 Bazargan resumed teaching at Tehran University, where he headed the Islamic Students Society and founded the National Freedom Movement of Iran (NFMI). The NFMI, now defunct, was a rightwing, religious, nationalist organization, which was at various times affiliated with the NF. A member of the Central Committee of the NF during 1961-63, he was convicted of treason (along with nine other NFMI leaders) by a military court in 1964. Bazargan was sentenced to 10 years of solitary confinement, but he was pardoned by the Shah in 1967. After his release he lived quietly in Tehran and devoted himself to running an engineering firm, but despite his enforced inactivity, his name remained known and respected in opposition circles. (C)

Personal Data

A particularly devout Shi'a Muslim, Bazargan has written extensively on religious matters. Although he is narrowminded almost to the point of fanaticism regarding Islam and its precepts, he is otherwise an intelligent man who can be receptive to the ideas of others. Bazargan speaks French and English. (C)

8 December 1978

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3908

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 10321

F.O. 12065: GDS 9/23/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P

TAGS: IR, FINT

SUBJECT: CHARGE'S MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
BANI ASSADI

REF: STATE 248243, PARA. 2

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. CHARGE PAID COURTESY CALL ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR COOPERATION (HAM KARI) BANI ASSADI SEPTEMBER 16. ASSADI, WHO IS SON-IN-LAW OF PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN, WAS RECOMMENDED TO CHARGE BY RAMSAY CLARK. ASSADI IS A U.S. EDUCATED (PURDUE, ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MA) AND UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA) SOCIAL SCIENTIST WHO SEES HIMSELF, AS HE SAID, AS BEING INVOLVED IN THE GOOD "FACE" OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION: THE PGOI'S EFFORTS TO REFORM AND RESTRUCTURE IRAN'S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY. AS ARE SO MANY OF IRAN'S TECHNOCRATS, ASSADI WAS PLAINLY DISTURBED BY THE DARK FACE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTION, THE JAILINGS AND EXECUTIONS, BUT SEEMS TO HAVE RATIONALIZED THEM AS NECESSARY. AT ONE POINT DURING THE CONVERSATION, ASSADI CLAIMED THAT KHOMEINI HIMSELF WAS CHECKING THE DEMANDS OF EXTREMISTS THAT MORE BE KILLED. ASSADI SAID HE HAD BEEN PRESENT JUST BEFORE THE FIRST EXECUTIONS WHEN KHOMEINI HAD ORDERED THAT ONLY THOSE UNQUESTIONABLY GUILTY OF KILLING BE EXECUTED. KHOMEINI HAD ORDERED THIS EVEN THOUGH "THE PEOPLE" WERE DEMANDING REVENGE.

3. ASSADI PLAINLY PREFERRED TO DISCUSS THE SOMEWHAT AMORPHOUS TASKS OF HIS OFFICE WHICH IS IN CHARGE, APPARENTLY, OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND SELF HELP PROJECTS. AT THE TIME OF THE CHARGE'S VISIT HE HAD BEFORE HIM THE DRAFT PLANS FOR LOCAL AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS WHICH ARE SUPPOSED TO BE HELD THIS FALL. THE ORIGINAL PLAN, ASSADI SAID, HAD BEEN SENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE THREE MONTHS BEFORE BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. THIS PLAN HAD BEEN COMPLETELY IMPRACTICABLE AND THEY HAD SENT IT BACK TO THE COUNCIL UNDER A LETTER SAYING THAT THE PLAN WOULD NOT WORK BUT THAT THEY WERE WORKING ON A NEW PLAN. (ASSADI PLAINLY HAD BEEN STUNG BY CRITICISM APPEARING IN THE PRESS THAT BAZARGAN HAD DONE NOTHING TO IMPLEMENT THE COUNCIL'S CALL FOR LOCAL ELECTIONS). ASSADI SAID THAT RESTRUCTURING AND DECENTRALIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED OVER NIGHT. GOVERNMENT IN IRAN HAD ALWAYS BEEN RUN FROM THE CENTER, AND IT WAS NOT EASY TO REVERSE THIS CENTURIES-OLD TRADITION AND GET LOCAL COMMUNITIES TO RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. ASSADI SAID HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH THE MINISTERS THAT AFTER-

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NOON TO DISCUSS A PLAN WHICH CALLED FOR MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS UNDER A SYSTEM OF FUNCTIONAL GROUPINGS (I.E. LABOR ETC). HE DID NOT LIKE THIS IDEA AS HE FELT IT GAVE TOO MUCH POWER TO THE LEADERS OF THESE GROUPS AND THAT IT WOULD NOT MESH WITH THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ELECTIONS WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON PARTIES.

4. COMMENT: WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHAT THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING WAS. INTERIOR MINISTER SABAGHIAN ANNOUNCED SEPTEMBER 10 THAT A NEW BILL ON URBAN AND RURAL COUNCILS HAD BEEN SENT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL FOR ITS APPROVAL. WE HAVE NO WORD YET WHEN THESE LOCAL LEVEL ELECTIONS MIGHT BE HELD. DURING THE MEETING, ASSADI SAID THAT THE PGOI INTENDS TO GO AHEAD WITH THESE ELECTIONS EVEN IF THE CONSTITUTION IS NOT COMPLETED.

5. ASSADI SAID THE PGOI WAS LOOKING INTO WAYS TO RAISE THE STANDARDS OF LIVING IN THE VILLAGES AND REDUCE THE DISPARITY BETWEEN CITY AND RURAL LIFE. ONE IDEA WHICH THEY WERE CONSIDERING WOULD BE TO GIVE EACH VILLAGE A LARGE AMOUNT OF MONEY TO USE FOR THEIR OWN NEEDS.

6. ASSADI SPENT SOME TIME ENTHUSIASTICALLY DISCUSSING HIS "CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION". A PEACE CORPS LIKE ORGANIZATION WHICH SENDS STUDENTS OUT INTO THE COUNTRY-SIDE TO WORK WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS TO SPEED UP DEVELOPMENT. ALTHOUGH CHARGE PRESSED ASSADI WITH QUESTIONS, HE DID NOT RECEIVE A VERY CLEAR PICTURE OF EXACTLY HOW THIS ORGANIZATION (IF IT CAN BE CALLED THAT) WORKS. EARLY IN THE REVOLUTION, ASSADI APPARENTLY PROPOSED THAT ALL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS BE SENT (A LA CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION) TO THE COUNTRYSIDE FOR A PERIOD OF TIME TO WORK IN RURAL COMMUNITIES. AS ASSADI DID NOT WIN APPROVAL FOR THIS IDEA, HE HAD TO SETTLE FOR A GENERAL APPEAL THROUGH THE NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS FOR VOLUNTEERS TO WORK IN HIS CRUSADE. HE SAID THE CRUSADE WAS RUN BY A BOARD COMPOSED OF SIX MINISTERS, TEN MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE CRUSADE. THE VOLUNTEERS ARE PAID AND ARE SOMEHOW MANAGED BY LOCAL BOARDS IN THE PROVINCIAL CITIES. THE CRUSADE
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3909

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 12321

APPEARED TO BE A STOPGAP MEASURE AND ASSADI DID NOT SEEM TO VISUALIZE ITS CONTINUATION ONCE LOCAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS BEGAN TO FUNCTION. COMMENT: SOME REPORTS REACHING EMOFFS INDICATE THAT SOME OF THE PROFESSORS AND STUDENTS GOING OUT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE WITH CRUSADE IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE REVOLUTION WERE GREETED WITH SUSPICION (AS GOVERNMENT SPIES) AND DISTRUST. DURING TROUBLES IN TURKOMAN SARAI IN EARLY REVOLUTION TWO VOLUNTEERS WERE KILLED. WE NOTE FROM RECENT FBIS REPORT THAT THERE IS NOW SOMETHING CALLED THE "CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION" WHICH IS GOING TO BE USED IN RECONSTRUCTING KURDESTAN. WE DO NOT KNOW IF THIS IS THE SAME OUTFIT.

7. ASSADI SEEMED VERY INTERESTED IN US LOCAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT AND WE ARE ARRANGING TO MAKE SOME BOOKS ON THIS SUBJECT AVAILABLE TO HIM. COMMENT: ASSADI IS JUST THE SORT OF WESTERNIZED TECHNOCRAT THAT ONE WISHES WOULD HAVE SOME INFLUENCE IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS VERY EFFECTIVE. LAINGEN
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E.O. 12065: 10/7/95 GDS (SENS. A.D.) CR-6
TAGS: PINT, ECON, IR
SUBJECT: CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION
REF:

2. IN HIS CALL ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER BANI-ASSADI (K. T. ECONOMISER) ASKED ABOUT PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN'S 25-
CENT DETAILED INVENTORY (REF B) OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF
THE CRUSADE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE NUMBER AND SCOPE (SMALL
ACCOMPLISHMENTS SEEMED RATHER EXTRAORDINARY, CONSIDERING
THAT THE CRUSADE HAD ONLY BEEN LAUNCHED THREE MONTHS AGO.
SMILING DELIGHTEDLY, BANI-ASSADI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD
WRITTEN THE SPEECH. THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS WERE INDEED EXTRA-
ORDINARY. LIFE THE REVOLUTION ITSELF, THEY CONSTITUTE A
MIRACLE, A PROOF OF GOD'S CONCERN FOR ITS SUCCESS. AS TO
THE ACCURACY OF BAZARGAN'S CLAIMS, BANI-ASSADI HAD A FEELING
THIS TOO (INDICATING 1-1/2 INCHES BETWEEN TWO FINGERS
(FOREFINGER) WHICH SUBSTANTIATED EVERY ACCOMPLISHMENT.

6. AS ONE EXAMPLE, HE CITED THE RECENT CLOSING OF 400 SCHOOLS IN TEHRAN PROVINCE. IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THAT MIDDLE SCHOOL PLANTS WERE NOT READY FOR THE OPENING OF SCHOOL. THE CRUSADE SET UP TENTS THROUGHOUT TEHRAN TO WHICH THE CITIZENRY BROUGHT PAINT, CEMENT, BRICKS--ANYTHING THEY COULD CONTRIBUTE. AT THE SAME TIME, ARTISANS HAD OFFERED THEIR SERVICES GRATIS TO DO THE WORK. MOREOVER, CONTINUED SEMI-ASADU PROUDLY, THE CRUSADE HAD PULLED 10,000 FEET. NOTING THE EXPRESSION ON JEFFERSON'S FACE, HE ADDED THAT MOST IRANIAN VILLAGERS HAD NEVER EVEN SEEN A DENTIST. THE VOLUNTEER DENTAL TEAMS THAT WENT OUT TO THE VILLAGERS HAD NEITHER THE TIME NOR THE RESOURCES TO DO FILLINGS AND CROWNS.

4. *THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRUSADE OVER THE PAST FIVE MONTHS, HAD NOT BEEN EASY. OPPOSITION FROM THE BUREAUCRACY ON THE ONE HAND, AND FROM THOSE (UNSPECIFIED) WHO WANTED TO EXPLOIT IT FOR THEIR OWN POLITICAL ENDS, HAD ALMOST ABORTED IT. THREE MONTHS AGO, HE TALKED SHEHINI INTO LAUNCHING HIS GENERAL APPEAL. EVEN PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN (BANI-ASSADI'S FATHER-IN-LAW) HAS BEEN SKEPTICAL ABOUT HANGING THE SPECIAL APPEAL FOR REBUILTING THE SCHOOLS. "IOWAS" AS HE TOOK A LOT OF EMPTY PROPAGANDA. HE APPARENTLY OBeyed TO BANI-ASSADI. BAZARGAN... EXPLAINED BANI-ASSADI... A... AN ENGINEER'S MIND. HE HAD TO HAVE ALL THE ELEMENTS IN A SITUATION FIRMLY IN HAND BEFORE HE WOULD MAKE A MOVE. AND

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

TEHRAN 107

HOWEVER, WAS A TIME BANI-ASSADI PLANS FOR ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF CERTAINTY. IN ANY EVENT, THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION HAD BEEN SO IMPRESSED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE SCHOOL CAMPAIGN THAT HE HAD ASKED THAT IT BE EXTENDED. THIS APPARENTLY BROUGHT PAZARGAN AROUND.

5. TDY ECONOFF EXPLAINED THAT HIS EFFORTS TO EXPLAIN THE CRUSADE AND ALL IT SIMPLIFIED TO WASHINGTON WOULD ENCOUNTER A SIMILAR SKEPTICISM. MUCH HAD BEEN CLAIMED FOR A VERY SHORT TIME WITHOUT MUCH SPECIFICITY AS TO MEANS. BANI-ASSADI SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF TDY ECONOFF COULD VISIT SOME OF THE PROJECTS FOR HIMSELF. HE THEN BACKED OFF A LITTLE, SAYING THAT THE FEELING AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AMONG THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRUSADE WAS PARTICULARLY VIRULENT. LATE THAT NIGHT, HOWEVER, HE CALLED TDY ECONOFF TO SAY THAT HE HAD ARRANGED FOR HIM TO VISIT PROJECTS IN SEIRAZ ON THE FOLLOWING TUESDAY, OCTOBER 9.

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4136

INFO RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JILDA 0362

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0123

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0071

RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0029

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 10766

E.O. 12065: 3DS 10/7/85 (SENS, A.D.) OR-3

TAGS: PINT, EXIN, IR

SUBJECT: BANI-ASSADI: TOWARDS A RESTRUCTURED IRAN

REFS: TEHRAN 10321

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: IN ORDER TO LEARN MORE ABOUT HIS CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION (REFS), TDY ECONOFF CALLED ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HOSSEIN BANI-ASSADI. THE CRUSADE (JIHAD) IS SEEN AS A PRIME MOVER IN A PLAN FOR RESTRUCTURING THE COUNTRY, OF WHICH BANI-ASSADI IS ONE OF THE ARCHITECTS. THIS TEL DISCUSSES THE GOVERNMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE PLAN. SEPARATE MESSAGES WILL DEAL WITH THE CRUSADE ITSELF.

3. GENERALLY, BANI-ASSADI (AND APPARENTLY OTHERS LIKE HIM) HAS FOUND PORTIONS OF THE KORAN, SHARIA AND RELATED SOURCES CONFIRMED BY HIS STUDIES OF MANAGEMENT THEORY IN U.S. UNIVERSITIES. ALTHOUGH MANAGEMENT THEORY IS IN NO WAY CONSIDERED TO BE OF EQUAL DIGNITY WITH THE KORAN, IT SEEMS TO BE ACCEPTED IN SOMEWHAT THE SAME LITERAL FASHION. ASSUMING THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY MOMENTUM CONTINUES, AND THAT BANI-ASSADI HAS THE INFLUENCE THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE, IRAN WILL BE REORGANIZED ON A HIGHLY ECLECTIC THEORETICAL BASE.

4. THAT MANAGEMENT THEORY NORMALLY CONTEMPLATES A MODERN CORPORATION, AND NOT AN ENTIRE DEVELOPING COUNTRY GOING THROUGH A REVOLUTION, DOES NOT SEEM TO PERTURB BANI-ASSADI. HE DOES NOT DOUBT THAT REVOLUTIONARY IRAN COULD PUT INTO POLITICAL PRACTICE MANAGEMENT THEORIES STILL TOO ADVANCED FOR MOST CORPORATIONS. AFTER ALL, SAYS BANI-ASSADI, THE REVOLUTION ITSELF REPRESENTS A MIRACLE. END SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

5. CENTRAL TO BANI-ASSADI'S THINKING IS THE KORANIC EXHORTATION THAT BELIEVERS AVOID DISSENSION, ACHIEVE CONSENSUS, AND ABOVE ALL, PARTICIPATE. JIHAD, HE POINTS OUT, MEANS CRUSADE, BUT ALSO EFFORT OR STRUGGLE. ONE OF THE EVILS OF THE OLD REGIME WHICH LED BANI-ASSADI TO RETURN TO THE U.S. FOR GRADUATE STUDIES WAS ITS PERPETUATION OF AUTOCRACY, AND THE DAMPENING OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND INITIATIVE WHICH GOD IMPOSES ON THE BELIEVING MUSLIM.

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5. AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, BANI-ASSADI STUDIED UNDER PROFESSOR AKOFF, AND ABSORBED HIS THEORY OF "CIRCULAR ORGANIZATION," A MANAGEMENT THEORY DESIGNED TO MITIGATE THE DAMPENING EFFECT ON CREATIVITY AND INITIATIVE OF THE AUTHORITARIAN LEVEL-BY-LEVEL HIERARCHY IN THE NORMAL ORGANIZATION. (I.E., ONE DEALS WITH ONE'S IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR, IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES AND LATERALLY ON THE SAME LEVEL.) ACCORDING TO AKOFF, ONE SHOULD INTERACT NOT WITH ONE, BUT WITH TWO LEVELS ABOVE AND TWO BELOW. OVERLAPPING COMMITTEES AS THE POINT OF INTERACTION AMONG THE DIFFERENT LEVELS, AND CONSENSUS RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL AUTHORITY AS THE SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING, FLOW FROM THIS, AT LEAST AS AKOFF IS INTERPRETED BY BANI-ASSADI.

6. BANI-ASSADI HAS BEEN A PRIME MOVER IN THREE PIECES OF LEGISLATION, TWO PASSED AND ONE PENDING, BEFORE THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE. IN MODIFYING THE CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE GREATER PARTICIPATION AND RESPONSIBILITY AT ALL LEVELS, THEY REFLECT BOTH ISLAM AND AKOFF. SPECIFICALLY, THEY DEAL WITH:

7. POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY. THE BILL STILL PENDING PROVIDES FOR THE DEVOLUTION OF POWER RIGHT DOWN TO THE VILLAGE LEVEL. SKETCHING OUT AN ORGANIZATION CHART, WITH THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION AT TEHRAN AT THE TOP, HE PUT THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS AT THE NEXT LEVEL, AND BELOW THEM, THE SECTION CHIEFS (TRADE, HEALTH, ETC.) IN EACH GOVERNORATE. AT THE BOTTOM WAS A LINE OF BOXES REPRESENTING THE VILLAGES. BETWEEN THE GOVERNORS AND SECTION HEADS IS FOUND A LATERAL BOX FOR A COMMITTEE. BANI-ASSADI DREW AN ARROW FROM TEHRAN TO THIS COMMITTEE, TO EMPHASIZE TWO-LEVEL PARTICIPATION. BETWEEN THE SECTION HEADS AND THE VILLAGES WAS ANOTHER COMMITTEE IN WHICH THE GOVERNORS ALSO PARTICIPATE.

8. BANI-ASSADI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT AKOFF'S MANAGEMENT THEORY DID NOT FIT EXACTLY AT THIS LOWEST LEVEL, SINCE THERE WAS NO SECOND LEVEL BELOW THE PEOPLE IN THE VILLAGES. GENERALLY, HOWEVER, THESE OVERLAPPING COMMITTEES WOULD ENSURE THE PARTICIPATION WHICH WAS AMONG THE PURPOSES OF THE

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EM RUQMRB 40706/02 2320624

ZNY CCCCCC ZZZ

P 002612Z OCT 72

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUFGC/SECSTAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 4137

INFO RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIPR 4138

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 4134

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0072

RUQMRB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0073

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 31 OF 02 TEHRAN 13776

E.O. 12265: GDS 10/7/55 (SEMS, A.D.) OR-E

TAGS: PINT, EFIN, IR

SUBJECT: BANI-ASSADI: TOWARDS A RESTRUCTURED IRAN

REVOLUTION.

9. FISCAL AUTHORITY. TRADITIONALLY, PROCEEDS FROM TAXES COLLECTED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WERE SENT TO TEHRAN, WHERE THEY WERE CENTRALLY APPORTIONED BY MINISTRY AND PROVINCE. THE FIRST OF THE TWO NEW BILLS RECENTLY PASSED WOULD AUTHORIZE COLLECTION AND RETENTION EVEN AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL OF SOME TAXES ALONG WITH COMMUNITY DECISION AS TO HOW THESE REVENUES WOULD BE EXPENDED. THE SAME FISCAL AUTONOMY WOULD BE GRANTED TO CITIES AND PROVINCES.

10. NEITHER THE MANNER IN WHICH THESE COMMUNITIES TAX THEMSELVES (I.E., INCOME, REAL ESTATE, PERSONAL PROPERTY, SALES), NOR THE PURPOSES TO WHICH TAXES WILL BE APPLIED ARE SPELLED OUT IN THE AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION. BANI-ASSADI HAD THE IDEA THAT ONE TAX WOULD BE A SORT OF TRANSIT TAX ON NON-INHABITANTS, "FATHER LIKE THE AIRPORT TAX PAID BY INTERNATIONAL TRAVELLERS." (OR LIKE SPEED TRAPS?)

11. PRESENTLY, BANI-ASSADI WENT ON, LOCALITIES WILL STILL HAVE TO DEPEND ON TEHRAN (AND OIL REVENUES) FOR THE FINANCING OF SCHOOLS, LOCAL ROADS, HOSPITALS, ET AL. IN TIME, HOWEVER, "AS IRAN BECOMES SELF-SUFFICIENT CHIEFLY THROUGH GREATER RELIANCE ON AGRICULTURE," LOCALITIES WILL BE ABLE TO SELF-FINANCE ALL SUCH EXPENSES. AT THAT POINT, OIL REVENUES COULD BE DEDICATED EXCLUSIVELY TO MAJOR PROJECTS OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE.

12. CRUSADE. WHAT WOULD MAKE THE SYSTEM WORK, BANI-ASSADI INSISTED, WAS THE ENTHUSIASM UNLEASHED BY THE REVOLUTION, AND A DESIRE FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT HITHERTO UNKNOWN IN IRAN. THIS ENTHUSIASM WAS LIKE MOLTEN METAL, WHICH HAD TO BE PROPERLY INSTITUTIONALIZED BEFORE IT COOLED, AFTER WHICH IT WOULD BE TOO LATE. THE CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION WAS A PRINCIPAL MEANS OF KEEPING THIS REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT "MOLTEN" WHILE THESE NEW INSTITUTIONS WERE BEING SHAPED. NEVER BEFORE IN HISTORY. RHAPSODIZED BANI-ASSADI, HAD SUCH GENUINE ENTHUSIASM BEEN AROUSED.

13. THE CRUSADE IS DISCUSSED IN FOLLOWING MESSAGES LAINGEN

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DE RUQMHP #1516 3741421

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIAC IMMEDIATE 4575

INFO RUUTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0420

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 11516

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/31/85 (KENNEDY, MOOREHEAD) OR-E

TAGS: PEPR, IR

SUBJECT: SHAH'S MEDICAL TREATMENT: DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER BANI-ASSADI PROTESTS

REFS: A. TEHRAN 11005; B. TEHRAN 17786;

1. C-ENTIRE TTX.

2. IN THE COURSE OF A CALL BY TTY ECONOFF TO DISCUSS
THE CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION (REFS), BANI-ASSADI
EXPRESSED DEEP BITTERNESS OVER U.S. ADMISSION OF SHAH
FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. WHY, HE ASKED, COULD NOT THE SHAH
BE TREATED IN MEXICO? WHY WOULD NOT THE U.S. ALLOW TWO
QUALIFIED IRANIAN PHYSICIANS TO EXAMINE HIM? EVEN
ASSUMING THAT INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO THE IRANIAN
PHYSICIANS, HOW COULD THE PCOI BE SURE THAT IT WAS CORRECT?

3. BANI-ASSADI DID NOT COMMENT ON TTY ECONOFF'S STOCK
ANSWERS. CLEARLY HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SHAH WAS
ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF MEDICAL ETHICS. "THE MAN IS
A CRIMINAL. HE SHOULD BE EXTRADITED," SAID BANI-ASSADI.

4. COMMENT: ONLY BY SWITCHING THE SUBJECT BACK TO THE
CRUSADE (SEPTET) AND HIS ADMIRATION OF IT WAS TTY ECONOFF
ABLE TO RESTORE THE USUAL PLEASANT TONE OF HIS CONVERSATIONS
WITH BANI-ASSADI. REFLIGIOUS, A DEEP BELIEVER IN
THE REVOLUTION, BUT ALSO AN ADMIRER OF THE U.S., BANI-
ASSADI SEEMED MORE HURT THAN ANYTHING ELSE BY THE
DECISION TO ADMIT THE SHAH. THERE WOULD, HE SAID, BE
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DEMONSTRATORS IN FRONT OF THE
EMBASSY ON NOVEMBER 1. ALL THAT WAS PLANNED WAS THE
PRESENTATION OF A DEMONSTRANCE. LAINGEN

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STAT 11/4/79
ECON:MKKENNEDY
ECON:MKKENNEDY:KJG
NONE
ECON-3 CHARGE POL, CHRON

MK A
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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, PRIORITY

E.O. 12065: GDS 11/4/85 (KENNEDY, M.) OR-E
TAGS: ECON, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION: DISCUSSION WITH
DEPUTY PM BANI-ASSADI.

REF: TEHRAN 11005

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE CRUSADE (JEHAD), SAID BANI-ASSADI, WAS FACING MAJOR PROBLEMS, WHICH WERE ONLY BEGINNING TO SURFACE. THE BUREAUCRACY, MUCH OF WHICH WAS NOT YET PERMEATED WITH THE IDEALS OF THE REVOLUTION (COMMENT: AN UNDERSTATEMENT) HAD LITTLE USE FOR THE ARDENT VOLUNTEERS IN THE CRUSADE. THE FIERCELY INDEPENDENT VOLUNTEERS, FOR THEIR PART, HAD NO USE FOR THE BUREAUCRACY. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY WOULD COMMANDEER PUBLIC VEHICLES AT WILL, WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OR ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY.

3. TDY ECONOFF REMARKED THAT A U.S. BUSINESSMAN IN THE SOUTH HAD COMPLAINED THAT THE JEHAD HAD WALKED OFF WITH 41 OF HIS JOINT VENTURE'S VEHICLES. "YES," REPLIED BANI-ASSADI, "AND THEN THESE BUSINESSMEN, QUITE CORRECTLY, PRESENT THE PGOI WITH THE BILL."

4. THE JEHAD, CONTINUED BANI-ASSADI, WAS A CREATION OF THE PGOI WHICH CONTINUED TO FUND IT. NEVERTHELESS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LATEST MANAGEMENT THEORY, IT WAS STRUCTURED TO AVOID HIERARCHY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CENTRAL OFFICE IN TEHRAN PROVIDED ONLY A SUPPORT FUNCTION. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, SHIRAZ CALLED IN FOR MORE PIPE FOR WATER-SUPPLY PROJECTS, THE SUPPORT OFFICE WOULD MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

5. ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE JEHAD WAS "CHAOTIC", BANI-ASSADI WANTED TO DO NOTHING WHICH WOULD SPOIL THE SPONTANEITY OF THE VOLUNTEERS. THEY WOULD REMAIN UNPAID (EXCEPT THAT A "SANDUQ", OR

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TREASURE CHEST, WAS BEING ESTABLISHED FOR THOSE IN FINANCIAL NEED), AT THE SAME TIME, SOME REGULATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE JEHAD WITH THE NORMAL FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE DEVELOPED. DID TDY ECONOFF HAVE ANY IDEAS? LAINGEN##

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

TEHRAN 1362

C 280926Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3440
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 01362

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CHRG: STATE 1/28/79
APPR: MIN:OWAS
INTE: POL:IFPATTERSON
CLAR: POL:GBIAMPRAKIS
DISTR: POL 3 AMB MIN
ECCN-2 PM CR
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CHRON/13

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/28/85 (PATTERSON, D.R.) OR-P
TAGS: IR
SUBJECT: (C) SUGGESTED CONTACTS

REF: STATE 22223

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR RECHECKING TELEPHONE NUMBER OF KHOMEINI AIDE BANI-SADR'S BROTHER. WE RECEIVED 847856 WHICH IS NOT EPT NOT HIS NUMBER. IF COTTAM DOES NOT HAVE ANOTHER NUMBER FOR BANI-SADR, PLEASE ASK WHETHER HE KNOWS ANY OTHER CHANNELS (FRIENDS, WORK COLLEAGUES OR RELATIVES) THROUGH WHICH PATTERSON MIGHT CONTACT BANI-SADR. PLEASE GIVE COTTAM OUR THANKS FOR LIST.
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4074

INFO RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0394

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 2 TEHRAN 11155

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

OR GR: STAT 10/22/79

APPRV: ECON:ALBINS

DRAFT: ECON:MCKENNEY:KJG

CLEAR: NONE

DISTR: ECON-3 CHANGE POL

ICA CHRON

7/WEB

E.O.12065: GDS 10/22/95 (SENS, A.D.) OR-E.

TAGS: ECON, ETIN, EINV, IR

SUBJECT: BANI-SADR

REF: TEHRAN 10827

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ECONOFFS SPENT AN HOUR ON OCTOBER 22 WITH ABOL-HASSAN BANI-SADR, ISLAMIC ECONOMIST AND INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES HAD ALREADY WARNED THAT BANI-SADR HAS A TENDENCY TO BE ELUSIVE IN HIS REPLIES, AND EVEN CONTRADICTORY, AS MAY BE APPARENT IN WHAT FOLLOWS.

3. ROLE OF THE CLERGY, NOT EMBARRASSED TO USE THE TERM MULOCRACY, BANI-SADR CONCEDED THAT THE CLERGY VERY MUCH HAVE THE FINAL WORD. HE COMPARED THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT TO A MINISTRY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TO A PARLIAMENT (UPON WHICH, PRESUMABLY, THE TENURE OF THE MINISTRY DEPENDS). ALL MAJOR PROJECTS, AS WELL AS AGREEMENTS TO COMPENSATE FORMER AMERICAN CONTRACTORS, ARE FIRST APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENT, AND THEN BY THE COUNCIL.

4. WITH REGARD TO UNION AGREEMENTS, BANI-SADR DUCKED A QUESTION ON GTE, SAYING THAT A DRAFT OF A NEW ARRANGEMENT HAD NOT AS YET COME TO HIS ATTENTION. HE COULD, HOWEVER, TAKE THE APPROVAL OF SUCH MAJOR PROJECTS AS THE NEW PORT AT BANDAR ABBAS, AND THE NEW TEHRAN AIRPORT, AS INDICATIVE OF THE DIRECTION WHICH GOI WISHES TO FOLLOW. AS A LATER STAGE IN THE CONVERSATION, HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT THE PATTERN OF MAJOR PROJECTS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SHAH, INCLUDING PORTS AND AIRPORTS, WERE OBVIOUSLY AT THE BEHEST OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES. THE TWO PROJECTS NOTED ABOVE HAD BEEN CONCEIVED UNDER THE FORMER REGIME. THE CONTRADICTION, THE FIRST OF SEVERAL DURING THE CONVERSATION, EVIDENTLY DID NOT TROUBLE BANI-SADR. LATER ON, WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE NEW REGIME FAVORED FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AND THE INPUT OF TECHNOLOGY, ETC. THAT SUCH PROJECTS REPRESENT, BANI-SADR REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, NOTING ONLY THAT THE NEW INVESTMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE FOR THE BENEFIT OF IRAN, AND NOT FOR THE BENEFIT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS.

5. BANI-SADR CONFIRMED THAT THE CLERGY AND KOMITERS WERE SEEKING PRICE INFORMATION FROM BAZARIS ON IMPORTED GOODS: HOW MUCH THEY HAD PAID THE FOREIGN SUPPLIER, AND WHAT THEIR MARKUP WAS. BANI-SADR EXPLAINED THAT PRICE JAGBONING WAS A TRADITIONAL CIRIFICAL FUNCTION IN IRAN. HIS GRANDFATHER, A MULLAH, HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR DROPPING

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TEHRAN 11155

1. PRICE OF CUCUMBERS DRAMATICALLY IN HAMADAN. NONE WAS SOLD UNTIL THE PRICE BECAME MORE REASONABLE. BANI-SADR CONCEDED THAT CONTEMPORARY MARKETS WERE MORE COMPLEX THAN CUCUMBERS IN HAMADAN.

6. ASKED ABOUT THE IDLING OF FIFTY PERCENT OF IRAN'S INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY AND HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT, BANI-SADR OBSERVED THAT MUCH OF THE SO-CALLED EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE SHAH WAS DISGUISED UNEMPLOYMENT. UNNECESSARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY MANPOWER WERE MEANS BY WHICH THE SHAH CONCEALED A SERIOUS PROBLEM. EVERY YEAR, HE SAID, ONE MILLION PERSONS JOIN THE WORKFORCE, CHIEFLY IN TEHRAN. RURAL DEVELOPMENT, AN IMPORTANT GOAL OF THE NEW REGIME, HAD THE ADDITIONAL DIMENSION OF GETTING PEOPLE OUT OF THE CITIES AND BACK ONTO THE LAND.

7. MOST OF THE INDUSTRIES NOW IN DIFFICULTIES, BANI-SADR WENT ON, SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE FIRST PLACE. THEY WERE A "FANTASY" SATISFYING THE NEEDS OF THE UPPER CRUST, AND, OF COURSE, THE GREED OF THE MULTINATIONALS. WHY, FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD IRAN HAVE SIX AUTOMOBILE ASSEMBLY PLANTS? ONE SHOULD SUFFICE, AND THAT SHOULD NOT MERELY ASSEMBLE THE FOREIGN COMPONENTS BUT FABRICATE THE ENTIRE VEHICLE. EVEN IN THE UNITED STATES, HE WENT ON, IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED THAT 55 PERCENT OF ALL MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS CONSUMED BY THE PUBLIC SERVE NO REAL NEED. THEREFORE, THE FIRST STAGE (OF THREE) IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF IRAN WILL INCLUDE A REALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO SERVE TRULY PRODUCTIVE ENDS AND GETTING THE PEOPLE "ENGAGED" IN THE SECOND PHASE CONSUMER GOODS WILL BE REINTRODUCED. THE THIRD PHASE WILL COME INTO BEING WHEN IRAN IS CAPABLE OF PLAYING "AN INDEPENDENT ROLE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY." THIS PROCESS OVERALL IS EXPECTED TO TAKE 20 TO 25 YEARS.

8. ELSEWHERE IN THE CONVERSATION, HOWEVER, BANI-SADR CONCEIVED THAT DURING THE FIRST STAGE, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN EMPLOYMENT, THUS ALSO CONCEDED THAT REDUNDANT FACTORIES WOULD HAVE TO BE KEPT IN OPERATION.

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10. BANI-SADR'S VIEWING IN THE PROFITS OF THE NEW PRICE POLICY IS NOT THE INTEREST OF THE NEW PRICE POLICY, BUT THE INTEREST OF THE NEW PRICE POLICY. HE SAW THE REASON OF THE NEW PRICE POLICY AS OF EVEN WIDER SCOPE, AIMED AT ENDING THE EXPLOITATION BY MIDDLEMEN OF PRIMARY PRODUCERS. A VERY SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE PRICE PAID BY THE CONSUMER OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IS RETAINED BY THE FARMER. THE VILLAGE MONEY LENDER SKIMS OFF AN EXHORBITANT AMOUNT, AND THE VILLAGERS HAVE NO OTHER WAY TO GET OPERATING CREDIT. THE CONSOLIDATION OF BANKS RECENTLY BEGUN (REF), WILL TERMINATE REDUNDANT BRANCHES AND PERSONNEL. BANI-SADR HOPED THAT THESE PERSONNEL COULD BE RETAINED AS BANKING AGENTS, TO GET INTO THE VILLAGES TO MAKE OPERATING CREDIT AVAILABLE IN WAYS THAT THE VILLAGES CAN AFFORD.

10. BANI-SADR CONCEDED THAT THESE FAR-REACHING CHANGES WOULD NOT BE EASY TO PUT INTO EFFECT, ESPECIALLY DURING A REVOLUTION. "WE HAVE NO CHOICE," HE SAID, "UNDER THE OLD REGIME, THE COUNTRY WOULD HAVE DIED."

11. COMMENT: BANI-SADR REFERS TO HIMSELF AS AN ECONOMIST, BUT SEEMS MUCH MORE INTERESTED IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. WHEN ASKED ABOUT ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS HE EITHER CHANGES THE SUBJECT OR EXPLAINS THAT HE LEAVES THE DETAILS TO OTHERS. HE EXPRESSES CONTEMPT FOR BUREAUCRACY, BUT SUGGESTS HE WOULD DO A GOOD JOB AS A DEPARTMENTAL MINISTER. HE CRITICIZES MINISTERIAL DECISIONS AND CRITICIZES FAILURES TO MAKE DECISIONS. HE CLAIMS HE WANTS TO LEAD WHEN IN FACT HE LECTURES. HE IS ABSTRACT AND ELUSIVE. YET AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE IN THE NEW REGIME. HE SEEMS TO BE A BUNDLE OF CONTRADICTIONS. WHETHER HIS IS AN HONEST CONFUSION, OR DEVICESNESS, WAS NOT CLEAR TO EMROFFS.

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**STADIS
ACTION**

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: KHOMEINI CONTACT

AMERICAN ACADEMIC EXPERT RECENTLY GAVE DEPTOFF NAME OF
MOHAMMED TAVASSOLI (TEHRAN TELEPHONE 243-906), IDENTIFYING
HIM AS PERSON PREFERRED BY KHOMEINI GROUP FOR CONTACT WITH
EMBASSY SHOULD THAT EVER BE DESIRABLE OR PRACTICAL. VANCE
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SECRET/EXDIS

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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2792

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E C R E T SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00368

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محمد تهرانی

CHRG: STATE 1-9-79

PPPV: DCM:CNAAAS

REFID: POL:JOSTEMPEL:LL

CLEAR: POL:GFLAMBRACIS

DISTR: DCM-2 AMB ~~PL~~

DUMMY/CHRON

F.O. 12065: RDS 1-8-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, PINR, PORS, PGOV, IR

SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT'S (LMI) NEAR-TERM POSTURE

SUMMARY: LMI'S TAVASSOLI TOLD EMBOFF LMI PLANS MANY DEMONSTRATIONS JAN 8 TO ECLIPSE "FEEBLE" JAN 7 EFFORTS. LMI WILL ISSUE NO RPT NO STRONG STATEMENT AGAINST BAKHTIAR GOVT FOR A FEW DAYS, WAITING TO SEE IF AND HOW BAKHTIAR GETS SHAH TO LEAVE. STRIKES WILL CONTINUE, HOWEVER. SOURCE EXPLAINED LMI SOLUTION TO IRANIAN IMPASSE AND EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER GROWING TUDER AND OTHER EXTREMIST STRENGTH. END SUMMARY.

1. LMI'S MOHAMMAD TAVASSOLI CALLED ON EMBOFF STEMPEL EVENING JAN 7 TO DISCUSS PRESENT SITUATION. TAVASSOLI MADE POINT OF SAYING SITUATION IN IRAN OVER PAST SIX MONTHS HAD UNFOLDED AS LMI HAD FEARED IT WOULD, AND SHAH WAS HANGING ON DESPITE OVERWHELMING PERCEPTION OF "THE PEOPLE" THAT HE HAD TO GO. HE GAVE EMBOFF COPY OF KHOMEINI ANNOUNCEMENT DISTRIBUTED IN TEHRAN JAN 7 WHICH CALLED BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT ILLEGAL, CALLED FOR CONTINUATION OF STRIKES IN ALL SECTORS, ASKED MINISTRY EMPLOYEES TO PREVENT NEW MINISTERS FROM COMING TO THEIR OFFICES, AND URGED ALL CITIZENS NOT RPT NOT TO PAY TAXES, INCLUDING WATER AND LIGHT BILLS. TO THIS END, LMI WILL SPONSOR MANY SMALLER RALLIES JAN 8 WHICH WILL BE DESIGNED TO SHOW MOVEMENT'S STRENGTH. TAVASSOLI HOPED THESE WOULD BE PEACEFUL, BUT SAID LMI WAS READY FOR OTHER EVENTUALITIES.

2. DESCRIBING BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT AS VIRTUALLY INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM ANY NATIONAL FRONT (INF) GOVERNMENT. TAVASSOLI SAID LMI BELIEVES BAKHTIAR AND SANJABI ARE REALLY COLLUDING WITH SHAH AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF IRANIAN PEOPLE. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S. TO DISCERN WHERE ITS TRUE INTERESTS LIE AND NOT BE FOOLED BY "FALSE" COALITION GOVERNMENT. EMBOFF OFFERED MILD REJOINER THAT BAKHTIAR SEEMED TO BE ON VERGE OF ACHIEVING WHAT LMI WANTED--DEPARTURE OF SHAH. SOURCE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND SAID LMI WOULD NOT BE ISSUING STRONG STATEMENT AGAINST BAKHTIAR BECAUSE MOVEMENT WOULD BE WAITING TO SEE IF AND HOW SHAH LEAVES COUNTRY. IT WAS NOT ENOUGH FOR SHAH TO GO ON VACATION; PEOPLE OF IRAN WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY SOLUTION WHICH DID NOT MEET WITH KHOMEINI APPROVAL (I.E. SHAH HAS TO GO). EMBOFF EXPLORED THIS POSITION. WHILE TAVASSOLI WAFFLED ON QUESTION OF WHETHER SHAH'S DEPARTURE ON VACATION WOULD BE CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY FIRST STEP, IT WAS CLEAR LMI HAS RETAINED HARD POSITION THAT SHAH MUST BE FORCED TO ABDICATE.

5 IF SHAH DOES NOT LEAVE, OR MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PLANS TO

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SECRET/EXDIS

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STRIKE HAD BEEN SETTLED UNTIL KROMBINI HAD GIVEN HIS PERMISSION. NEWSPAPERMEN HAD WAITED UNTIL KROMBINI PERSONALLY HAD OK'D THEIR EFFORTS BEFORE AGREEING TO FINISH.

6. IN BRIEF DISCUSSION OF PROSPECT OF MILITARY TAKEOVER, TAVASSOLI EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT U.S. HAD APPARENTLY ACTED TO RESTRAIN IRANIAN MILITARY, AND EMROFF REPEATED THAT US FAVORED CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION, NOT MILITARY COUP. TAVASSOLI SAID LMI WAS GREATLY RELIEVED THAT GEN. OVEISSI HAD DEPARTED AND CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS OVEISSI WHO HAD WORRIED LMI WHEN TAVASSOLI LAST SPOKE TO EMROFF ABOUT PROSPECTS OF MILITARY COUP.

7. COMMENT: MEETING TOOK PLACE BEFORE NEWS OF GENERAL JAM'S RESIGNATION BECAME KNOWN EARLY JAN 8. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT, DEPENDING ON FALLOUT FROM JAM DEPARTURE, LMI MAY ADVANCE IT'S TIMETABLE FOR PRESSING BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. SULLIVAN

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TEHRAN 6211

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Delvan
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STATE 6/14/79
APPRV: CHARGE: CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL: JDSTEMPSEL:
CLEAR: POL: VLTOMSETH
DISTR: CHG POL-3 OR
ECOM ICA RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/14/85 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PGOV, SHUM, IR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH TEHRAN MAYOR TAVASSOLI

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE.)

2. SUMMARY: TAVASSOLI SAID REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATION SUFFERS FROM LACK OF MONEY AND INDISCIPLINE OF WORKERS. HE URGED US UNDERSTANDING OF REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. END SUMMARY.

3. TEHRAN MAYOR TAVASSOLI ASKED DEPARTING POLOFF STEMPEL TO CALL ON HIM AT HIS OFFICE. STEMPEL HAD NOT SEEN TAVASSOLI SINCE DECEMBER, AND MAYOR WELCOMED HIM WARMLY AS OLD FRIEND. AFTER BRIEF DISCUSSION ON SUCCESS OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, TAVASSOLI (DISPLAYING BETTER SENSE OF HUMOR THAN POLOFF HAS EVER SEEN) SAID RUNNING "REVOLUTIONARY TEHRAN" WASN'T THE KIND OF JOB HE HAD EXPECTED. SAME PROBLEMS EXISTED WITH MUNICIPALITY AS WITH NATIONAL GOVERNMENT--LACK OF MONEY AND INDISCIPLINE OF WORK FORCE. POLOFF COMMENTED THAT TEHRAN SERVICES HAD GOTTEN BACK TO NORMAL FAIRLY QUICKLY GIVEN REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION. TAVASSOLI REPLIED, "YES, BUT YOU DON'T KNOW HOW OFTEN I HAVE TO TALK TO THE WORKERS TO MAKE THEM UNDERSTAND OUR PROBLEMS." HE SAID TEHRAN METRO WAS BEING REVIEWED, AND CONTRACTS APPEARED VERY ONE-SIDED; SUCH THINGS TOOK MUCH TIME. MAYOR ADMITTED HE WORKED AT LEAST A 23-HOUR DAY; CALLS EVEN REACHED HIM LATE AT NIGHT.

4. TAVASSOLI SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE PLEA FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN AMERICA. HE SAID U.S. "SHOULD BEHAVE IN A WAY THAT WILL KEEP RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES." POLOFF REPLIED IN SPIRIT OF FRANK FRIENDSHIP THAT SUGGESTION CUT BOTH WAYS. THERE FOLLOWED SHORT DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS FORCED ON BOTH COUNTRIES BY RECENT EVOLUTION OF SITUATION. TAVASSOLI ASKED FOR UNDERSTANDING ON CASE OF CONTRACTS WITH UNFAIR CANCELLATION CLAUSES, ASSISTANCE WITH GRAIN SHIPMENTS, AND A "FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE" ON SPARE PARTS. POLOFF SAID U.S. ATTITUDES WOULD PROBABLY REFLECT PGOI AND KHOMEINI ATTITUDES AND SAID FRANKLY OUTPUT FROM SENIOR FIGURES WAS NOT VERY REASSURING OR HELP-INDUCING. TAVASSOLI ADMITTED THAT SOME STATEMENTS WERE EXTREME, BUT NOTED USG SHOULD STOP ANTI-ISLAMIC CAMPAIGN IN AMERICAN PRESS. POLOFF SAID SHAH'S MEN HAD MADE EXACTLY SAME POINT A YEAR EARLIER. IT WOULD HELP IF MORE IRANIANS UNDERSTOOD NATURE OF U.S. FREE PRESS. POLOFF SAID THERE WERE SOME THINGS PGOI AND KHOMEINI WERE DOING THAT WENT AGAINST OUR VALUES, SUCH AS THE REVOLUTIONARY EXECUTIONS AND SUPPRES-

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TEHRAN 6211

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TEHRAN 621

SION OF WOMEN. PGOI COULD EXPECT UNFAVORABLE PRESS COVERAGE OF THIS, AND THERE WAS LITTLE ANYONE COULD DO ABOUT IT. POLOFF SUGGESTED ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SHOULD DO BETTER JOB OF PUBLICIZING ITS POSITIVE ASPECTS, AND TAVASSOLI READILY AGREED.

5. AT END OF DISCUSSION, TAVASSOLI DEFENDED NEED FOR REVOLUTIONARY TRIALS, BUT SAID THEY HAD NOT BEEN CARRIED OUT WELL. HE ASCRIBED THIS TO SWIFTNESS OF REVOLUTIONARY VICTORY AND LACK OF JUDICIAL PREPARATION. IN INTERESTING SIDE COMMENT, HE SAID IT WAS "IMPOSSIBLE" FOR ISLAMIC MOVEMENT TO TURN SUCH TRIALS OVER TO MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS, SINCE THESE WERE ALL "SLAVES OF THE SHAH." (COMMENT: TAVASSOLI IS A LEFTIST MEMBER OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, BUT HIS STATEMENT REFLECTS "WE BROTHERS" SPIRIT OF MOST COMMITTED ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARIES, AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PLACE BEYOND THE PALE THOSE WHO WORKED IN ANY WAY FOR OLD REGIME.) POLOFF GAVE TAVASSOLI NAME OF HIS SUCCESSOR, AND MAYOR HAD NO TROUBLE WITH THE IDEA OF SEEING OFFICIAL U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM TIME TO TIME.

NAAS

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#6211

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6211

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TEHRAN 5232

DE RUQMNR.#5232 141 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210723Z MAY 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1555
BT

CLASS: LIMITED OFFICIAL
CHRG: STATE 5/21/79
APPRV: CHARGE: CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL: JDSTEMPEL
CLEAR: POL: VTOMSETH
DISTR: CHG POL-3 OR
ECON ICA RF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 05232

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: SHAHABI REQUEST FOR INFO ON FEDERALISM

REF: TEHRAN 5207

1. (ACTION CABLE.)
2. DURING CHARGE'S MEETING WITH MINSTATE FOR REVOLUTION-ARY AFFAIRS SHAHABI (REFTEL), SHAHABI ASKED IF U.S. COULD PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION ON WORKINGS OF FEDERAL SYSTEM, ESPECIALLY DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN CENTER AND STATES.
3. SHAHABI READS BOTE FRENCH AND ENGLISH, BUT FRENCH BETTER THAN ENGLISH, AND WE THOUGHT IF YOU WERE ABLE TO OBTAIN MATERIAL FROM ICA OR LOCAL ACADEMIC SOURCES, ESPECIALLY ANYTHING ON SUBJECT IN FRENCH, THIS WOULD BE CHANCE FOR YOU TO BE RESPONSIVE PERSONALLY TO REQUEST FOR USC HELP IN AREA WHICH IS NOT FRAUGHT WITH LOCAL SENSITIVITY AND YET IS IMPORTANT FOR INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT. NAAS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TEHRAN 5230

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5207

DI RUOMEE #5207 140 **
ZNY CCCCC 22H
O 221212Z MAY 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1540
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05207

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STATE
APPRV: CHG: CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL: JDSTEMPEL
CLEAR: POL: VTOMSETH
DISTR: POL

F.O. 12065: GDS 5/20/85 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-F
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PINR, IR
SUBJ: MEETING WITH MINISTER SAHABI

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE)

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE DISCUSSED WITH MINISTER SAHABI U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS. MINISTER EXPRESSED HOPE CURRENT MIS-UNDERSTANDINGS WOULD NOT IMPED GOOD TIES WHICH PGOI WANTS. SAHABI TALKED OF NEW GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND SHOWED ACTIVE INTEREST IN FEDERAL SYSTEM. BIO NOTE. END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE AND ACTING POLCOMUS CALLED ON MINISTER OF STATE FOR REVOLUTIONARY AFFAIRS DR. YADOLLAH SAHABI MORNING MAY 20. SAHABI RECEIVED AMERICANS IN PLEASANT, GRACEFUL OLD-WORLD PERSIAN MANNER AND DISCUSSION WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT. FOLLOWING ARE IMPORTANT POINTS:

4. AFTER CHARGE EXPRESSED U.S. INTEREST IN GOOD TIES WITH NEW PGOI AND ASSURED MINISTER THAT USG WAS NOT RPT NOT INTERFERING IN IRAN AND WOULD NOT DO SO, SAHABI IMMEDIATELY AND IN AN UNDERSTANDING MANNER EXPRESSED REGRETS FOR MEDIA ATTACKS ON USG IN WAKE OF PUBLICITY GIVEN JAVITS RESOLUTION ON IRAN. SAHABI SAID IRAN IS IN REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD AND AFFIRMED TWICE THAT BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH U.S. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE MANY QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED BETWEEN IRAN AND U.S. AND REGRETTED VERY MUCH THAT QUOTE MISUNDERSTANDINGS UNQUOTE WERE MARRING PUBLIC SCENE. FORMIN WOULD BE CALLING TO TALK TO CHARGE ABOUT PROBLEM (YAZDI DID CALL; SEE SEPTEL ON LATER MEETING). HE SAID THAT MUCH OF WHAT WAS IN RESOLUTION WAS TRUE; SOME OF WHAT PRESS IN IRAN WAS SAYING IS TRUE. IRAN IS IN A REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION--EVEN QUESTION AS SIMPLE AS THAT OF NEW PASSPORTS IS NOT RESOLVED YET. ROLE OF REVOLUTIONARY COURTS, MASS DEMONSTRATIONS AND VARIOUS MOVEMENTS ARE ALL CHANGING. IRAN'S PROBLEMS WILL BE WORKED OUT, BUT IT WILL TAKE TIME. CHARGE COMMENTED THAT EXECUTIONS AND TRIALS WITHOUT INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED STANDARDS CAUSED U.S. AND OTHERS TO THINK MORE BADLY OF THE REVOLUTION THAN THEY WOULD OTHERWISE. WITH OBVIOUS PAIN IN HIS BROW, SAHABI SAID QUOTE YOU ARE RIGHT; WE ARE NOT HAPPY WITH THESE EXECUTIONS OURSELVES. BUT WHAT CAN YOU EXPECT? IF THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT STAY IN OFFICE, THERE WILL BE NO HOPE FOR STABILITY. END QUOTE. (COMMENT: WE THINK HE IS PROBABLY RIGHT.) SAHABI SAID COURTS WERE A SHORT TERM EXPEDIENT WHICH WOULD NOT LAST; PGOI WANTED TO WIND THEM UP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT IT WOULD TAKE A LITTLE TIME.

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TEHRAN 5207

CONFIDENTIAL

TERRAN 5207

CHARGE ASKED ABOUT NEW GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE. SAHABI REPLIED THAT DRAFT CONSTITUTION WOULD BE RELEASED WITHIN TWO WEEKS. CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD BE CALLED WITHIN 30 TO 60 DAYS. PGOI EXPECTED ASSEMBLY TO LAST A MAXIMUM OF FOUR MONTHS, WITH ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT AND THE PARLIAMENT TO FOLLOW TOWARD THE END OF THIS YEAR. WITH RESPECT TO RELATIONSHIP OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS TO NEW GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, SAHABI SAID THIS CONFUSES EVEN MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT. FOR NOW, DR. MUSTAFA GHAMRAN IS THE HEAD OF THE GUARDS, BUT HE IS NOT YET NOT A DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. DEPUTY PM BANI-ASSADI HAS NO REPORTED CONNECTION WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS.

6. SAHABI SAID HIS OWN OFFICE, THE BUREAU OF REVOLUTIONARY AFFAIRS, WILL BE IN CHARGE OF REVIEWING ALL LAWS AND HARMONIZING THEM WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE THANKED ACTING POLCOMS FOR SENDING HIM A COPY OF THE U.S. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. AFTER DISCUSSION OF FEDERAL SYSTEM, INCLUDING DUAL LINES OF GOVERNMENT AND STATE AND FEDERAL TAX STRUCTURES, SAHABI SAID THAT IF WE HAD ANY MORE MATERIAL ON U.S. FEDERAL STRUCTURE, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IT. PGOI PLANNED TO REMAKE IRAN INTO FEDERATED SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT TO HELP EASE TRIBAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS OF DECENTRALIZATION. CHARGE SAID USG WOULD BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFO (SEE SUPPL).

7. BIO. NOTE: SAHABI IS IN HIS 30'S AND A CLOSE, LONG-TIME FRIEND OF PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN. OTHERS WHO HAVE SEEN HIM HAVE NOT BEEN IMPRESSED WITH HIS GRASP OF PROBLEMS AND COHERENCE, BUT DURING THIS MEETING HE EXHIBITED SOPHISTICATED VIEW OF IRAN'S PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL AND REMAINED ALERT THROUGHOUT. HE HAS NO INDEPENDENT POWER BASE, HOWEVER, AND MUST BE COUNTED AMONG THE PGOI'S SECULARISTS. HIS REACTION TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS AND U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS MADE IT CLEAR HE LACKS SYMPATHY FOR THE KHOMEINI ENTourage. HE IS OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF INSTITUTIONALIZING THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, AND SPOKE FORCEFULLY ON THE NEED TO GET A NEW GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE IN PLACE. HE IS ONE OF THE REVOLUTION'S ELDER STATESMEN. NAAS

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TERRAN 5207

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دکتر علی شریعتداری

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 05218

DL RUJMR 45218 140 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201306Z MAY 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1547
INFO RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05218

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STATE 5/20/79
APPRV: CHARGE: CWNAAS
DRFTD: ICA:JSHELLENBERG

AM
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG POL OR
ECON ICA RF

P.O. 12065: GDS 5/20/65 (SHELLENBERGER, J.) OR-O
TAGS: SEDU, IR

SUBJECT: CALL ON DR. SHARIAT-MADARI, MINISTER OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: MINISTER RECEIVED CHARGE AND PAO MAY 20
AND DURING NEARLY ONE HOUR VISIT OUTLINED GENERAL POLICIES
RESPECTING IRANIAN STUDENT STUDY ABROAD, LANGUAGE TRAINING,
EXCHANGE OF PROFESSORS, VISITING U.S. IRANOLOGISTS, ETC.
ON THE GENERAL US-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP, THE MINISTER, IN
A VERY PERSONALIZED MANNER, TICKED OFF A NUMBER OF PAST
USG SINS. ON THE WHOLE, THE CONVERSATION WAS LOW KEY
AND WITHOUT POLEMICS, AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT FROM AN ACADEMIC
WHOSE SPECIALTY IS PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND WHO HAS
TAUGHT AT U.S. UNIVERSITIES. END SUMMARY.

3. THE MINISTER RECEIVED US WITHOUT CEREMONY, INTRODUCED
A COLLEAGUE FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AND IMMEDIATELY RAISED
THE SUBJECT OF STUDENT ORIENTATION AND PREPARATION FOR
STUDY ABROAD. HE BELIEVES MUCH BETTER LANGUAGE PREPARA-
TION IS ESSENTIAL AND WOULD THINK CANDIDATES FOR STUDY
ABROAD SHOULD HAVE ONE TO TWO YEARS INTENSIVE PREPARATION.
HE ASKED WHETHER THE IRAN AMERICA SOCIETY WAS HOLDING
CLASSES AND SEEMED PLEASED TO HEAR THAT IT WAS. PAO
DESCRIBED FORMER ORIENTATION PROGRAMS AT IAS AND EXPRESSED
READINESS TO RESUME THOSE WHEN AND AS MINISTRY IS READY.
MINISTER SAID THE NEW QUALIFYING EXAM FOR THOSE SEEKING
STUDENT PASSPORTS FOR STUDY ABROAD WOULD BE HELD AS EARLY
AS NEXT WEEK AND HE ANTICIPATED A CONSIDERABLE DROP IN THE
NUMBER OF PASSPORTS WHICH WILL BE ISSUED. HE PROJECTED A
MUCH MORE COMPREHENSIVE ENGLISH TEACHING PROGRAM IN IRAN
AND SAW NO PROBLEM WITH ISSUANCE OF WORK PERMITS TO
FOREIGNERS WHO WOULD COME TO TEACH LANGUAGES HERE.

4. ON INSTITUTIONAL EXCHANGES OF PROFESSORS, THE MINISTER
COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON THE FULBRIGHT PROGRAM, BUT WENT ON
TO SAY THAT THE UNIVERSITIES HERE WILL BE DISCOURAGING
OVERSEAS TRAVEL BY IRANIAN PROFESSORS FOR THE TIME BEING.
HE DOES NOT BELIEVE IRAN CAN SPARE PROFESSORS EVEN FOR
BRIEF PERIODS ABROAD. ON THE OVER-ALL QUESTION OF INTRA
UNIVERSITY LINKS, HE SAID ALL SUCH PAST AFFILIATIONS WERE
BEING REVIEWED TO ASSURE THAT THEY WERE NECESSARY AND IN
THE INTEREST OF IRAN. HE INDICATED THAT SOME HAD LITTLE
PRACTICAL UTILITY. THOSE THAT STAND THE TEST OF SCRUTINY
WILL DOUBTLESS BE RESUMED, HE SAID. THE MINISTER DES-
CRIBED A PROJECT ACCORDING TO WHICH PROFESSIONAL BODIES
IN VARIOUS FIELDS, ESPECIALLY THE SCIENCES, WOULD BE MEET-
ING THIS SUMMER TO ESTABLISH GOALS RE UNIVERSITY CURRICULUM,

TEXTS, INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH. ON THE BASIS OF THESE FINDINGS, UNIVERSITIES WILL CHART THEIR COURSE. (TIME DID NOT PERMIT DISCUSSION OF THE UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY QUESTION, BUT OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT THIS MINISTER LIKE SEVERAL OF HIS PREDECESSORS IS MAPPING A HIGHER EDUCATION STRATEGY IN WHICH MINED WILL BE THE KEY ARBITER.)

5. WE MENTIONED THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF IRANIAN STUDIES AND THE DESIRE OF AMERICANS WHO ARE PERSIAN STUDIES SCHOLARS/RESEARCHERS TO COME TO IRAN. HE ASKED ABOUT THE VARIOUS FIELDS OF INQUIRY, AND THEN OPINED THAT THIS SUMMER WOULD NOT BE A GOOD TIME FOR SUCH VISITS BECAUSE OF THE PREOCCUPATION OF IRANIAN ACADEMICS AND OTHERS WITH INTERNAL CONCERNS. HE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME UNIVERSITY STUDENT CONFERENCES THIS SUMMER TO WHICH FOREIGN STUDENTS MIGHT BE ADMITTED. HIS GENERAL ADVICE WAS TO DISCOURAGE RESEARCHERS FROM COMING HERE UNTIL FALL AT THE EARLIEST.

6. AT THE CLOSE OF OUR VISIT, I MADE THE POINT THAT THE USG LOOKS FORWARDS TO AN OPEN, COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND THAT OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN IRAN'S INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROVIDED A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE. THE MINISTER REPLIED TO THIS STATEMENT BY TICKING OFF SOME OF OUR PAST "SINS"--ALL PART OF THE NOW FAMILIAR LITANY I RECEIVE--BUT AGREED THERE WOULD BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE.

7. BIO NOTES: DR. SHARIAT-MADARI SPEAKS ENGLISH FLUENTLY BUT VERY SOFTLY AND METHODICALLY. HE IS A REFLECTIVE MAN WHO CLEARLY ENJOYS THE ABSTRACT. FROM 1965-67, HE TAUGHT EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA, AND LATER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE. INDIANA INVITED HIM BACK FOR A SYMPOSIUM LAST SUMMER. HE HAS TRANSLATED INTO FARSI SEVERAL LEADING AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL TEXTS. CULTURED, COMPOSED, AND IN POSSESSION OF A STRATEGY, DR. SHARIAT-MADARI SEEMS FAR REMOVED FROM THE POLICIZED CROWDS CALLING THE SHOTS ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES. OF ALL CABINET POSTS, HIS WOULD SEEM ONE OF THE MOST VULNERABLE AND LEAST SECURE. IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE HOW HE AND HIS POLICIES FAIR. NAAS

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TEHRAN 10546

DE RUQMHR #0546 274 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 01108Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4018
INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0022
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10546

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STAT 10/1
APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL: JLMBERT: GO
CLEAR: POL: NASWIFT
DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
ECON CONS CHRON
RF 8/WEB

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/1/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, IR
SUBJECT: ELECTION SCHEDULE

REF: TEHRAN 10440

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING SEPT 30 CALL BY CHARGE AND EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR SABAGHIAN DISCUSSED SCHEDULED LOCAL AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS. SABAGHIAN SAID THAT FIRST STEP WOULD BE ELECTIONS FOR COUNCILS IN 150 MUNICIPALITIES ON OCTOBER 12 AND 13. ELECTIONS IN TEHRAN AND THE MAJOR PROVINCIAL CITIES OF MASHHAD, TABRIZ, SHIRAZ, ESPAHAN, AND AHWAZ WOULD BE HELD LATER.

3. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A REFERENDUM ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION, BY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND THEN BY ELECTIONS FOR A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. ALL OF THESE ELECTIONS SABAGHIAN HOPED WOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF THE IRANIAN YEAR (MARCH, 1980). HE ADDED THAT THE VILLAGE AND DISTRICT (BAKHSR) ELECTIONS WOULD PROBABLY BE THE LAST TO BE HELD, SINCE THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S APPARATUS WAS WEAKEST AT THOSE LEVELS. (FYI: IN A SEPARATE INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN SEPT 30 TEHRAN TIMES, SABAGHIAN SAID THAT THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS SHOULD COMPLETE THEIR WORK BY OCTOBER 23 AND THAT THE REFERENDUM COULD BE HELD AT THE END OF NOVEMBER. END FYI).

4. ASKED ABOUT THE DATE FOR MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS IN THE MAJOR CITIES SABAGHIAN ESTIMATED THAT THESE ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD ABOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER THE OCTOBER 12/13 ELECTIONS AND BEFORE THE REFERENDUM ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

5. SABAGHIAN SAID THAT HE HOPED THESE ELECTIONS WOULD PROVIDE PRACTICAL DEMONSTRATION OF THE NEW IRANIAN REGIME'S DETERMINATION TO ESTABLISH ISLAMIC AND DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES IN THE COUNTRY. HE SAID THAT THESE ELECTIONS WOULD ESTABLISH A PERMANENT GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE WHICH SHOULD HELP TO ALLEVIATE SOME OF THE ABUSES CAUSED BY THE WEAKNESS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. COMMENT: WE WISH WE COULD BELIEVE THIS. LAINGEN
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#0546

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TEHRAN 10546

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG: CWNAAS
POL: JDSTEMPEL
NONE
POL

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

AGREMENT CHANNEL***

E.O. 12065: GDS-4 4/15/79 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PDIP, PGOV, IR
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT FOR IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S.

REF: STATE 90602

1. ACTING POL SECTION HEAD WAS CALLED TO MFA APRIL 14 TO RECEIVE PGOI DIPLOMATIC NOTE REQUESTING AGREEMENT FOR REZA SADR, PRESENT MINISTER OF COMMERCE, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO U.S. NOTE INCLUDED FOLLOWING BIODATA (INFORMAL TRANSLATION FROM FARSI): DR. REZA SADR, 47 YEARS OLD. FINISHED HIGH SCHOOL IN KASHAN, STUDIED PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY WHERE HE RECEIVED HIS BA AND PHD. WAS IN U.S. 1963-72, STUDIED AT UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, RECEIVED BA IN CHEMISTRY. RETURNED BRIEFLY TO IRAN IN 1972, THEN WENT BACK TO NEW YORK UNIVERSITY WHERE HE RECEIVED A MA IN MANAGEMENT STUDIES. WHILE IN U.S., WORKED FOR MANIFOLD SUPPLIES FROM 1964-68, AND LATER FOR KEYSANZA (PHOENTIC FROM THE FARSI) COMPANY. NAMED MINISTER OF COMMERCE BY BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT, FEB 1979.

2. IN CONVERSATION, DEP HEAD OF 4TH POLITICAL DIVISION ALI PARSAKIA INDICATED PRIVATELY THAT PROFESSIONALS WERE JUBILANT OVER SADR APPOINTMENT. MFA SEES SADR AS LONG-TIME KHOMEINI SUPPORTER WHO HAS CLOUT NECESSARY TO "BRING WASHINGTON EMBASSY UNDER CONTROL." OFFHANDLY NOTING THAT IT WAS "IMPOSSIBLE" FOR FOREIGN MINISTRY TO CONTROL ROUHANI NOW, HE SAID, SADR HAD BEEN NAMED SPECIFICALLY TO STRAIGHTEN OUT IRANIAN REPRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON. PARSAKIA ALSO NOTED THAT APPOINTMENT OF MAN VERY FAMILIAR WITH U.S. SCENE WAS DELIBERATE EFFORT TO SHOW NEW PGOI'S INTEREST IN IMPROVED RELATIONS. PARSAKIA URGED PROMPT U.S. ACCEPTANCE AND EXPRESSED HIS OWN APPROVAL AT U.S. CHOICE OF "GOOD CAREER" AMBASSADOR

3910

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR IRAN. WITHOUT LINKING IT WITH SADR NOMINATION,
ACTING POLCHIEF INQUIRED ABOUT STATUS OF U.S. REQUEST;
PARSAKIA SAID APPROVAL SHOULD BE FORTHCOMING SOON.
NAAS##

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG:CWNAAS
CHG:CWNAAS
NONE
POL

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/23/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
TAGS: PDIP, PGOV, IR
SUBJ: REZA SADR WILL NOT BE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S.

REF: TEHRAN 3910

IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER OF COMMERCE REZA SADR ON APRIL 23 HE INFORMED ME THAT AT HIS REQUEST THE** PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN HAD AGREED NOT TO SEND HIM AS AMBASSADOR TO U.S. THEREFORE, POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH HIS STATUS IN U.S. DID NOT ARISE. HE APPEARED SURPRISED THAT I DID NOT KNOW OF THIS CHANGE IN PLANS AND SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE FOREIGN MINISTRY INFORM US OFFICIALLY. HE SAID THAT ON REFLECTION, AFTER REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SUBMITTED, HE BELIEVED HE COULD DO MORE FOR HIS COUNTRY BY REMAINING AS MINISTER OF COMMERCE. NAAS#

TODAY THE "ZIONIST-DOMINATED AMERICAN PRESS" PREJUDICES PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST THE REVOLUTION AND EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE IRRITATION WITH THE RECENT NEWSWEEK ARTICLE ON IRAN. (THIS MAY HAVE PARTLY BEEN CAUSED BY THE FACT THAT AN INTERVIEW HE GAVE TIME DID NOT SURVIVE EDITING.) THERE ENSUED A CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF THE ALLEGED ZIONIST INFLUENCE IN THE U.S., WHICH--AS IS THE CASE WITH MANY IRANIANS THESE DAYS--MADE NO PROGRESS IN CONVINCING THE MINISTER TO THE CONTRARY.

PGOI WANTED AN IMPROVED COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP; SAID HE HOSTILE TO AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN WHO CAN FLOURISH IF THEY ARE WILLING TO WORK WITHIN THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REVOLUTION. PICKING UP MY WORDS, HE SAID ALL THAT IS NECESSARY FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS TO HAVE A FREE REIN IN THE IRANIAN ECONOMY IS "MUTUAL RESPECT." IRANIANS CAN FORGET THE PAST, HE ADDED, "IF U.S. BUSINESSMEN WILL ACT AS EQUAL PARTNERS NOW."

7. HE THEN SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE SHERRY AND SHIRIBANI CASES AND I THANKED HIM, AGREEING THAT THE BUSINESS CLIMATE DID SEEM TO BE IMPROVING. I NOTED THAT WHILE POSSIBLY TOO EARLY TO RESURRECT THE JOINT COMMISSION, PERHAPS IN THE INTEREST OF MORE OPEN COMMUNICATION WE COULD GET THE IRAN/AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND THE BUSINESS COUNCIL STARTED AGAIN. REZA SADR SAID HE AGREED THAT ANYTHING ON THE JOINT COMMISSION WOULD BE PREMATURE BT

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TEHRAN 8873/1

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TEHRAN 8873/2

DE RUMER #8873/02 220 **

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3135

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 08873

CLASS CONFIDENTIAL

CHRG: PROG 8/7/79

APPRV: CH3:LBIAINGEN

PRFTD: ECON:ADSENS

CLEAR: NONE

R: ECON-3 CHG

POL AF CHRON

AT THIS STAGE BUT THOUGHT THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IDEA
A GOOD ONE. AT MR. SENS' SUGGESTION, HE AGREED TO BE
GUEST OF HONOR AT A KICK-OFF LUNCHEON IN A MONTH OR SO.

8. IN PARTING, WE ASKED REZA SADR WHETHER HE COULD CONFIRM
THAT NATIONALIZATION WAS NOT A THING OF THE PAST AND HE
SAID HE HOPED SO; WE THEN SAID WHAT OF GENERAL MOTORS
HAVE THEY BEEN NATIONALIZED OR NOT AND HE REPLIED,
EMPHATICALLY, THAT GM'S SHARE IN GENERAL MOTORS IRAN HAS
NOT BEEN NATIONALIZED. WE TOLD THE MINISTER THAT WE PUT
GM'S RECENT TREATMENT HERE ON THE PLUS SIDE OF THE LEDGER,
THANKING HIM FOR THE GOOD RECEPTION THEIR REPRESENTATIVES
HAD HAD FROM HIM IN THEIR RECENT VISIT. WE HAD PUT GTE'S
EXPERIENCE ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, ALTHOUGH RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTS APPEARED MORE HOPEFUL. LAINGEN

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#8873-

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TEHRAN 8873/2

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 9144/1

REF: POL:HR #9144/21 225 **

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161321Z AUG 79

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3263

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 09144

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHPG: STATE 8/16/79
 APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAINGEN
 JKFTD: POL: MJMETRINO: G
 CLEAR: POL: VLTOMSETH
 R: POL2 CHG RF
 CHRON

F.O. 12065: GDS 8/16/85 (METRINO, MICHAEL J.) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, SOPN, IR

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH DEP PRIME MINISTER TABATABAI

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH PGOI SPOKESMAN DEP PRIM MIN TABATABAI TO DISCUSS RECENT ANTI-U.S. STATEMENTS MADE OVER NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION (NIRT). IN A FRANK AND FRIENDLY CONVERSATION TABATABAI DISCUSSED THE PGOI'S OWN PROBLEMS WITH NIRT, AS WELL AS STILL STRONG ANTI-U.S. FEELING IN IRAN. DESCRIBING THE PGOI'S DIFFICULTIES VIS-A-VIS INTENSE POPULAR EMOTIONS, TABATABAI ASKED THAT OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN DO MORE TO HELP SOLVE THE PRESENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN, AND ASKED FOR MORE FREQUENT MEETINGS WITH THE EMBASSY IN ORDER TO PREVENT AND OVERCOME SUCH DIFFICULTIES. END SUMMARY

3. I MET WITH DEP PRIM MIN SADEQU TABATABAI ON 13 AUGUST TO DISCUSS ISSUES OF RECENT ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENTS ON NIRT AND MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE UNDER SECRETARY POMKEN'S ALLEGATIONS THAT AMERICAN REPORTERS OFTEN TENDED TO BE SPIES FIRST AND REPORTERS SECOND. TABATABAI RESPONDED BY CLAIMING THAT THE NIRT IS ONE OF THE LARGER PROBLEMS BEING FACED BY THE PGOI. WHILE EVERYONE ASSUMES THAT THE NIRT IS GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED, HE SAID, IN REALITY THERE HAS BEEN MUCH DIFFICULTY BETWEEN THE PGOI AND NIRT MANAGEMENT. IN FACT, PM FAZARGAN WAS SCHEDULED TO ATTEND A MEETING AT NIRT THAT VERY AFTERNOON IN AN ATTEMPT TO SMOOTH OUT PROBLEMS THE PGOI HAS BEEN HAVING WITH THE ORGANIZATION.

4. TABATABAI WENT ON TO SAY THAT A VARIETY OF POLITICAL VIEWS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED VIA THE NIRT FACILITIES, INCLUDING SOME THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED ATTACKS ON THE PGOI ITSELF. ELABORATING FURTHER ON ANTI-U.S. STATEMENTS BEING MADE BY NIRT AND THE PRESS, HE EXPLAINED THAT THE ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT AMONG THE PEOPLE OF IRAN WAS STILL VERY STRONG, AND REPORTERS WERE OFTEN INFLUENCED BY SUCH FEELINGS. AS AN EXAMPLE, TABATABAI DESCRIBED HIS TRIP TO GERMANY SOME MONTHS EARLIER, WHEN IRANIAN STUDENTS THERE HAD DEMANDED NOT ONLY THAT IRANIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS BE BROKEN, BUT THAT THE U.S. ALSO BE FORCED TO PAY REPARATIONS FOR ALL OF THE SHAH'S MISDEEDS IN IRAN. IF THESE STUDENTS, WHO COULD BE CONSIDERED AMONG IRAN'S FUTURE INTELLECTUALS AND WHO ALL LIVE ABROAD FEEL THIS WAY, HE SAID, HOW CAN ONE EXPECT THE COMMON AND UNEDUCATED PEOPLE TO FEEL DIFFERENTLY? IN AN EFFORT TO EXPLAIN THE PRESSURES UNDER WHICH THE PGOI WAS OPERATING, TABATABAI DESCRIBED

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TEHRAN 9144/1

THE REACTION TO HIS RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT ABOUT THE CANCELLATION OF THE AWACS AND F-16 CONTRACTS BETWEEN THE IRANIAN AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS. "ABOUT TWO HUNDRED PEOPLE CALLED AND WROTE MY OFFICE ASKING WHY I HAD NOT USED THE TERMINOLOGY 'CRIMINAL' TO REFER TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT," HE SAID.

5. ACCORDING TO TABATABAI, POPULAR ANTIPATHY WAS NOT LIMITED TO THE USA, BUT INCLUDED THE WEST IN GENERAL, AND GERMANY IN PARTICULAR. THERE WAS, IN ADDITION, A DEEP HATRED FELT FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THIS ANTI-USSR FEELING SPANG FROM THE VERY RELIGION OF THE IRANIANS, AND IN THE LONG RUN WOULD DO MUCH TO PUT THE USA IN A FAR BETTER LIGHT HERE.

6. ALONG PREVIOUSLY REPORTED LINES, I EXPRESSED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO ESTABLISH AND ENCOURAGE GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND ASKED TABATABAI FOR ANY SUGGESTIONS HE MIGHT HAVE TO IMPROVE THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THIS REPORT. TABATABAI CLAIMED THAT OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN, INCLUDING THOSE AT THE WHITE HOUSE, DEPT OF STATE, AND MYSELF, SHOULD DO MORE TO MAKE PUBLIC OUR PRIVATE EXPRESSIONS OF UNDERSTANDING ON IRAN. HE SAID THAT THE ONLY REASON HE KNEW THE U.S. WAS MAKING SUCH EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS WAS BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN TOLD SO IN CABINET MEETINGS. PRIOR TO HIS APPOINTMENT AS DEP PRIM MIN, HE HAD SIMPLY NOT REALIZED IT, AND CERTAINLY THE ORDINARY PEOPLE OF IRAN SAW NO INDICATION OF SUCH EFFORTS SINCE AMERICAN PRESS COVERAGE APPEARED TO BE ANTI-REVOLUTION IN TONE. I RESPONDED BY SAYING I HAD SEEN VERY LITTLE IN PERSIAN PRESS COVERAGE TO INDICATE IRAN'S DESIRE TO ENCOURAGE A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP, AND ASKED IF WHETHER SUCH A MUTUALLY DESCRIBED GOAL SHOULD NOT ALSO BE GIVEN OFFICIAL PUBLICITY IN IRAN. TABATABAI SAID THAT "IN A MONTH OR SO, WHEN POPULAR ANTI-U.S. FERVOR HAD SOMEWHAT DIED DOWN, THIS WOULD INDEED BE POSSIBLE. IF FRIENDLIER PUBLICITY COULD COMMENCE IN THE U.S., HOWEVER, IT WOULD MAKE THE PGOI'S TASK MUCH EASIER.

7. TABATABAI ALSO ASKED FOR MORE MEETINGS WITH ME SINCE HE HAD FOUND THE FRANK TALK TO BE VERY USEFUL. HE INDICATED, PERHAPS CARRIED AWAY BY HIS OWN

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TEHRAN 9144/1

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TEHRAN 9144/2

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 09144

ENTHUSIASM, THAT HE WOULD EVEN COME TO THE EMBASSY IF IT WERE MORE CONVENIENT.

E. AS A LAST POINT, I THANKED TABATABAI FOR THE PCOI'S AID IN REPLACING THE (MASHALLAE KASHANI) EMBASSY SECURITY GUARD GROUP WITH A SECURITY UNIT MORE APPROPRIATE TO THE EMBASSY, AND STATED THAT THIS WOULD FACILITATE THE OPENING OF NORMAL CONSULAR ACTIVITIES WITHIN A SHORT TIME. TABATABAI'S RESPONSE WAS THAT HIS OFFICE HAD BEEN UNDER TREMENDOUS PRESSURE ON THIS SCORE, AND AS A PARTING GIFT HE PRESENTED ME WITH A YOUNG RELATIVE'S STUDENT VISA APPLICATION FOR PROCESSING OUTSIDE THE NORMAL CHANNELS. LAINGEN

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TEHRAN 9144/2

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-242-483

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10563

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

CHRG: SEAT 10/1/79

APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAING79

DRFTD: POL: PASWIFT

CLEAR: ICA: JGRAVPS

DISTR: POL: CHG ICA

ERON CONS CTRD

RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/1/95 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P

THS: SEUM, IR

SUBJECT: CHARGE'S TALK WITH INTERIOR MINISTER ON
EXECUTIONS

REF: (A) TEHRAN 10511, (B) TEHRAN 10564

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SEPTELS GIVE FULL TEXT OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
TABATABAIE'S STATEMENT OCTOBER 1 CRITICIZING CHARGE'S
EXCHANGE ON EXECUTIONS WITH INTERIOR MINISTER SABAGHIAN
AND TEXT OF INTIMIDATE ATTACK BY JUMHURI ISLAMI IN ITS
EDITORIAL. SEPTEL ALSO REPORTS SABAGHIAN STATEMENTS
ON TEHRAN RADIO THIS AFTERNOON -- STATEMENTS WHICH PUT
ENTIRE EXCHANGE ON EXECUTIONS INTO MORE ACCURATE
PERSPECTIVE

3. WHILE TABATABAIE'S COMMENTS ON CHARGE'S STATEMENT
ON EXECUTIONS OF THREE SENATORS ARE FAIRLY STANDARD FARE,
JUMHURI ISLAMI'S EDITORIAL IS NOT.

4. JUMHURI ISLAMI IS THE OFFICIAL PAPER OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLICAN PARTY WHICH IS CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH
KHOMEINI. THE PARTY CHAIRMAN IS THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
OF THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI. WHILE
JUMHURI ISLAMI IS FAMOUS FOR ITS INTIMIDATE EDITORIALS
(IT ATTACKED YAZDI ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO), IT CAN ALSO
BE SEEN AS A SEMI-OFFICIAL ORGAN OF SOME OF KHOMEINI'S
CLOSEST ALLIES AND SUPPORTERS WITHIN THE CLERICAL
ESTABLISHMENT.

5. EMBASSY DOES NOT PLAN PUBLIC RESPONSE TO JUMHURI
ISLAMI EDITORIAL. PAO GRAVES, HOWEVER, WILL RAISE OUR
CONCERN OVER TABATABAIE'S STATEMENT AND ESPECIALLY TONE
OF EDITORIAL WHEN HE SEES CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN PRESS
DIVISION OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE BAZANDIA
OCTOBER 2 IN APPOINTMENT SCHEDULED SOME DAYS AGO.

6. EMBASSY NOTES WITH WRY AMUSEMENT THAT TEHRAN TIMES
ON SAME PAGE AS CHARGE'S MEETING WITH SABAGHIAN CARRIES
STORY THAT MINISTER BAZARTAN TOLD ITALIAN JOURNALIST
FALLACI THAT "HE DEcried SUMMARY EXECUTIONS BY IRAN
REVOLUTIONARY COURTS SAYING HE HAD OFTEN EXPRESSED HIS
ANGER AND DISDAIN TO KHOMEINI." LAINGEN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10616

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/2/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OF-P

TAGS: IR, SOPN, PINT

SUBJECT: CHARGE'S MEETING WITH DEP PRIM MIN TABATABAI

REF: TEHRAN 10560

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE HAD A MEETING WITH DEP PRIM MIN TABATABAI ON OCT 2 TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERN THAT PUBLIC MEDIA AND PGOI SPOKESMEN CONTINUED TO FEED NOTION THAT THE USA WAS HOSTILE TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. TABATABAI ASSURED CHARGE THAT THE JUMHURI-YE-ISLAMI EDITORIAL ATTACKING THE USA FOR CHARGE'S ALLEGED "MEDDLING" OVER EXECUTIONS REFLECTED NEITHER OFFICIAL PGOI NOR KHOMEINI'S VIEWS. END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE MET WITH DEP PRIM MIN AND GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN TABATABAI ON OCTOBER 2 TO DISCUSS INTER ALIA, THE JUMHURI-YE-ISLAMI EDITORIAL (REFTEL) WHICH HAD ACCUSED THE USA OF INTERFERING IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IN ANSWER TO CHARGE'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE JUMHURI-YE-ISLAMI NEWSPAPER REFLECTED EITHER THE PGOI OR QOM'S VIEWS VIS-A-VIS THE USA, TABATABAI EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS DEFINITELY NOT RPT NOT SO. HE SAID THAT THE PAPER WAS NOT EXPRESSING THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE PGOI, THE REVOLUTION'S LEADER IMAM KHOMEINI, OR ALL THE PEOPLE OF IRAN. THE PAPER DID, HOWEVER, REFLECT SENTIMENTS HELD BY "SOME RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND SOME OF THE PEOPLE. TABATABAI SAID THAT JUMHURI-YE-ISLAMI WAS ONE OF THE PGOI'S WORST CRITICS, AND HAD FREQUENTLY ACCUSED FOMMIN YAZDI AND NIRT HEAD GHOBTZADER OF BEING AMERICANS. THE PAPER HAD ALSO ACCUSED THE PGOI OF BEING TOO PRO-WEST. TABATABAI SAID THAT WHEN HE READ THE EDITORIAL, HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN UPSET AT THE ATTACK ON BOTH THE US GOVERNMENT AND ON CHARGE.

4. TABATABAI CLAIMED THAT A RECENT ENGLISH LANGUAGE PAPER VERSION OF REMARKS BY HIM SUGGESTING THAT THE USA IS IRAN'S NUMBER ONE ENEMY HAD NOT BEEN AT ALL ACCURATE. WHAT HE HAD ACTUALLY SAID WAS THAT "IT IS A MISTAKE TO THINK OF THE USA AS OUR NUMBER ONE ENEMY. OUR MAIN ENEMY IS ISRAEL (AND ZIONISM) WHICH SEES ITS EXISTENCE THREATENED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN." WHEN CHARGE ASKED WHYLY WHETHER THIS MEANT THE PGOI NOW SAW THE USA AS ITS SECOND MAJOR ENEMY, TABATABAI SAID THIS WAS BY NO MEANS THE CASE. THE NUMBER TWO SPOT, HE CLAIMED, WAS HELD BY THE SOVIET UNION AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED. HE ADDED THAT THE

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SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD EVEN PAID A VISIT TO
PROTEST RECENT ANTI-SOVIET STATEMENTS.

5. COMMENTING FURTHER, TABATABAI SAID THAT HE HIMSELF
SAW RELIGIOUS AND LEFTIST FANATICISM AS THE CHIEF
DANGER TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. HE CLAIMED THAT
THE NEWSPAPER JUMHURI-YE-ISLAMI WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF
THIS SORT OF FANATICISM.

6. COMMENT: IN GENERAL, THE TONE OF THE MEETING WAS
WARM AND FRIENDLY, WITH TABATABAI DOING HIS BEST TO BE
CONCILIATORY. CERTAINLY THERE IS NO ANTI-AMERICANISM
EVIDENT IN HIS OWN OFFICE. TABATABAI'S STAFF-AIDE
ESCORTED CHARGE DOWN TO THE LOBBY AND TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY
TO ASK FOR HELP WITH A NEPHEW'S STUDENT VISA. FYI:
PRESS ATTENTION TO CHARGE-SABAGHIAN EXCHANGE WAS VERY
LIGHT OCTOBER 2. ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEHRAN
TIMES AND KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL CARRIED TABATABAI'S
STATEMENTS (REFTEL) TO PRESS AND ALSO QUOTED TEHRAN
RADIO OCT 1 AS CRITICIZING SABAGHIAN FOR EVEN OFFERING
AN EXPLANATION TO CHARGE'S COMMENTS. FARSI PRESS
OCTOBER 2 DID NOT MENTION THE SABAGHIAN-CHARGE-
TABATABAI EXCHANGE. LAINGEN

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RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1045
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BONN 18713

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P.O. 12065: GDS 17/18/85 (VAN HEUVEN, MARTEN) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, GW, IR
SUBJECT: TABATABAI TO MEET FRG OFFICIALS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE FOREIGN OFFICE CONFIRMED TO US ON OCTOBER 18 A NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT IRANIAN VICE PRIME MINISTER TABATABAI WILL MEET THIS WEEK WITH CHANCELLERY STATE MINISTER WISCENIEWSKI AND OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. OUR SOURCE IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE SAID THAT TABATABAI IS IN THE FRG ON A PRIVATE VISIT (HIS FAMILY STILL RESIDES HERE), AND IS TAKING THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH THE FRG. OUR SOURCE CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS NO OTHER PARTICULAR REASON FOR THE TALKS. HE COULD NOT EXPLAIN WHY TABATABAI WAS MEETING INTERIOR OFFICIALS.

3. WE WILL SEEK A READOUT ON THE DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK. STOESSEL

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*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1973-507-456

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RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0909
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4566
RUHHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9209
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5738
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1046

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BONN 19172

F.O. 12065: GDS 10/25/55 (VAN HEUVEN, MARTEN) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR, IR, GW, EGEN, ENRG

SUBJECT: TABATABAI MEETS SCHMIDT, WISCHNEWSKI

REF: BONN 18713

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE FOREIGN OFFICE IRANIAN AFFAIRS OFFICER SCOEPS TOLD US OCTOBER 24 THAT THE MOST INTERESTING PART OF THE OCTOBER 19 DISCUSSION BETWEEN IRANIAN VICE PREMIER TABATABAI AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT (WHO JOINED THE SCHEDULED MEETING WITH HIS DEPUTY STATE MINISTER WISCHNEWSKI) WAS AN EXCHANGE CONCERNING THE USHIRE NUCLEAR CONTRACT WITH KWU. TABATABAI EXPRESSED IRAN'S CONTINUED INTEREST IN RESTARTING WORK ON THE PROJECT, AND SUGGESTED GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATIONS DIRECTED TOWARD THE END. GERMAN POSITION WAS THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD TALK DIRECTLY TO KWU - IT WOULD BE IMPROPER FOR THE FRG TO INSERT ITSELF INTO PRIVATE BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS. SCOEPS SAID THE FOREIGN OFFICE WAS NOT CERTAIN TO WHAT EXTENT TABATABAI WAS AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER IN BONN.

3. OIL. IRAN'S OIL SUPPLIES WERE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY. TABATABAI INDICATED THAT, DESPITE SOME SPECIFIED PRODUCTION PROBLEMS, THE CURRENT PRODUCTION LEVEL WOULD BE MAINTAINED. SCOEPS SAID THIS ACCORDED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE'S ASSESSMENT OF IRANIAN PLANNING.

3. KURDS. SCOEPS TOLD TABATABAI'S

COMMENTARY ON THE KURDISH REBELLION. A DISAPPOINTING REPETITION OF TEHRAN'S PROPAGANDA LINE ON MINORITY PROBLEMS. THE GERMANS HAD HOPED FOR A FRANK EXCHANGE ON THIS PROBLEM.

5. OTHER ISSUES. SCHOEPS CLAIMED TO BE UNINFORMED ABOUT OTHER MEETINGS TABATABAI HAD PLANNED, INCLUDING THOSE AT THE INTERIOR MINISTRY (RFEETEL) AND WITH POLITICIANS. SCHOEPS NOTED THAT TABATABAI WAS STILL IN GERMANY ON HIS ESSENTIALLY PRIVATE VISIT, AND MIGHT NOT HAVE YET HELD THE MEETINGS. SCHOEPS SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF THIRD COUNTRIES.

6. SCHOEPS SUMMED UP THE VISIT AS WITHOUT RESULT, AS HAD BEEN EXPECTED. HE THOUGHT THAT THE VISIT HAD BEEN A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO REINFORCE, THROUGH TABATABAI, GERMANY'S RELATIONSHIP TO IRAN. THE IRANIAN SPOKESMAN WORKED AS A PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY IN BOCHUM FOR SEVENTEEN YEARS, HAD MARRIED A GERMAN WOMAN, WHO WAS STILL RESIDING IN BOCHUM WITH THEIR CHILDREN (HENCE TABATABAI'S VISIT), AND SPOKE EXCELLENT GERMAN (BUT NO ENGLISH). SCHOEPS TOLD US THAT BONN VIEWS HIM AS "THEIR MAN IN TEHRAN," ALTHOUGH THE GERMANS ARE NOT QUITE SURE OF HIS INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. SCHOEPS SAID THAT THEIR INFORMATION INDICATED THAT TABATABAI HAD A FAIRLY GOOD RELATIONSHIP TO KHOMEINI BECAUSE OF THEIR CONTACTS WHEN THE LATTER WAS IN PARIS.

7. COMMENT: SCHOEPS FELT THAT, GIVEN THE CURRENT UNPOPULARITY OF THE US AND UK IN IRAN, TABATABAI'S GERMAN TIES GIVES BONN AN ADVANTAGE IN DEALING WITH TEHRAN THAT EVEN THE FRENCH DO NOT HAVE. SCHMIDT'S DECISION TO TAKE TIME OUT FROM HIS BUSY SCHEDULE TO JOIN THE TABATABAI-WISCHMEWSKI MEETING SHOWS A CONSCIOUS GERMAN EFFORT TO CULTIVATE THIS PERCEIVED ADVANTAGE. END COMMENT. STOESEFL

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tehran, Iran

صادق قطب زاده

January 12, 1978

OFFICIAL INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Charles W. Naas, Director
and Mr. Myles L. Greene
NEA/IRN
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Charlie and Myles:

Realizing that the holidays, combined with the President's visit, have impeded my progress, I hope you won't mind a joint effort which tries to answer Charlie's letter of November 23 and Myles' epic of December 27.

First things first--we trust you have seen that part of the President's press conference given on his way home which refers to human rights and Iran. I am enclosing the relevant question and answer, including an extra copy which we would appreciate your flogging to D/HA when they show signs of loosening the presidential perspective. We were very pleased by the Visit and, as you know from others, so were the Iranians. My contacts, especially some of the "alienated ones", were delighted to see the President mention human rights and relieved that he did not go on too heavily.

Qajar Cuties: Myles, thanks for sending us the Firouz material. Suffice to say, we feel the Prince has no backing here, and your question about human rights under the Qajars gets right to the heart of the matter. Moreover, such sketchy views as I have been able to turn up suggest that Firouz became an early apologist for Soviet views and has not demonstrably changed his spots in the past few years though he may be a more sophisticated exponent of them than today's crop of students are of theirs.

The Waldheim letter is interesting of course, because the signatories have figured in this type of correspondence addressed to others. I do not know if Waldheim has seen the letter, but it was eventually delivered to the U.N.,

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according to a local source with contacts among the oppositionists. The charges within the letter are the extreme points of view on all subjects, usually containing a kernel of fact and popcorn balls of innuendo. It would be rather useless and too time-consuming to go into all the inaccuracies in the piece, but let me cite a couple of the more obvious: 1) Comments on torture which hint at recent use are probably flatly false; 2) the description of the Resurgence Party clearly misrepresents the amount of popular participation and is flatly wrong stating that the GOI has intimidated people into voting for approved candidates; and 3) the letter overdoes the point about lack of freedom of expression--the letter itself being one form of such freedom.

It would be useful for us if you could have INR/OIL/B run some spot checks thru the computer on the names at the bottoms of the various letters we've sent you--I know their computer can do it, if someone will take the initiative. In that connection, I'm enclosing a rough cut at a list of key dissidents which you might like to crank into the process.

Regarding the enclosure to Charlie's letter from the Liberation Movement, I have checked with my OR colleagues who are as mystified as I am about some of the "incidents" portrayed in the "communiqué". The "execution" of Akhoondi was, of course, carried out after a military tribunal convicted him of killing Embassy employee Hosnan. The GOI's weakness on this one stems from the fact that his trial was announced and sentence carried out before the effective date of the reforms, but after they had been announced. The October "religious demonstrations" mentioned in the other communiqué do not correspond to the dates we have for some events, and include others which we are not convinced took place at all. For example: Tehran University students have not, to our knowledge, called for the return of Khomeini (as charged in item 1); attacks against the students were not carried out before November 18 (item 2); and there appear to have been no religious disturbances in October except for the larger meeting on October 15, which the communiqué dates as the 7th, and places in the wrong city. We have not run the names of alleged torture victims through our special contact, but we have no other knowledge of them. (Perhaps one of the international groups visiting Iran's prisons could ask about them?)

Which brings us to Sadigeh (or Sadegh) Ghotbazadeh (or Gombazadeh), who wrote to the Department's Robert Montell. We received his packet, apparently from Ollie Jones in HA/HR

(through you?). Ghotbzadeh, of course is the noted T.V. personality who went on 60 minutes in March 1977 charging Savak with trying to kill him and producing a rather elderly old man as a witness. Our sketchy records show he was a student in the U.S. in the early '60s and is a member of "moderate" dissident movement in Europe. He has been linked to Musa Sadr's group in Lebanon and has traveled to the Mideast many times under assumed names. He is in the U.S. lockout book, but apparently turns up in America with disgusting (and probably illegal) regularity. His bio should be checked out thoroughly.

We have no other information on the specific charges in the packet, either regarding individual names, or the text of what appears to be the Movement's description of Iranian operations. The latter seems to be grossly overdrawn, badly out of date in some spots, and takes no account of what's been happening during the past year in Iran. Should anything else turn up, we'll let you know.

To return briefly to Myles' recent letter: we hope that, aimed with the President's remarks, the final "country evaluation plan" which emerges is sensible and recognizes that there are probably a lot of other regions which have not further to go than this one. On the other hand, steady, objective pressage such as that supplied by Bill Butler (we note with pleasure his projected return to Iran this spring), can probably push the cause ahead.

On last note on the question of executions: To our best knowledge in the past three years there have never been any executions without due process according to Iranian law. There have been folks killed in shootouts, but I can hardly bring myself to call them "innocent college students" when the police (or SAVAK, the police) haul out an arms cache that would have given the Viet Cong control of a whole district in my Vietnam days from the "innocent lodgings" from which these students have been shooting at police for several minutes to an hour or more. Perhaps the above is a bit frisky, but you understand my point--in my time here, the GCI has not resorted to the random police killing that marks some other regimes. It is unfair to single out Iran simply because the radical leftist movement has its propaganda effort better grounded (from where, by the way?) than its counterparts in China, the Philippines, etc.

Here's a better New Years to you both--and what's this about Myles departure?

Best to all,


John D. Stempel

enclosures



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

January 17, 1979

TO: NEA/IRN - Mr. Henry Precht
FROM: PM/SSP - Robert B. Mantel
SUBJECT: Contact with Sadegh Ghotbzadeh in November 1977

I want to bring to your attention the substance of a conversation with Sadegh Ghotbzadeh who, according to recent press reports, appears to be a key aide and spokesman for the Ayatollah Khomeini. Ghotbzadeh called me some time in November, 1977, to request that I have lunch with him, identifying himself as head of an Iranian resistance movement based in Paris. I asked Charlie Naas, then Country Director for Iran, whether he had any information on Ghotbzadeh. Naas did not know of Ghotbzadeh or his organization. I subsequently had lunch with Ghotbzadeh, approximately 2-3 weeks prior to the visit of the Shah in December, 1977 if my memory is correct. Main points made by Ghotbzadeh follow:

-- he was in the US to make contact with Americans both in and out of the Government whom he knew were familiar with Iranian affairs. (He apparently was familiar with my Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Report on "US Military Sales to Iran.")

-- he and his organization were admirers of the US and the ideals for which it stood. He was particularly pleased with the emphasis being placed on human rights by the Carter Administration, and saw an opportunity to influence the policies of the Administration so that it would not repeat the mistakes of previous Administrations namely -- identifying US interests in Iran and the region as being coincident with and dependent upon the views, policies, and indeed the continuing rule of the Shah.

-- the Shah was universally hated within Iran, and that pressures were building throughout Iranian society against the Shah and his repressive form of government.

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Shah's B. A., to and his organization has conducted contacts with all levels of Iranian society, including the military. These contacts were reporting that the Shah was increasingly unpopular and that a revolution was brewing.

-- the IC was identified with the Shah's government because of the US view that US interests were best served by support of the Shah and his policies. The IC did not seem to have many common interests but that this would change when the revolution came unless the Carter Administration took steps to avoid identification with the Shah and his repression.

-- with regard to the military, the top generals and other leaders were "bought" by the Shah, but low and middle ranking officers were increasingly discontented with corruption and repression of the Shah. In the Iran case, the bulk of the military was a suspected Iranian people rather than their corrupt leaders.

-- in conclusion, Chomsky's statement that he had renewed hope in the Carter Administration was a result of its policies of human rights. He was disappointed in the restraint policy announced by the President. He was in a more realistic posture vis-a-vis the Shah's regime, many of which merely wasted Iranian resources.

I discussed the above with Chomsky at a meeting. Subsequently, Chomsky's statement was published by his organization, the National Guardian Council, August 22, 1977 in the name of Syed Ali Shomroo. I forwarded all of this information to CIA/R who, I understand, circulated it to NSA/CSS and DIA/ISA and, finally,

I have not heard from Chomsky since my meeting with him. The Guardian and the National Guardian Council, 6 December, 1977, which, in my opinion, is a very good

Chomsky seemed to be a serious fellow who spoke in a moderate, sensible way. He hoped the new Administration would change American policy toward Iran if he would welcome it. He did not seem ideologically anti-American.

I hope that the above is of interest and, if possible, use to you.

cc: [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

SADEGH GHOTBZADEH

66, RUE DU MOULIN DE LA POINTE

75012 PARIS

TÉL. 589-54-73

صادق غوثزاده

File BIO

From: Ellis O. Jones
HA/HR

Mr. Robert Montell
Department of State
Bureau of Political and
Military Affairs
Washington, D.C.
U.S.A.

12/27

G-HOTBZ

RTN to J.
STAMPED
POL

Dear Mr. Montell,

I hope you are well and fine. I'm sorry that I haven't been able to write you sooner, but I wish to thank you now for your valuable time that you gave me in Washington.

Enclosed you'll find documents concerning tortures, police methods, letters from the families of the imprisoned and certain communiqués regarding Iran. Unfortunately some of them are still in the original French. These will be translated into English and the translations sent to you later on; however, in view of the urgency resulting from the Shah's upcoming visit to the U.S., I thought it best to send you everything as is.

I hope you realize that this trip is extremely important because it is the first contact with the present Carter Administration. I am sure that the Shah will try the same methods and the same arguments that he used during his first trip to Washington after the late President Kennedy took office. He'll try to convince President Carter that if he is given a free hand with his repressive methods, he will soon finish off the opposition and rally the people around himself.

Needless to say, this argument holds no water. He has used it before and he has failed over and over. But since he uses this kind of argument with new people each time, he succeeds in getting away with his crimes and goes off scot-free to commit fresh ones.

I'm not trying to analyze the entire American foreign policy in Iran, nor the Shah's policy regarding our people, but rather what I wish to emphasize is the fact that our people see the Americans supporting the Shah as the primary cause of repression in Iran. The Shah is in real trouble in Iran, economically, politically and socially. I hope you are aware of all this and that when you judge the Shah, you will judge him on the entire record of his rule, taking all these things into account.

I sincerely hope the documents submitted here will find their way to the President's attention, and I trust to you to do this in whatever way you deem most helpful. I hope to see you soon in Washington and promise to send you more documents on various subjects. In the meantime I remain.

Yours sincerely,

S. Ghotbadeh

Sadegh Ghotbadeh

P.S. A commission of the Red Cross has gone to Iran and made inquiries about the political prisoners and their conditions in the prisons. The reports will be secret but should be extremely useful. I hope you will be able to get hold of this report through the necessary channels.

ACTION

S E C R E T

RUUVV ESA2469RA069
RUQMHR
RUUEHC 7110 0212109
RUSSSS ZZH
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RU GEOSTATE WASHDC
RU RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 9768
RU RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5841

21 JAN 79 21 17Z

001297

ACTION:

~~POC-3~~

INFO:

AMB

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8/GMH

S E C R E T STATE 017110

RU. 12065: GDS 1/21/79 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: SADEGH GHOTBZADEH

1. AMERICAN PROFESSOR WHO HAS KNOWN GHOTBZADEH FOR YEARS TELLS US THAT IN THE PAST TWO YEARS HIS POSITION IN KHOMEINI ENTOURAGE APPEARS TO HAVE CHANGED. FORMERLY, GHOTBZADEH WAS CLEARLY THE DOMINANT PERSONALITY, TO WHOM YAZDI SHOWED DEFERENCE. DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS, HOWEVER, THE TWO MEN HAVE SEEMED ABOUT EQUAL IN RANK AND STATURE.

2. PROFESSOR DESCRIBED GHOTBZADEH'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS LEFT OF CENTER, STRONGLY ANTI-COMMUNIST. SINCE HIS STUDENT DAYS IN THE US, GHOTBZADEH HAS HAD A CONSPIRATORAL/REVOLUTIONARY OUTLOOK. OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, THOUGH, HE HAS APPEARED MORE DISCIPLINED AND LESS PRONE TO SHOOT FROM THE HIP WITH WILD IDEAS.

3. GHOTBZADEH HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOUMEDIENNE AND ARAFAT. HE ALLEGEDLY DESPISES THE IRAQIS AND ADMIRES AMRAD. HE WAS CLOSE TO MUSA SADR AND INVOLVED IN SHIA AFFAIRS IN LEBANON. HIS RELATIONS WITH QADAFFI HAVE BEEN AN ON-AND-OFF AFFAIR.

4. GHOTBZADEH APPEARS TO BE GENERALLY RESPECTED BY THE KHOMEINI GROUP (BEHESHTI AND BARZARGAN) IN TEHRAN.

5. FINALLY, DEPARTMENT HAS RECEIVED SEVERAL CALLS FROM AMIR AFSHAR REGARDING GHOTBZADEH'S PROSPECTIVE VISIT TO THE U.S. WE ARE DECLINING TO DEAL THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES.

RUUVV

S E C R E T

BT

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صادق قطب زاده

• *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1001-1005

ON RECONVERTED TO RADICAL ISLAM. CLAIMS
ONCE HAD REPRESENTATIVE POLISH STRAIN PASSPORT. SULLIVAN

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TEHRAN 1131

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C O N F I D E N T I A L USICA 37877

USICA

12065 GDS 4/6/85

FOR SEHLENNBERGER/SNOW FROM BRESCIA

CLASSIFIED BY: PETER F. BRESCIA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR - NEA
1. ON FRIDAY APRIL 6, HERB ERB AND I HAD A CONVERSATION WITH
DR. F. TROWBRIDGE VOM BAUR, A WASHINGTON ATTORNEY WHO HAS HAD
A LONG STANDING ACQUAINTANCESHIP OF SADEGH GHOTBZADEH OF NIRT.
DR. VOM BAUR REPRESENTED GHOTBZADEH IN 1961 WHEN HE WAS
ARRESTED FOR CONDUCTING AN ANTI-SHAH DEMONSTRATION AND SIT-IN
AT THE IRANIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. THE INCIDENT OCCURRED
WHILE GHOTBZADEH WAS A STUDENT AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY'S
SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE. THE ARREST ULTIMATELY RESULTED
IN HIS BEING DEPORTED FROM THE U.S. AND HIS BEING TRIED IN
ABSENTIA IN IRAN AND SENTENCED TO DEATH. GHOTBZADEH AND
VOM BAUR HAVE BEEN IN CORRESPONDENCE AND HAVE BEEN SEEING
EACH OTHER INTERMITTENTLY OVER THESE LONG YEARS.
2. VOM BAUR WAS VERY FORTHCOMING IN GIVING US HIS VERY HIGH
OPINION OF GHOTBZADEH. HE FEELS THAT HE IS A MAN OF GREAT
INTELLIGENCE, INTEGRITY, AND CONSCIENTIOUSNESS. HE CHARAC-
TERIZED HIM AS MODERATE IN HIS OUTLOOK, WILLING TO MAKE
CAREFULLY REASONED JUDGMENTS BASED ON FACTS AND LOGIC. VOM
BAUR CONSIDERED HIM TO BE A FRIEND OF AMERICA AND THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE IN SPITE OF HIS LONG-STANDING ANTI-SHAH POSITION.
3. THE MATTER OF DR. AMINI'S SITUATION WAS OUTLINED WITH
VOM BAUR IN ORDER TO GET HIS ADVICE ON A POSSIBLE COURSE OF
ACTION THROUGH GHOTBZADEH. HE ADVISED THAT A CAREFULLY-
CRAFTED, WRITTEN EXPLANATION OF THE SITUATION MAY BE HELPFUL
IN GETTING GHOTBZADEH'S ASSISTANCE IN INTERCEDING ON DR.
AMINI'S BEHALF. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT GHOTBZADEH WOULD BE
PERSUADED BY THE FACTS IN THE CASE RATHER THAN BY EMOTION-
ALISM.

4. EXPLAINED TO VOM BAUR THAT WE WOULD BE RELAYING THE CON-
TENTS OF OUR DISCUSSION WITH HIM TO THE POST, AND VOM BAUR
AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE ALL RIGHT WITH HIM.

R-INHARDT

BT
#7877

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable B. Usually reliable C. Fairly reliable D. Somewhat reliable E. Unreliable (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Fairly reliable. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

SECRET
BEFORE/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	MIT-5785
SUBJECT	Iranian Government Report on Asadollah Mobasher	DATE OF REPORT	13 February 1962
		NO. OF PAGES	3
		REFERENCES	MIT-5362, 5630

DATE OF INFO: October 1961

INFO

PLACE & DATE ACQ: Iran, Tehran (11 January 1962)

DATE ACQ:

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Iranian intelligence officer (C) with access to reports concerning internal security matters. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Below is an edited translation of a report on Asadollah Mobasher, chief of the inspections department, Ministry of Justice, prepared in the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) in October 1961.

Asadollah Mobasher is fifty years old and married. He has five children and resides in his own house, first on the right, Kuche Shepur Ali Reza, Pahlavi Avenue. He completed his elementary and secondary education in Tehran and graduated from the law college in 1935, this also being the year he was employed by the Justice Ministry. He began his civil service with the Justice Department at Yazd, and was subsequently transferred first to Isfahan and then to Shiraz. Afterward he was transferred to Tehran for reasons mentioned hereunder, and has been in Tehran since.

Mobasher was in Isfahan during World War II and at a time when the Tudeh / Communist / Party was at the peak of its power throughout the country, particularly in working centers. Mobasher provoked the workers of the Isfahan mills, suggesting that they throw the employers out of the mills, have committees elected to run the mills, pay wages and other expenses out of the proceeds of sales, and hand over the remainder, if any, to the employers. His provocations resulted in extensive strikes at Isfahan; government authorities, finding Mobasher the agent provocateur and responsible for the workers' strikes, transferred him to Shiraz. There, too, he was active and endeavored to provoke tribal chieftains. His activity attracted the attention of the British Consul at Shiraz, who reported Mobasher's secret efforts to the British Embassy in Tehran and the latter asked the Foreign Office to have Mobasher recalled to Tehran and no position or mission be given him anywhere in the south. Consequently, Mobasher was transferred to Tehran and assumed his new duties here as deputy public prosecutor for the Penal Court, and in this capacity he helped the late Ali Akbar Mousavizadeh, who was later Justice Minister, investigate dossiers on

BEFORE/CONTINUED CONTROL
SECRET

S E C R E T

MAYFAIR/QUINCY'S CORREL.

- 2 -

railway employees and the impeachment sent to the Fiscal Court against Hussein Rafiei, former Director-general of the Railway Administration. Mubasheri was lenient toward Hussein Rafiei and as a result he was able to obtain many privileges for the Eshkites and a branch of the Central United Council in the railways.²

Mubasheri visited Europe in 1947 and 1948 and during this visit that he got his LL.B. in Paris. Upon his return to Iraq he was given an important position until the late Abdul Aji Ismail was made Justice Minister. Subsequent to 21 July 1952, he was made Administrative Director of the Justice Ministry on Lutfi's instruction. At the same time he was also a Supreme Court Judge.

When General Fawziyah Taha took over as Prime Minister the government and Justice Ministry received reports that Mubasheri was a Turkish Party member, and so he lost his positions and he had no executive job until 1955. In that year Ali Asiri took over as Minister of Justice and Murad-Idris Almusli put in a few good words for Mubasheri and as a result Mubasheri was made head of the technical division of the Justice Ministry.³ Toward the end of Muhammad Ali Nadgahi's term as Justice Minister, Mubasheri also was made deputy prosecutor for the Supreme Court (Court of Cassation). He eventually was made Director-general of inspection by present Justice Minister Almusli. Mubasheri also acts as adviser to Almusli and takes part in all secret and sensitive committees of the ministry. Mubasheri is a member of the eight-man secret committee in the Justice Ministry, set up by Almusli.⁴ Friends of Mubasheri include Almusli, Khaliliah Saadiah-Farhan, Ibrahim Saif, publisher of Qasab-Iraq, Fawziyah Taha, Ahmad Saadiah, Mubasheri and Ahmad Saadiah.⁵

In 1945 Mubasheri created an intelligence network for the Turkish Party to get information on political activity of the British Embassy officials in Tehran. When the British learned of this network they assigned the late Ahmad Saadiah, one of their agents and a Justice Ministry official, to approach Mubasheri about joining the anti intelligence network, if possible, in order to keep the British Embassy informed of the network activity. Incidentally, the late Ahmad Saadiah was able to join the network as a preliminary member. At that time, Mubasheri's intelligence network had taken a shop opposite the British Embassy gate on Fawziyah Avenue in order to overwatch the people going into the embassy. The shop was run by one of the network members. So one night when the late Ahmad Saadiah was going into the British Embassy to report and give documents to the British Embassy officials, the network member in charge of the shop, who knew all network members, saw him going into the British Embassy and reported this to the network at once. Ahmad Saadiah was dismissed from the network the next day and the network changed its tactics. There is no information available on the present status of this network.

Mubasheri had an important part in gathering the judges, who asked for a raise, together and getting them to strike for a few hours about the time the teachers had arranged their strike during the last days of Jafar Sharif-Saadi's office.

SECRET

SECRET/CONTINUED

- 3 -

SECRET

1. Asst. Under General, Hassan Ibrahim, Chief of 10000, and Taha, former Asst. Under General, Chief of 10000, have said that there is no connection between the two men. Ibrahim also commented that Koberber had done some useful work against the Arab Party in Jordan some years ago. Ali Vass, Assistant to Prime Minister Ali Adnan, has said that Koberber is practically the reincarnation of the Imam Ali: a pure, religious, virtuous man, but functionally opposed to corruption.
2. This probably is connected with a case in which Taha was ordered by his superior to encourage dissident Syrian military engineers who had been dismissed during World War II on security charges. The case had been dropped on good evidence of espionage connections against the Syrian. Ali Vass and Taha were in contact with Koberber in 1954 during the case.
3. Ali Adnan was Minister of Justice from May to December 1955, and Koberber was appointed Ambassador to Washington.
4. 1954-1955 concluded that this candidate had been forced, held secret residence, and was concerned with espionage appointments, treasury, pensions and other changes in the ministry.
5. According to earlier reports Kober, a lawyer, was a former member of the Arab Party, but left the Party when he discovered that it was under UNRWA sponsorship. In 1951 he was reported to be associated with the National Front, and in 1954 with the National Resistance Movement. RIN-5600 and 5562 are Iranian Government reports concerning contacts in the government and nation these persons.
6. This report has been coordinated with the Embassy.

SECRET/CONTINUED

SECRET

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
COUNTRY
CHARGE TO

FROM: AMMAN, JORDAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: SECRETATE WASHDC

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL TEMPOR

ACTION: E.O. 12065: GDS 3/29/85 (TAYLOR, CLYDE D.) OR-E

TAGS: ECON, EFIM, IP

SUBJECT: (C) PLANNING AND BUDGET MINISTER MOJNEAR'S VIEWS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE EMBASSY HAS EXTRACTED THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS BY
MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE PLAN AND BUDGET ORGANIZATION
ALL AMRAT MOJNEAR FROM A TRANSCRIPT OF AN INTERVIEW
MARCH 21 OF 22 GRANTED A FOREIGN JOURNALIST (FINANCIAL
TIMES - PROTECT). WE UNDERSTAND THAT LITTLE OF THE
INTERVIEW WAS PUBLISHED. MOJNEAR'S COMMENTS DO NOT REVEAL
A HIGH LEVEL OF EXPERTISE OR ARTICULATION, BUT PERHAPS
THAT WAS INTENTIONAL, OR AT LEAST UNDERSTANDABLE, GIVEN
THE PRESENT CHARACTER OF THE GOI. EMBASSY COMMENTS FOLLOW
SOME OF HIS STATEMENTS.

3. THE BUDGET: THERE WILL BE A "TEMPORARY" BUDGET FOR
THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF THE NEW YEAR (I.E., MARCH 21
TO JUNE 21), DURING WHICH WE WILL HAVE TO STUDY ALL THE

BY: TAYLOR:HAM	DRAFTING DATE: 3/29/79	TEL EXT.: 1137	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: E/CACOTAYLOR
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CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 100
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Page 2 of 2

[PROBLEMS AND MAKE FINAL DECISIONS ON EXPENDITURES.]

THUS, WE HOPE TO HAVE AN ANNUAL BUDGET WITHIN THE THREE MONTH PERIOD. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE BUDGET WILL BE PLANNED FROM THE EXPENDITURE SIDE AND NOT ON REVENUE POTENTIAL, WHICH IS CHIEFLY A FUNCTION OF THE DISCRETIONARY LEVEL OF OIL EXPERTS. THE AIM IS NOT TO SPEND MONEY FOR AMBITIOUS PROJECTS. THE BUDGET WILL NOT BE AS HIGH AS LAST YEAR'S (NOTE: WHICH WAS AUTHORIZED AT RIALS 2935 BILLION OR DOLS. 41.6^{BW.}/AT 70.5 CONVERSION) IT WILL PROBABLY BE 75-80 PERCENT OF THE 1357 LEVEL. REDUCTIONS WILL BE OBTAINED FROM THE MILITARY SIDE ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT WE HAVE OTHER EXPENSES FOR THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE SUCH AS RURAL ~~RXXX~~ ROADS, LOW-INCOME HOUSING, NEEDS OF THE VILLAGES AND AGRICULTURE. COMMENT: THERE IS LITTLE SURPRISING IN HIS MOST GENERAL VIEWS, BUT IT IS GOOD THAT HE REALIZES THE POTENTIAL FOR WELFARE EXPENDITURES, WHICH TO A LARGE DEGREE WILL OFFSET SAVINGS FROM MAJOR PROJECTS AND MILITARY CUTS. HIS ESTIMATE ON THE 1358 BUDGET (I.E., 75 TO 80 PERCENT OF 1357'S), WOULD PUT IT AT ABOUT THE SAME LEVEL AS 1356, I.E., RLS. 2200 TO 2350 BILLION.

4. MAJOR PROJECTS: PROJECTS SUCH AS KISH ISLAND ARE NOT RIGHT FOR OUR PEOPLE. I AM NOT AGAINST TOURISM, BUT BEFORE GOING AHEAD WITH LARGE HOTELS OTHER NEEDS SHOULD [BE CONSIDERED. WE HAVE INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS WHICH ARE]

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3325
MRN

[UNDER STUDY, PROJECTS WHICH WE HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER]
TO CONTINUE OR PUT ON HOLD. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT
SUCH PROJECTS WILL BE DELAYED OR CHANGED CONSIDERABLY.
THE SECOND GAS PIPELINE (I.E., IGAT II) IS AMONG OUR
MAIN PROJECTS WHICH ARE UNDER STUDY. COMMENT: OUR
SOURCE SAID HE TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO PIN MOINFAR DOWN
ON VARIOUS MAJOR PROJECTS, ESPECIALLY IGAT II; HIS
IMPRESSION WAS THAT MOINFAR AND STAFF DO NOT HAVE
ANSWERS YET AND THAT THE STAFF IS NOT UP TO MEETING
SUCH TASKS.

5. REVENUES: THE JOURNALIST SUGGESTED OIL REVENUE OF
DOLS 16 BILLION FOR YEAR 1358; MOINFAR SAID HE DID NOT
KNOW WHAT TO SAY TO THAT. HE SAID THAT THE ~~MAX~~ MAXIMUM
OIL PRODUCTION WAS 6 MILLION (B/D), BUT HE SUPPOSED IT
WOULD BE LESS THAN THAT AND, IN ANY CASE, WOULD BE
RELATED TO THE EXPENDITURE NEEDS. CUSTOMS REVENUE MAY
NOT BE AS MUCH AS BEFORE SINCE THE IMPORTATION OF LUXURY
AND NON-ESSENTIAL GOODS WILL BE REDUCED. THERE WILL BE
NO ENTRIES IN THE BUDGET FOR REVENUE FROM FOREIGN LOANS
NOR LOANS TO OTHER COUNTRIES. WE HAVE NO NEED FOR
FOREIGN LOANS. OUR NATION HAS DEVELOPED TO THE EXTENT
THAT IF THE PEOPLE FEEL THE GOVERNMENT IS IN NEED OF
MONEY THEY WOULD GIVE IT THEIR JEWELS, RINGS, NECKLACES
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE ARE THE SAME. COMMENT:

[APART FROM THE FOOLISHNESS, WE BELIEVE THAT MOINFAR HAS]

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OPTIONAL FORM 15CA
(Formerly 10-612A)
Jan 1975
Dept. of State

[NOT FACED UP TO THE OBLIGATIONS MADE TO SOME FOREIGN COUNTRIES, WHICH, THOUGH NOT LARGE IN FIRM COMMITMENTS, WOULD BE POLITICALLY AND IN SOME CASES ECONOMICALLY (E.G., THE IRON ORE PROJECT IN INDIA) UNWISE TO DISHONOR.

6. CONSEQUENCES OF CANCELLING PROJECTS: THE INTERVIEWER LED MOINFAR INTO THE CONSEQUENCES OF CANCELLED PROJECTS. MOINFAR SAID THAT CANCELLING A PROJECT DOES NOT MEAN UNEMPLOYMENT; THE TYPES OF PROJECTS WILL BE CHANGED. SO THE SAME UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE WILL FIND WORK ELSEWHERE. ALSO CONSIDER THAT WE HAVE HAD A GREAT NUMBER OF FOREIGN WORKERS IN THIS COUNTRY. I DO AGREE, HE SAID, THAT IN THE FIRST FEW MONTHS THERE WILL BE UNEMPLOYMENT, BUT GRADUALLY THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNEMPLOYED. I BELIEVE IN NEW TECHNOLOGY. BUT IF TECHNOLOGY CAUSES UNEMPLOYMENT IT SHOULD NOT BE EMPLOYED. HE GAVE AS AN EXAMPLE ROAD CONSTRUCTION, SAYING THAT IF THERE ARE NUMBERS OF UNSKILLED WORKERS IDLE, THE MACHINERY, ALTHOUGH ALREADY PROCURED, SHOULD BE LEFT ASIDE AND THE WORKERS EMPLOYED.

7. ARREARAGES ON PUBLIC PROJECTS: HE SAID THAT THE PROBLEM ON ARREARAGES RELATES NOT ONLY TO FOREIGN CONTRACTORS ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ BUT LOCAL. WE STARTED PAYMENTS BEFORE NO RUZ AND HAVE AS A CONSEQUENCE ALREADY INJECTED MUCH MONEY INTO THE MARKET. WE ARE MAKING REGULAR PAYMENTS. I DON'T HAVE ANY FIGURES TO GIVE YOU. WE WILL GRADUALLY

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MINI

[PAY THE GOVERNMENT DEBTS AND THERE SEEMS TO BE NO (FINANCIAL) PROBLEM SINCE THE OIL EXPORTS ARE GOING AND WE HAVE ENOUGH POSSIBILITIES FOR (REVENUES FOR) OUR PAYMENTS.

8. CORRUPTION: MOINFAR, HARDLY PROMPTED BY THE INTERVIEWER, WENT ON AT LENGTH ABOUT CORRUPTION, THE "PAHLAVI PERCENTAGE" AND SAID THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE STUDY OF PROJECTS THAT IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THOSE BASED ON DISHONESTY WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND BY A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.

9. COMMENT: BASED ON THIS JOURNALIST'S IMPRESSIONS AND THE EMBASSY'S OTHER CONTACTS, SOME INCLUDING OFFICERS IN THE PBO, IT APPEARS THAT MOINFAR AND COMPANY HAVE A LONG ROW TO HOE TO GET FROM REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC TO THE REALITIES OF PLANNING AND FINANCING AND ECONOMY AND GOVERNMENT. MOINFAR DISMISSED ALL HIS UNDER SECRETARIES AND, FROM REPORTS, IGNORES HIS DIRECTORS GENERAL, PREFERRING TO SURROUND HIMSELF WITH ADVISORS FROM THE LOWER RANKS OR THOSE NEW TO PBO. FORMER PBO MINISTER MEHRAN DESCRIBED MOINFAR TO EMBOFF AS "LEFT OF THE NATIONAL FRONT" AND HAVING SOME COMPETENCE, BUT NOT IN THE SAME ACADEMIC LEAGUE AS ARDALAN AND MOWLAVI. WE HAVE LITTLE OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT HIM, OTHER THAN THAT HE WAS A DIRECTOR GENERAL IN PBO. SULLIVAN##

CONFIDENTIAL

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على اکبر حسین قزوینی

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TEHRAN 11203

DE RUEMHR #1203 #298 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZJ
P 231045Z OCT 75
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4425
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 11203

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
REF: STAT 10-23-75
P.V. CHARGE: LRLAINGEN
REF: POL: JLMBERT: CO
CZAR: POL: VITO: SEH: ECO
SENS
DISTR: POL: CAG ICA
ECON CONS CERN
BT

F.O. 12065: GDS 10/23/95 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, BNRG, IR
SUBJECT: OIL MINISTER REPORTEDLY BEATEN AND HOSPITALIZED

1. (U) ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEHRAN TIMES OF OCTOBER 20
CARRIED STORY THAT OIL MINISTER ALI AKBAR MOINFARR
WAS HOSPITALIZED IN TEHRAN AFTER SUFFERING A HEART ATTACK
OCTOBER 20. ACCORDING TO THE STORY, MOINFARR'S CONDITION
WAS CRITICAL WHEN HE ARRIVED AT THE HOSPITAL. HE IS NOW
RECOVERING AND IS EXPECTED TO BE OUT IN THREE DAYS.

2. (C) NEWSPAPER VERSION HAS BEEN CONTRADICTED BY
REPORTS THAT MOINFARR WAS IN FACT BEATEN BY ANGRY OIL
WORKERS IN KHUZESTAN. ACCORDING TO EYEWITNESS REPORT
REACHING EMBASSY FROM KHUZESTAN-BASED JOURNALIST,
MOINFARR WAS DRAGGED FROM HIS CAR IN ABADAN BY WORKERS
ANGRY AT RECENT WAGE CUTS AND REFUSALS TO PAY TAXES.
HE WAS SEVERELY BEATEN BEFORE HE COULD BE RESCUED.

3. (C) THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER REPORTS THAT MOINFARR
BRIEF TENURE AS OIL MINISTER HAS BEEN STORMY. ACCORDING
TO ONE STORY EMPLOYEES WERE THREATENED INTO ATTENDING
MEETINGS AND RALLIES IN SUPPORT OF THE NEW MINISTER
AND AGAINST FORMER NIOC DIRECTOR NAZIR. LAINGEN

BT
#1203

NNNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TEHRAN 11203

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DE RUEHC #5793 3032344

ZNY CCCCC 72H

P R 302219Z OCT 79

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1206

INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN #21

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 285768

E.O. 12965: RDS-3 12/29/99 (MCAPME, WILLIAM)

TAGS: PINR, IR, VE

SUBJECT: (U) IRANIAN MINISTER OF PETROLEUM, ALI AKBAR MOINFAR

REFS: A) CARACAS 12092, RI TEHRAN 11023 (NOT SENT TO CARACAS)

1. (C) AS HEAD (SINCE SEPTEMBER 1979) OF THE NEWLY CREATED MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM, ALI AKBAR MOINFAR LEADS THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (NIOC), THE NATIONAL IRANIAN GAS COMPANY, THE NATIONAL IRANIAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, AND THE PETROLEUM DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND FINANCE. HE IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF CABINET OFFICERS WHO HAVE REPUTATIONS FOR HONESTY, BUT ARE LITTLE KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC. MOINFAR HAS NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN PETROLEUM AFFAIRS, AND HIS SUBSTANTIVE KNOWLEDGE SEEMS LIMITED TO CIVIL ENGINEERING AND SEISMOLOGY. IN ADDITION, HE LACKS SUPERIORITY SKILLS. HIS POLITICAL CONNECTIONS, HOWEVER, ARE EXCELLENT. HE WAS A FOLLOWER OF PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN WHEN THE LATTER WAS A PROFESSOR OF ENGINEERING AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY IN THE 1950S. AS AN ENGINEER, MOINFAR MAY BE MORE

ACCEPTABLE TO RANK AND FILE WORKERS. THERE WAS HIS PREDECESSOR, DANIEL HASANMAZIZADEH. THE MINISTER HAS ANNOUNCED THAT HE WILL PURSUE THE INDUSTRY OF ALL PERSONS WHO WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. IF EXPERIENCED MANAGERS AND EMPLOYEES ARE REMOVED, PROMOTION AND MORALE WOULD SUFFER.

2. (C) AS REPORTED IN REF B, MOINFAR WAS RECENTLY KICKED FROM HIS CAR IN MAHADAN, IRAN, BY OIL WORKERS AND AT WAGE CUTS AND REFUSAL TO PAY BONUSES. HE WAS

SEVERELY BEATEN BEFORE HE COULD BE RESCUED. THIS VERSION WAS RELIABLY CONFIRMED BY THE TURKISH TIMES OF 30 OCTOBER 1979 WHICH ASSERED THAT MOINEAR HAD BEEN HOSPITALIZED IN TURKISH AFTER SUFFERING A HEART ATTACK ON OCTOBER 20. MOINEAR MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR AN INTERVIEW WITH VENEZUELAN ENERGY MINISTER HYPERIO CALDERON BERTI (REF A).

3. (C) A GRADUATE OF TURKISH UNIVERSITY IN CIVIL ENGINEERING, MOINEAR HAS A MASTER'S DEGREE IN SEISMOLOGY FROM A JAPANESE UNIVERSITY. SOME DETAILS OF HIS CAREER ARE CURRENTLY UNAVAILABLE. HE WAS DIRECTOR OF THE TECHNICAL BUREAU OF THE PLAN ORGANIZATION IN 1966 AND HEADED THE TECHNICAL RESEARCH AND STANDARDS BUREAU OF THAT BODY FROM 1972 UNTIL THE REVOLUTION. HE SERVED AS MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE PLAN AND BUDGET ORGANIZATION FROM FEBRUARY 1979 UNTIL HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND AS MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND MINES DURING FEBRUARY-MARCH 1979.

4. (U) MOINEAR, ABOUT 52, SPEAKS ENGLISH AND JAPANESE.

5. (C) NAZIR IS TECHNICALLY STILL HEAD OF NIQC. A REPLACEMENT HAS NOT BEEN NAMED. HE HAS BEEN GLORIOUSLY ECLIPSED BY MOINEAR, HOWEVER, AND HAS PROBABLY RETAINED LITTLE OR NO POWER UNDER THE REORGANIZATION. SOME OF NAZIR'S ENEMIES SEEM DETERMINED TO TRIE HIM FOR VARIOUS ALLEGED CRIMES AT NIQC, AND HE MAY BE IN HIDING. AT THE MOMENT HE IS CLEARLY OUT OF FAVOR AND CALDERON BERTI MAY WISH TO BE CAUTIOUS IN MENTIONING AN INTEREST IN NAZIR.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET-SENSITIVE

December 13, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES

FROM: NEA/IRN - Henry Precht

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, Adviser to Khomeini, December 12, 1978, at Dominique's Restaurant

I had dinner with Robert Hirschman of WETA and Dr. Yazdi and for a short time Marvin Zonis at Hirschman's invitation. Yazdi, an American citizen, was on his way to spend a day in Houston where he is in cancer research. He has known Khomeini since the early 1960's. Yazdi is a reserved, exceedingly calm, but very persistent idealist. I believe he is intelligent and honest with himself. The following paragraphs summarize the main points in our conversation:

-- The President's December 12 statement: Yazdi regretted the President's statement because it again showed total American support for the Shah and denigrated the opposition, specifically Khomeini. He did not know whether Khomeini would react strongly to the President's implied and "not true" criticism.

-- Khomeini on violence: Yazdi said that following the September 8 "massacre," Iranians had asked Khomeini for permission to take up arms against the Shah. Khomeini had refused, but authorized them to acquire arms in the event an armed struggle might be necessary at a later stage. He indicated that if the army attempted to crack down harshly, Khomeini would be obliged to issue a call to arms. I asked him about the "torrents of blood" statement attributed to Khomeini. Yazdi said that he had complained to UPI that Khomeini had made no such call for violence. I asked if Khomeini did not feel responsibility for the violence and destruction against banks, movie theaters, hotels, etc.? Yazdi said Khomeini had not called for such actions and that some were the work of SAVAK. He acknowledged that it was not possible to control strictly their followers in Iran and that

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XDS-4, 12/13/98 (PRECHT, HENRY)

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Khomeini must bear some of the responsibility for the destruction. I asked about responsibility for the assassination of American military personnel. Yazdi again denied this was Khomeini's doing, but asked in turn whether the Americans who trained and equipped the Iranian army were not responsible for the deaths of innocent Iranians?

Yazdi's position on violence is that the Iranian Government has been responsible for the killing of innocent persons in Iran. The Khomeini revolt is an unarmed one that suffers from the violence of the Government.

-- The December 10-11 demonstrations: I asked Yazdi whether Khomeini's group considered the peaceful demonstrations a defeat. Some people believed that Khomeini wanted violence on Ashura and that he had been committed to bring down the Shah on that day. Yazdi denied that Khomeini had made such assertions. He said that their people in Iran had planned the demonstrations to show to the outside world that they were capable of absolute discipline and a peaceful expression of their views. He felt that they had succeeded enormously.

Yazdi said the opposition had had two choices: It could have marched toward the Palace or it could have marched as it chose in a neutral direction. The Government had no such choice. If it had attempted to prohibit the demonstrations, there would have been a slaughter and the army would have been unable to hold together.

I asked about the Khomeini organization in Iran. Yazdi did not want to talk about this but made a passing reference to our "central committee and delegations and means of communication."

-- The Islamic Republic: I asked if Khomeini's people came to power what would happen to such responsible figures as Dr. Yeganeh whose only defect perhaps was that he had served the Shah's Government? Yazdi said that if such men were otherwise clean and were willing to work for the new Government, there would

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be no problem. A person like Ganji, who was well-known to Yazdi, had been listed as one who took millions out of Iran. Yazdi implied that that would finish Ganji.

I asked how an Islamic board of review would work? He said Iranian economists would be obliged to come up with some new system (e.g., service fees) to replace interest rates. He felt confident this could happen. In its dealings abroad Iran would pay and receive interest. What about co-education? No problem said Yazdi, there could be co-education. He emphasized that it would take some time and the re-education of the people to build a new political system founded on Islamic principles. It would not be like the tribal society in Saudi Arabia, and in fact would be unique in the world.

When the Shah goes, Khomeini would designate a cabinet which would serve as a transitional government until elections could produce a lasting government. Elections would be absolutely free. They were an essential element in the Khomeini program. The Islamic Republic would also enjoy full freedom of speech and the press, including the right to attack Islam. The Shias had no fears because they knew they were strong.

As to foreign relations, the Islamic Republic would seek good ties with all countries. It would not sell oil to South Africa or Israel, however. I asked whether Iran might send troops to aid the Arabs in another Arab-Israeli war? No, said Yazdi. How about joining an Arab oil embargo? I don't know, he said.

Yazdi dismissed the communists as being unimportant politically in Iran. Similarly, he dismissed the threat of Soviet intervention. He appreciated that Iraq was nervous because Iraq's social/political situation made it ripe for the same kinds of events occurring in Iran.

We asked whether Khomeini's people had had any contacts with any foreign governments, e.g., Saudi Arabia or Egypt? He said they had not. He dismissed the Libyan Government as so inept that it could be of little help to Khomeini.

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-- The military: After the Shah, Khomeini forces would purge the senior Generals, if any remained in the country. He said a number of officers had come secretly to see Khomeini and he was confident of support within the army. The task of the Islamic Republic would be to educate the army to a national mission rather than one of protecting the Shah.

Yazdi said the Islamic Republic would probably cancel many arms sales contracts as they did not serve Iran's interests. It would pay its debts for any contracts that were cancelled. He said the new Government would be happy to buy tractors instead from the U.S.

-- The future of the Shah: I described a number of arrangements ranging to the "King of Sweden model" which might be adopted to preserve a position for the Shah. Yazdi was uncompromising. The Shah must go and his system must be abolished. We were dealing with a mass revolution. If Khomeini argued that the Shah could stay with reduced powers, he would be rejected by his followers.

Would it be possible for a Sanjabi to negotiate a new government? Would Khomeini accept that? "No."

Wasn't it necessary to keep the Shah in order to preserve military discipline and prevent civil war? Yazdi was confident that once the Shah was gone, Iran's problems would be solved and the military would have no choice but to sign up with the Islamic Republic.

-- The U.S. Role: The U.S. was crucial, Yazdi said. If the U.S. withdrew its support of the Shah, he would fall immediately. If the support continued, the U.S. would suffer the same fate as the Shah in Iran. Would the Ayatollah call for violence against Americans if he called for a holy war on Shah's regime? That was a real possibility, Yazdi said, particularly, if the U.S. continued to make statements such as the President's statement of December 12. He could not, of course, control all of the Iranians who were in a rage in any event.

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What about Khomeini's threat to cancel oil contracts with the U.S.? That would depend, Yazdi said, on how the U.S. performed between now and the day that the Shah fell.

On parting, we agreed that neither of us would acknowledge that there had been any official contact between Khomeini and the U.S. Government.

Comment

All of this sounds naive. It is, but it is also deeply felt. I had the impression that the Khomeini organization is very amateurish in its handling of PR and contacts with foreigners. But, clearly, they know how to operate in Iran in a way that the Shah's people have forgotten.

cc: D - Mr. Christopher
P - Mr. Newsom
NEA - Mr. Saunders
CIA - Mr. Ames
NSC - Captain Sick
Ambassador Sullivan

Drafted: NEA/IRN:HPrecht:amp
12/13/78 - ext:20313

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E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: IR, FR, PINT
SUBJECT: (U) KHOMEINI CAMP'S REACTION TO VISIT OF
BAKHTIAR TO PARIS

1. (U) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS FROM THE AP TICKER:

A. DR. YAZDI SAID SATURDAY NIGHT THAT AYOTULLAH KHOMEINI WOULD AGREE TO MEET PREMIER BAKHTIAR WHEN HE ARRIVES IN PARIS. YAZDI SAID THAT KHOMEINI HAD KNOWN IN ADVANCE OF BAKHTIAR'S PLAN.

B. SOURCES IN KHOMEINI'S ENTOURAGE SAID THAT BAKHTIAR MIGHT MEET AS EARLY AS SUNDAY IN KHOMEINI'S HOUSE IN SUBURBAN PARIS. YAZDI SOUNDED JUBILANT AND SAID HE WAS HAPPY BECAUSE BAKHTIAR'S MOVE SHOWED HE MIGHT BE CHANGING HIS POLICY.

C. YAZDI SAID BAKHTIAR HAD SAID THAT HE WANTS TO HEAR KHOMEINI'S OPINION AND, IF SO, KHOMEINI IS WILLING TO LET HIM HEAR IT.

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D. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH FRENCH RADIO SATURDAY NIGHT, BAKHTIAR SAID THAT HIS VISIT TO PARIS WOULD LAST A MAXIMUM OF THREE DAYS. BAKHTIAR SAID THAT HIS OFFER TO MEET WITH KHOMEINI WAS A GOOD WILL ATTEMPT WHICH HE WAS MAKING WITH GREAT PLEASURE. BAKHTIAR DID NOT KNOW IF KHOMEINI WOULD RETURN TO TEHRAN WITH HIM. BAKHTIAR RESPONDED TO A QUERY OF WHETHER THE AIRPORT WOULD BE OPENED FOR HIS FLIGHT TO PARIS BY CONSIDERING THIS A SECONDARY QUESTION AND "WHAT IS NECESSARY WOULD BE DONE."

E. IRANIAN SOURCES SAID THAT GENERAL FERIDUM JAM, WHO WAS MINISTER OF DEFENSE IN THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT BUT RESIGNED TWO DAYS LATER, MET WITH KHOMEINI ON FRIDAY NIGHT.

F. AP COMMENTED THAT BAKHTIAR'S DECISION TO COME TO PARIS APPEARS TO HAVE DIVIDED KHOMEINI'S CLOSEST AIDES AND DELAYED UNTIL SUNDAY FINAL CONFIRMATION THAT THE MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE. YAZDI SAID WITHOUT QUALIFICATION THAT KHOMEINI WOULD MEET WITH BAKHTIAR AND HAD KNOWN IN ADVANCE THAT BAKHTIAR WAS COMING. BUT SADEGH GHOTBZADEH LATER TOLD REPORTERS KHOMEINI WOULD RECEIVE BAKHTIAR IF BAKHTIAR IS COMING TO OFFER HIS RESIGNATION AS PREMIER. GHOTBZADEH SAID THAT ANY OTHER MOTIVATION WOULD BE STUDIED WITH CARE BEFORE KHOMEINI TOOK A DECISION ON THE MEETING. QUERIED ON THE CONTRADICTION, YAZDI SAID THE TWO AIDES WERE EXPRESSING THEIR OWN UNDERSTANDING OF DEVELOPMENTS AND ADDED THAT IT WAS NATURAL THAT TWO PEOPLE MIGHT REACH DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS. YAZDI SAID KHOMEINI WOULD MAKE KNOWN HIS DECISION SOMETIME SUNDAY.

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0 N F I D E N T I A L MAR 79

THIS IS IIR 6 846 0134 79

1. COUNTRY: IRAN (IR)

2. REPORT NUMBER: 6 846 0134 79

3. TITLE: STRIP FOR PERIOD 171200-181200L MAR 79

4. OMITTED.

5. DATE OF INFO: 790317

6. DATE OF REPORT: 790318

7. DATE: PLACE OF ACQ: 790317, TEHRAN, IRAN

8. REFERENCE: ICR U-UEE-49128, W-3E1-15016

9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE B. INFO

10. ORIGINATOR: USDAO (AAIRA) TEHRAN, IRAN

11. REQUEST EVAL: ICR

12. PREPARING OFF: W.F. JOHNSON, CAPT, USAF, AAIRA

13. APPROVING AUTH: I.E. SCHAEFER, COL, USAF, DATT

14. SOURCE: LOCAL NEWS MEDIA, USDAO PERSONNEL, EMBASSY

OFFICIALS, 6 846 0003

15. SPECIAL INST: DIRCI NO.

16. SUMMARY. (C) REPORT FORWARDS INFORMATION FOR THE PERIOD 171200-181200L MAR 79. INFORMATION CONCERNS ECONOMICS, AFGHANS, MINISTER OF JUSTICE, POLITICAL ACTIVITY, YAZDI, MARCHES, EMBASSY SECURITY.

17. TDSU 21. OMITTED

22. DETAILS: (C) A. ECONOMICS - IN AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S

FIRST MAJOR SPEECH ON ECONOMICS HE, REFLECTING PM BAZARGAN'S

GROWING CONCERN FOR THE IRANIAN ECONOMY, HAS WARNED THE

PEOPLE THEY MUST IMMEDIATELY START WORKING TO SAVE THE

"BANKRUPT ECONOMY." BOTH THE SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS

HAVE CALLED ON THE YOUTH OF THE NATION AND THE OVER ZEALOUS

GUARDIANS OF THE REVOLUTION TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT

IN ACHIEVING A HEALTHY FINANCIAL SITUATION IN IRAN. PRESS

REPORTS INDICATE THE NATION WAS BROKE THREE DAYS AFTER

THE REVOLUTIONARY VICTOR ON FEB 11.

ORIGINATOR COMMENTS: (C) ECONOMIC REALITY IS BECOMING A

MAJOR CONCERN OF THE GOVERNMENT. BAZARGAN SEEMS TO HAVE

COMMENCED KHOMEINI THAT IF THE ECONOMY DOES NOT RECOVER,

THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ENDURE. THE PROBLEM IS HOW DO YOU

CONVINCE A POPULATION THAT HAS LONG BEEN WITHOUT POWER OR FREEDOM, THAT THE BATTLE IS OVER AND THEY MUST RETURN TO THEIR JOBS. HOW DO YOU CONVINCE THEM THEY MUST HAVE DISCIPLINE AND MUST WORK FOR A "BOSS". HOW CAN FACTORIES RUN IF WORKERS ONLY DEBATE THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND VOTE ON WHAT TYPE OF WORK THEY WILL DO. IF THE ECONOMY IS TO RECOVER, THE ~~AFGHANISTAN MUST FIND THE MEANS TO GO AND RETURN TO WORK.~~

~~2. AFGHANS: A GROUP OF ABOUT 22 AFGHAN YOUTH PUSHED THEIR WAY INTO THE AFGHANISTAN EMBASSY IN TEHRAN PROTESTING THE PERSECUTION OF MUSLIMS BY MAXIST LEADERS IN KABUL.~~
PRESS REPORTS STATE THAT A SECOND INCIDENT TOOK PLACE AT THE AFGHAN AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE IN NORTH TEHRAN. YOUNGSTERS ATTACKED THE HOME AND PULLED DOWN THE AFGHAN FLAG. TWO IRANIAN SHIA LEADERS, AYATOLLAH SADEGH MOSSLEINI ROUHANI AND AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI HAVE CONDEMNED THE KABUL REGIME AND CALLED FOR THEM TO STOP THEIR "DEVILISH ACTS".

~~ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: (C) THE AURA OF POWER SURROUNDING IRAN'S AYATOLLAS MAY BEGIN TO SHINE IN OTHER OPPRESSED ISLAMIC NATIONS.~~

C. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE. A SPEECHSMAN FOR THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE HAS ANNOUNCED THE DISSOLUTION OF THE STATES SUPREME COURT AS WELL AS THE JUDGES DISCIPLINARY AND APPELLATE DISCIPLINARY COURTS. REORGANIZATION

OF THE COURT SYSTEM

WILL BEGIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

D. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES:

(1) THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT HAS CALLED FOR ALL GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS BELIEVING IN DEMOCRACY AND ANTI-IMPERIALISM TO JOIN ITS RANKS. THIS IS A PRE-REFERENDUM ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE THE ACTIVITIES OF THOSE WHO OPPOSE AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND THE YES/NO REFERENDUM.

(2) THE IRANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY HAS DESCRIBED ITSELF AS A MARXIST, LENINIST, MAOIST ORGANIZATION. THEY FURTHER STATED THEY HAVE NO CONTACTS WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, BUT ARE OPPOSED TO SOVIET SOCIAL-IMPERIALISM. THE PARTY FURTHER STATED THEIR ONLY DISAGREEMENT WITH ISLAM IS ISLAM'S ACCEPTANCE OF CAPITALISM AND THE PARTY'S REJECTION OF CAPITALISM..

(3) A NEW PARTY BEING FORMED IN THE PROVINCES IS THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY. IT IS REPORTED TO HAVE SIGNED UP 10,000 MEMBERS IN RUDESAN.

~~ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: (C) A FREE ELECTION SOMETHING NEW IN IRAN. AS THE REFERENDUM APPROACHES NEW POLITICAL PARTIES APPEAR LIKE FLOWERS IN SPRING.~~

E. YAZDI. ASSISTANT TO THE PM FOR REVOLUTIONARY AFFAIRS, DR. ISRAHIM YAZDI, MAY BE THE FIRST CASUALTY OF JAMES BILL'S

TIME MAGAZINE ARTICLE. TO BE ACCUSED OF PRO-U.S. INCLINATION IS A SHANDER NOT MANY POLITICIANS CAN SURVIVE IN PRESENT IRAN. MR. YAZDI HAS REBUTED MR. SILL'S COMMENTS; HOWEVER, A SHADOW SPENS CAST OVER HIS CREDITABILITY. AN EMBASSY OFFICIAL HAS TALKED WITH AN IRANIAN WHO REPORTEDLY DISCHURSED A GROUP OF IRANIANS FROM ATTEMPTING TO KILL YAZDI.

ORIGINATOR COMMENT: (C) WITHOUT A DOUBT MANY OF THE INTELLIGENT AND POLITICALLY ACTIVE IRANIANS WERE TRAINED IN THE U.S. WE FEEL THAT BECAUSE OF THAT TRAINING, EVENTUALLY A FAVORABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN WILL BE FORTHCOMING. HOWEVER, EVERY TIME AN ARTICLE BRINGS THESE PEOPLE AND THEIR BACKGROUND BEFORE THE LESS SOPHISTICATED MASSES, IT DOES NOTHING BUT HARM TO WHAT COULD BE A GOOD FUTURE RELATIONSHIP.

F. MARCHES. EMBASSY OFFICIALS REPORT THAT DURING NOV AUZ ON THE 21ST AND 23RD OF MARCH THERE WILL BE MARCHES IN TEHRAN.

G. EMBASSY SECURITY. DURING THE NIGHT OF 17/18 MARCH SHOOTING IN AND NEAR THE COMPOUND WAS HEARD AT 2330, 2130 AND 0500. NO DAMAGE OR CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.

(C) SOMETIME ON THE 16TH AND 17TH THE U.S. CONSULATE STUDENT ANNEX ON THE COMPOUND WAS ENTERED AND SLIGHT DAMAGE WAS DONE TO THE INSIDE OF THE BUILDING.

ORIGINATOR COMMENT: (C) NIGHTLY SHOOTING ON OR NEAR THE EMBASSY COMPOUND HAS BECOME COMMON OCCURANCE. THE ONLY GOOD TO FIND IN THESE SHOOTOUTS IS THAT NO ONE HAS BEEN HIT. A GENERAL ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING APPEARS TO BE ON THE UPSWING. RECENT CONTACT WITH IRANIANS FINDS MANY WHO COULD SPEAK VERY GOOD ENGLISH IN THE PAST, NOW UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE EXCEPT IN FARSI. ADDITIONALLY, WE MAY SEE A FURTHER DEGRADATION OF AMERICAN COMMUNITIES POSITION WITH THE SIGNING OF THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI PEACE TREATY. ALTHOUGH THE U.S. EMBASSY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO SECURE A SATISFACTORY METHOD OF MOVING U.S. GOODS FROM IRAN, AN AIR FRANCE AIRCRAFT, OBSERVED BY AAIRA, WAS LOADING PALETTE OF DAMAGE.

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EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4. 3/26/89 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P

TAGS: PINR, PINS, PEPR, IR

SUBJECT: Biographic Information on Deputy Prime Minister
Ebrahim Yazdi.

1. C - entire text.

2. The following biographic information on Ebrahim Yazdi comes from a conversation with Yazdi more than a month ago but was not reported earlier because the Embassy was invaded on the day it was to be drafted. Some of the details have faded from memory, but the general outline contains some information that we believe is not on file in Washington.

3. According to a form Yazdi filled in on his most recent entry into Iran, he was born in 1931. This fits in with his own account of his life as given to Pol Counselor and contrasts with published version of his age, which originally had him as 39 years old, and have since described him as in his early forties. Yazdi appears to be in fact 47 or 48 years old, despite a youthful appearance under a full beard. He has three brothers.

4. Yazdi has three brothers, one or two of them older than himself. All four appear to have studied to become pharmacists, in Iran, with a year or two of post-graduate study elsewhere. The oldest brother is a doctor (perhaps an

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opthamalogist) with his own private clinic in Tehran. Another brother is living here, and a third one reportedly in Baltimore, an American citizen.

5. Yazdi claims to have been very active as a student in Tehran in helping to form an Islamic movement with such other notables of today as Ayatollah Taleghani and Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. This was in the 1940's and early 1950's and, according to Yazdi, was aimed primarily at countering the appeal of Marxism among Iranian youth, especially the students. In this he claims a kinship of effort with people such as the philosopher Ali Shariati, who was a little younger.

6. Yazdi says he left Tehran for the United States in the early 1950's and did some post-graduate studies and teaching in New Jersey and elsewhere, ending up in Texas. His field had become scientific, particularly medical, research. After the anti-Shah demonstrations in Iran during 1962 and 1963, and the subsequent exile of Ayatollah Khomeini to Turkey and eventually Najaf, Iraq, Yazdi said he took a job teaching at the American University of Beirut to be closer to the scene.

7. The Lebanese government turned against Iranians some time in 1966 or 1967 (the exact occasion escapes us) and Yazdi had to leave, along with many other Iranians. He returned to the U.S., after having visited Khomeini and being appointed by Khomeini as his personal representative

for the United States, Yazdi says. In the U.S. he was active on Khomeini's behalf.

8. When Khomeini was thrown out of Iraq last year, Yazdi went to Paris, London, and Bonn, but was told by oppositionists there not to go visit Khomeini in Najaf because he would be arrested. After some hesitation, he nevertheless flew to Baghdad and arrived in Najaf the very evening that Khomeini was packing up to leave.

9. The guards refused to let him see Khomeini, but by using subterfuge (asking to pray in a mosque and using another exit) he got to Khomeini and accompanied him, his son and two other disciples on the drive to the Kuwaiti border. There the party was refused permission to enter Kuwait and, after a few hours, instructions from Baghdad came ~~down~~ to let Khomeini's group come back to Baghdad for departure to Paris. Yazdi himself was refused the same permission and kept prisoner overnight at the border post. The next day instructions from Baghdad released him so that he could follow Khomeini. He went to Paris with Khomeini and stayed there as an intimate member of his entourage.

10. The above was volunteered by Yazdi without much prodding and could conceivably be doctored for our ears. It fits in, however, with what we have heard about him from other Islamic sources, namely that he is not a Marxist

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or a Communist, although like many Iranians of his generation he was exposed to Marxism and Communism during his university years and would have had to take a position for or against it. His early association with Ayatollah Taleghani and Bazargan would explain his stature in the movement, particularly as he seems to have been delegated or perhaps self-selected to get close to Khomeini while Khomeini was in exile. He apparently spent some time with Khomeini before being appointed Khomeini's personal representative in the U.S. This put Yazdi early on in the role of a bridge among various top leaders of the Islamic movement, a role he apparently still plays.

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CHG: CWNAAS
POL: JDSTEMPEL
NONE
CHG POL(2) ECON, OR ICA RF

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

LIMDIS

EO. 12065: XGDS 4/25/09 (STEMPEL, J.D.)OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJ: IBRAHIM YAZDI AS FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: A) TEHRAN 4244 B) TEHRAN 3245 (EXDIS)

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: YAZDI'S NOMINATION AS FOREIGN MINISTER RAISES MORE QUESTIONS THAN IT ANSWERS. MIXED SIGNALS ON YAZDI'S ROLE WITH PLO. BANI-ASADI WILL PROBABLY REPLACE YAZDI. YAZDI WILL EXPRESS HIS VIEWS INTELLIGENTLY BUT THEY WILL BE ANTI-WEST. END SUMMARY

3. PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN'S APRIL 24 ANNOUNCEMENT THAT YAZDI WOULD BE FOREIGN MINISTER POSES MOST INTERESTING QUESTION: WAS HE PROMOTED OR KICKED UPSTAIRS? BASIC BIODATA ON YAZDI SUBMITTED IN REFTELS; BELOW WE DEAL WITH SOME IMPONDERABLES IN THE YAZDI EQUATION.

4. SPECULATION IS RIFE THAT YAZDI WAS KICKED UPSTAIRS BECAUSE HE WAS EITHER GETTING IN BAZARGAN'S WAY, OR HAD LOST HIS UTILITY AS A GO-BETWEEN WITH THE PGOI AND THE COMMITTEE STRUCTURE. EVIDENCE FOR LATTER VIEW IS ADDUCED BY THOSE WHO SAW YAZDI GET INTO FURIOUS SHOUTING MATCH WITH COMMITTEE GROUP AT AIRPORT WHEN LIBYAN PRIME MINISTER JALLUD ARRIVED ON APRIL 22. EYEWITNESSES SAY YAZDI WANTED TO KEEP JALLUD ON PLANE UNTIL HE EXPLAINED WHERE LIBYANS HAD HIDDEN IMAN MUSA SADR. COMMITTEE WANTED TO LET PM LAND AND TAKE HIM TO QOM. KHOMEINI'S SON RUSHED TO SCENE AND CONVINCED YAZDI TO YIELD TO COMMITTEE VIEW. TWO GOOD SOURCES SAY YAZDI'S DAYS AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER WERE NUMBERED FROM THAT MOMENT.

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5. ALTERNATE VIEW (THERE'S ALWAYS ONE IN IRAN) SAYS THAT YAZDI ROLE AS MAN WHO BROUGHT PLO TO IRAN WAS CREATING PROBLEMS FOR BAZARGAN, AND PROMOTION TO FOREIGN MINISTER WAS CONSIDERED BEST WAY TO GIVE YAZDI MORE AUTHORITY FOR HANDLING PLO AND AT THE SAME TIME GET HIM AWAY FROM THE PM'S OFFICE. NON-IRANIAN NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENT CLOSE TO PLO CHIEF HASSAN DISPUTES THIS VIEW, AND SAYS PLO HAS BEEN HAVING PROBLEMS WITH YAZDI. (HE ALSO CONFIRMED INFORMATION REPORTED EARLIER THAT PLO ARE TRAINING MUJAHIDDIN AND FEDAYEEN AND JUST ABOUT EVERYONE WHO WANTS TO LEARN WEAPONRY.) SOURCE CLOSE TO YAZDI WHO HELPED ARRANGE ENTRY FOR PLO IN EARLY DAYS SAYS PLO BECAME ANNOYED WITH YAZDI WHEN HE WANTED TO RESTRICT PLO TO TRAINING NEW REVOLUTIONARY GUARDIANS CORP. THERE IS SOME LEEWAY IN VARIOUS STORIES, BUT IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT IN SOME WAY YAZDI ROLE WITH PLO, FOR GOOD OR BAD, WAS CONNECTED WITH HIS BEING NAMED FOREIGN MINISTER.

6. ANOTHER IRANIAN SOURCE INDICATES THAT EMBARRASSMENT OVER REVELATION THAT YAZDI HAS U.S. PASSPORT (HE ADMITTED THIS IN PERSIAN PRESS EVENING APRIL 24) AND CHARGES THAT HE WAS A CIA AGENT MEANT HE HAD TO BE GOTTEN OUT OF PM'S OFFICE. BAZARGAN'S PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT YAZDI'S DEPUTY FOR REVOLUTIONARY AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO WOULD BE GIVEN TO SOMEONE ELSE SUGGESTS SOME TRUTH TO THIS. NAMING OF HOSSEIN BANI-ASADI (BAZARGAN SON-IN-LAW; INFLUENCE OF FAMILY AND DOWREH LIVES ON IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN) TO DEPUTY PORTFOLIO FOR QUOTE COOPERATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE UNQUOTE IS NOT A DIRECT REPLACEMENT FOR YAZDI, BUT MOST OBSERVERS FEEL HE WILL EVENTUALLY GET HOLD OF YAZDI'S REVOLUTIONARY RESPONSIBILITIES, SINCE HE HAS BEEN DEPUTY TO THE MINISTER FOR REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM, YADOLLAH SAHABI, AS WELL AS BAZARGAN RELATIVE.

7. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY, NOT INCONSISTENT WITH EITHER OF THE ABOVE, IS THAT YAZDI, WITH THE PGOI'S BEST CONNECTIONS TO THE COMMITTEE COMPLEX, WAS SEEN AS THE BEST MAN TO BEGIN TO START PULLING IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TOGETHER INTO A COHERENT WHOLE. HE HAS BEEN DEALING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXTENSIVELY ANYWAY, AND HIS APPOINTMENT AS MINISTER NOW GIVES HIM A MANDATE OVER THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AS WELL.

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8. YAZDI THE MAN: US CORRESPONDENT WHO HAS FOLLOWED YAZDI PERSONALLY SINCE PARIS SAYS YAZDI IS CONSUMMATE MEDIA MANIPULATOR (VIEW THOSE OF US WHO HAVE DEALT WITH HIM SHARE) WHO IS REALLY DEVOUT BELIEVING MOSLEM. CORRESPONDENT DESCRIBES HIM, HOWEVER AS MAN WHO ALWAYS HAS HIS MASK ON; IN TEN MONTHS, ONLY TIMES HE SHOWED INNER PERSONALITY WERE ONCE IN PARIS IN DISCUSSION OVER KHOMEINI ROLE WHEN HIS RELIGIOUS SIDE CAME OUT, AND AT TIME OF US EMBASSY SACKING WHEN HE BLEW UP AT PHOTOGRAPHERS OF EVENT AND ORDERED THEIR CAMERAS BROKEN AND FILM EXPOSED.

9. EMBASSY DEALINGS WITH YAZDI: HE IS A HARD MAN TO REACH, BUT IN PERSON-TO-PERSON CONTACT, EITHER OVER PHONE OR IN PERSON, HE IS VERY SMOOTH AND FRIENDLY. HE UNFOLDS UNPALATABLE NEWS WITH JUST A SHADE OF APOLOGY, AND HAS EXCELLENT UNDERSTANDING OF HOW TO MANIPULATE VALUE SYSTEM OF HIS LISTENERS TO PRODUCE REACTION HE WANTS TO ACHIEVE. HE HAS GOOD POLITICAL TOUCH, BUT VERY MUCH BELIEVES US IS CAUSE OF IRAN'S TROUBLES FOR PAST 26 YEARS. HE IS NOT HARD-LINE OR STRIDENT ABOUT IT, BUT FIRMLY COMMITTED TO VIEW. AS FOREIGN MINISTER HE COULD TURN OUT TO BE PERSIAN REFLECTION OF STRAIN OF ANTI-US, ANTI-WESTERN THOUGHT IN THE TRADITION OF KRISHNA MENNON AND NUMEROUS YANKEE WAITING AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE 60'S AND 70'S. IN TRUE PERSIAN FASHION, HE WILL PROBABLY BE MODERATELY ASSERTIVE IN PUBLIC AND MORE REASONABLE IN PRIVATE. UNLESS HE GETS CARRIED AWAY BY HIS NEW INCARNATION, HE WILL PROBABLY REMAIN SOMEONE WE CAN TALK TO WITH SOMEWHAT BETTER PROSPECTS OF GETTING RESULTS (ONCE HE AGREES TO A POSITION) THAN MANY OF HIS REVOLUTIONARY COLLEAGUES W/IFER. NAAS##

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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
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E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, US, IR
SUBJ: INTERVIEW IN IRAN TIMES - DR. IBRAHIM YAZDI

1. AYANDAGAN OF MAY 9 REPORTED AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN THE IRAN TIMES (A U.S. PAPER) WITH THE SON OF FOREIGN MINISTER DR. IBRAHIM YAZDI. THE INTERVIEW DISCUSSES DR. YAZDI'S U.S. CITIZENSHIP STATUS, PURPORTEDLY QUOTING A FORMER EMBASSY TEHRAN OFFICIAL.

2. EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF PERTINENT PORTION FOLLOWS: QUOTE IN PRESENT CONDITIONS IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TAKES ANY STEPS AGAINST YAZDI, IT IS PROBABLE THAT HE MAY LOSE HIS U.S. CITIZENSHIP. HE ADDED THAT IT WILL BE SILLY FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO CANCEL YAZDI'S CITIZENSHIP. HE ADDED: IF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IMPRISONS YAZDI, HE WILL ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF THE U.S. CONSULATE IN IRAN. IF HE MAKES ANY COMPLAINTS FROM THE PEOPLE IN CHARGE OF THE PRISON, THE U.S. EMBASSY IN IRAN WILL FORWARD A PROTEST TO IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND RETURN HIM TO THE USA. THE OFFICIAL ADDED: THESE POSSIBILITIES ARE SILLY IN FACT. UNQUOTE.

3. AS DR. YAZDI HAS REPEATEDLY DENIED U.S. CITIZENSHIP HERE, THIS STORY WILL BE EMBARRASSING, AND WE EXPECT QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. PLEASE PROVIDE THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE INTERVIEW, AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE, ASAP. NAAS##

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E.O. 12065 GDS 6/20/79 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: IR

SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOLLOWING CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE HAS BEEN APPROVED.

Q. IS EBRAHIM YAZDI A U.S. CITIZEN?

A. WE CANNOT CONFIRM THAT HE IS A U.S. CITIZEN.

Q. DOES HE NOW HAVE OR HAS HE EVER HELD A U.S. PASSPORT?

A. STATE DEPARTMENT PASSPORT FILES ARE CONFIDENTIAL AND PROTECTED BY THE PRIVACY ACT. WE CANNOT, THEREFORE, CONFIRM OR DENY REPORTS OF ANY INFORMATION IN THESE FILES.

Q. IF DR. YAZDI IS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, CAN HE RETAIN HIS U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT IF HE IS CONSIDERED AN IRANIAN CITIZEN UNDER IRANIAN LAW?

A. ALTHOUGH THE U.S. DOES NOT ENCOURAGE DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A MATTER OF POLICY, IT DOES ACCEPT ITS EXISTENCE IN INDIVIDUAL CASES AS A MATTER OF FACT RESULTING FROM THE CONFLICTING LAWS OF OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY THE U.S. THUS, SOME U.S. CITIZENS MAY POSSESS ANOTHER NATIONALITY AS A RESULT OF THOSE CONFLICTING LAWS.

Q. IF IN FACT DR. YAZDI IS A U.S. CITIZEN, HAS HE LOST HIS U.S. CITIZENSHIP BY ANY ACTIONS-HE HAS TAKEN? IF SO, IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN THE PROCESS OF REVOKING HIS CITIZENSHIP?

A. AS I INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, IF WE HAD ANY INFORMATION ON THIS QUESTION, IT WOULD BE PROTECTED BY THE PRIVACY ACT.

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S E C R E T

Believe that the Dr. Yazdi of your 20 September letter to Charlie Naas is probably Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, a dentist, with whom Embassy officers have been in contact in the past. Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi was one of the founders in 1946 of the Islamic Society of University Students, an anti-communist but pro-Mossadegh Islamic fundamentalist organization. It was led by Muhammad Maghshab and Qolam Ali Bazargan. In 1960, Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi was an employee of the "Drug Production Company". No further information.

from CIA 10/2/78

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E.O. 12065: RD;-3 10/5/99 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: YAZDI IN NEW YORK

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. IRAN'S FOREIGN MINISTER WAS PLAINLY DETERMINED TO CREATE A STRONG IMPRESSION OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY AS A NEW BREED OF MAN. LIKE IRAN'S STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS WHOSE RANKS HE RECENTLY LED, HE DID NOT SEEM INTERESTED IN WINNING FRIENDS AS MUCH AS DEMANDING ATTENTION TO HIS CAUSE AND PROCLAIMING ITS JUSTICE. WHATEVER INTERESTS THE NEW GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE IN THE UN OR THE US SEEMED OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE TO YAZDI'S DESIRE FOR PSYCHIC SATISFACTION AND THE PROMOTION OR PROTECTION OF HIS OWN POLITICAL FUTURE IN IRAN.

3. IT WAS, AFTER ALL, THE RETURN IN TRIUMPH OF ONE WHO HAD BEEN SCORNE IN EXILE. THUS, AS A STREET FIGHTER LECTURING THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT, HE TOLD THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF 25 YEARS OF MISTAKES IN US FOREIGN RELATIONS RANGING FROM CHINA, VIETNAM TO IRAN AND AFRICA. HE TOLD THE UNGA OF HIS SATISFACTION AFTER "SCREAMING THE OUTRAGE OF MY PEOPLE... FROM THE SIDEWALKS" TO "HAVE PENETRATED THE WALLS AND YOU ARE HEARING ME LOUD AND CLEAR." SIMILARLY, HE USED HIS FIRST MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY TO RELIEVE HIMSELF OF THE BROODING PAIN OF 25 YEARS OF US SUPPORT FOR THE SHAH AND 7 MONTHS OF DOUBTS HE HAS HAD ABOUT OUR FRIENDSHIP.

4. YAZDI ON THIS VISIT WAS MORE AGGRESSIVELY SURE OF HIMSELF AND YET ALSO VERY INSECURE. THUS, HE AFFECTS A MODIFIED-MAO DRESS CODE AND ORNAMENTS HIS DISCOURSE WITH SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTS LIKE ALIENATION THAT WE BELIEVE MANSOUR FARHANG MAY DEVISE FOR HIM. HIS REMARKS ARE NOT

QUALIFIED BY UNCERTAINTY OR BY SENSITIVITY TO THE PERCEPTIONS OF HIS LISTENERS. HIS ORIENTATION IS STRONGLY IDEOLOGICAL AND IDEALISTIC, BUT THERE IS LITTLE IN HIS THOUGHT THAT IS DEEP, SUBTLE OR ORIGINAL. HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE A POLITICIAN'S TALENT FOR INFLUENCING HIS AUDIENCE NOR IS THERE MUCH SIGN OF A POLITICIAN'S FLEXIBILITY IN HIS APPROACH.

5. POLITICS, HOWEVER, ARE A CONTINUING PREOCCUPATION. HIS EVERY WORD IN A MEETING IS RECORDED BY ONE OR MORE NOTETAKERS. IN FACT, THE NOTETAKERS MAY BE THE PRINCIPAL AUDIENCE ON THESE OCCASIONS. HE INSISTED ON HAVING THE VIDEOTAPE OF HIS WETA INTERVIEW BEFORE LEAVING THE STUDIO. HE TOLD A DEPTOFF PRIVATELY THAT HE FELT THREATENED SOMEHOW BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN IN THE US WHEN THE TEHRAN PRESS REPORTED OUR CHARGE'S "DEMARCHÉ" ON EXECUTIONS. THE APPROACH SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE, HE SAID, TO THE MFA WHERE HE HAD INSTRUCTED HIS OFFICERS NEVER TO SPEAK TO THE PRESS. HE MADE CLEAR IN THE SAME PRIVATE CONVERSATION THAT HE VERY MUCH HOPED FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW US AMBASSADOR WHO WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC TO THE REVOLUTION. WE SUSPECT THAT YAZDI SINCERELY FEARS THE US MAY SEEK TO OVERTHROW THE ISLAMIC REGIME AND IS INTENT ON PERSONALLY MANAGING THE US-IRAN RELATIONSHIP HIMSELF TO PROTECT THE REVOLUTION.

6. YAZDI MAY FEEL VULNERABLE TO ATTACK BY POLITICAL FACTIONS IN TEHRAN. HE TOLD ONE IRANIAN CONTACT OF INTENSE IN-FIGHTING AND THE NEED TO CONTINUE PURGES UNTIL "WE FEEL SECURE WITH OUR OWN PEOPLE." HE SAID TO ANOTHER CONTACT THAT HE TOLD KHOMEINI HE SHOULD STAY OUT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CITED THE APPOINTMENT OF AN AMBASSADOR TO BAHRAIN AS A VICTORY HE ACHIEVED OVER THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT. THUS, IF YAZDI IS TO HAVE ANY INFLUENCE AND POLITICAL FUTURE IN IRAN, HE MUST PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE CHARGE THAT HE IS AMERICA'S NO. 1 AGENT. HE SUCCESSFULLY DEMONSTRATED THE ABSURDITY OF THAT CHARGE THIS WEEK. UNFORTUNATELY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONS, HE CLEARLY BELIEVES MUCH OF WHAT HE SAYS TO ENDEAR HIMSELF TO IRANIAN AUDIENCES. VANCE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 11217

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STAT 10/23/79
APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL: HPRCHT: GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CE3 ICA
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E.O. 12065: GDS 10/23/95 (LAINGEN, L. BRUCE) OR-P
TAGS: IR, LE, PINT
SUBJECT: YAZDI ON LEBANON AND PALESTINIANS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING CALL OF CHARGE AND VISITING DEPTOFF ON FON MIN
YAZDI, WE REFERRED BRIEFLY TO US EFFORTS TO STABILIZE
SITUATION IN LEBANON. YAZDI SAID CONDITIONS IN NORTHERN
LEBANON WERE BECOMING INTOLERABLE FOR SHIAS WHO WERE
CONSIDERING JOINING FORCES WITH PALESTINIANS AGAINST
ISRAELIS AND CHRISTIANS. US MUST USE PRESSURE TO STOP
ISRAELI ATTACKS. CP

3. WE REPLIED THAT US WAS ATTEMPTING TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL
BUT PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ATTACKS MUST ALSO BE ENDED IF
ISRAEL WAS TO CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE. IT SEEMED TO US
THAT IRANIAN REVOLUTION, WHICH MOBILIZED ENTIRE PEOPLE IN
PEACEFUL DISPLAY OF POLITICAL WILL, WAS A BETTER MODEL
FOR THE PALESTINIANS. YAZDI SAID IRANIANS HAD BEEN
WORKING ON PLO TO THAT END. IRANIANS WANTED PLO TO INJECT
GREATER USE OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY IN ITS APPEAL. IF PLO
CONTINUED SECULAR APPROACH, VICTORY WAS NOT ASSURED.
IF PLO DID CREATE A PALESTINIAN STATE ON PURELY SECULAR
LINES, THE MARXISTS AND RADICAL PALESTINIANS WOULD MOVE
QUICKLY TO TAKE OVER. YAZDI SEEMED TO THINK THAT
IRANIANS HAD MADE SOME IMPRESSION ON PALESTINIANS. HE
ALSO MADE QUITE CLEAR IRAN'S COMMITMENT TO THE PALESTINIAN
CAUSE: "WE HAVE HELPED THEM AND WE WILL HELP THEM IN THE
FUTURE." LAINGEN

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INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USINT BAGHDAD
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY PARIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/5/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, IR
SUBJ: 4TH OF JULY RECEPTION

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DESPITE UNCERTAINTIES OF OUR SITUATION HERE AS A CONSEQUENCE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTION, MISSION DECIDED TO CONDUCT OBSERVANCES OF THE 4TH OF JULY IN AS NORMAL MANNER AS POSSIBLE. THIS INCLUDED AN OFFICIAL VIN D'HONNEUR TO WHICH THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS, BUSINESS AND PRESS REPRESENTATIVES, AND A NUMBER OF SENIOR PGOI OFFICIALS WERE INVITED. FEW AMONG THE LATTER GROUP BOTHERED TO R.S.V.P., AND THUS IT WAS SOMETHING OF A PLEASANT SURPRISE THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER DID IN FACT ATTEND. FM YAZDI LED A LARGE DELEGATION FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. DEPUTY PM AMIR-ENTEZAM WAS ALSO THERE, AS WERE THE MINISTERS OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE (MINACHI) AND AGRICULTURE (IZADI). CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR MOULAVI CAME AND SO DID GEN. EFTEKHARI OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION, COL. IRAN-NEJAD OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY GEN. MADANI. WE ARE INCLINED TO REGARD THIS TURNOUT AS A CONSCIOUS EFFORT ON THE PGOI'S PART TO TELL US THAT IT IS SERIOUS IN ITS DESIRE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH US. SEVERAL

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OF THE OFFICIAL IRANIANS ASKED MISSION OFFICERS ABOUT OUR
PLANS FOR SENDING AN AMBASSADOR. LAINGEN##

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5. TO WASHINGTON WASHDC PRIORITY 2824

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM 17762-41
TO WASHINGTON
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON
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1. C O M M I T T E E I A I SECTION 21 OF WASHINGTON 17762-41

2. 12855: GDS 7/24/80 (JOHNSON, MARK) CR-1
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, PAPER, IR
SUBJECT: CALL ON MINISTER OF FINANCE ARDALAN

1. (C- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. CHARG, ACCOMPANIED BY VISITING DEPUTY, CALLED ON
MINISTER OF FINANCE ALI ARDALAN JULY 24. ARDALAN WAS
JOINED BY DEPUTY MINISTER DR. IBBRAHIM-ZADEH WHO INTER-

3. CHARG OPENED CONVERSATION BY EXPLAINING OUR UNDER-
STANDING AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVOLUTION. WE WERE
WILLING TO WORK WITH IRAN IN THE TASK OF REBUILDING OUR
RELATIONS AND STOOD READY TO COOPERATE IN THOSE AREAS
WHERE IRAN FELT WE COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE. CHARG SAID
WE HAD COMMON INTERESTS AND ASSETS, SUCH AS OUR
COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, WHICH COULD AID THIS REBUILDING.

4. ARDALAN REPLIED BY OFFERING HIS VISITORS A HISTORICAL
SKETCH OF THE LONG AND FRUITFUL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
IRAN AND THE U.S. THE MEMORIES OF THOSE AMERICANS WHO
LIVED IN IRAN IN THE EARLY YEARS AFTER IRAN'S CONSTITU-
TIONAL SPRING WERE CHERISHED BY IRANIANS. ARDALAN
RECALLED ONE OF THE JORDAN, AN AMERICAN WHO HELPED
ESTABLISH ALBANY COLLEGE WHERE MANY IRANIANS HAD GOTTEN
THEIR FIRST TASTE OF HIGHER EDUCATION. SIMILARLY, IRANIAN
FAMILIES REMEMBERED PEOPLE LIKE MORGAN SPUSTER AND
ROBERT WASSERMAN IN TABRIZ WHO SYMPATHIZED WITH THE
WISHES OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. HE AGREED THAT THESE
RELATIONSHIPS WOULD INFLUENCE THE FUTURE. ARDALAN
SAID THAT THE NEW GROUP OF AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD
HAVE THE SAME FEELING TOWARD IRAN.

5. TURNING TO SUBJECT OF BANK NATIONALIZATIONS, THE
PROTECTED AND PROTECTED. THIS WAS REQUIRED BY BOTH
IRANIAN TRADITION AND GOVERNMENT LAW, HE SAID. NO TIME-
TABLE HAD BEEN SET FOR THIS COMPENSATION AS THE GOVT.
WAS STILL INVESTIGATING THE VARIOUS BANKS. IBBRAHIM-ZADEH
ADDED THAT THE COMMITTEE IS NOW IN THE VERGE OF MERGING
THE NATIONAL BANKS INTO A FEW MAJOR BANKS. PERHAPS
FIVE OR SIX.

6. CHARG THEN RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF REACTIVATING
THE U.S.-IRAN CHARTER OF COMMERCE OR THE BUSINESS COUNCIL
AS A WAY OF IMPROVING THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN AMERICAN AND
IRANIAN FIRMS. ARDALAN SAID HE WAS IN FAVOR OF DOING
THIS ALTHOUGH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MATTERS LIKE THE
CHARTER OR COUNCIL RESTED WITH THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE.
ARDALAN'S MINISTRY WOULD BE WILLING TO BACK UP ANY

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PROPOSAL PUT FORTH BY THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE. LOOKING FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD, DID THE MINISTER SEE ANY ROLE FOR THE JOINT COMMISSION? THE CHARGE SAID HE WERE NOT PUSHING THE COMMISSION BUT WANTED TO SEE ARDALAN'S VIEWS. THE MINISTER FELT THAT IDEA WAS BASICALLY GOOD, BUT HE HAD NO PARTICULAR VIEWS ON TIMING. THIS SUBJECT WOULD NEED STUDY BY THE INTERESTED PARTS OF THE GOVT.

P. CHARGE USED CASE OF CTE AS ILLUSTRATION OF WHAT WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO AVOID. MINISTER WAS BASICALLY AWARE OF PROBLEM BUT HAD NO REAL INVOLVEMENT IN THIS DISPUTE, WHICH HE HOPED COULD BE SOLVED THROUGH DIALOGUE RATHER THAN COURTS. ARDALAN THEN WENT ON TO MAKE WHAT WAS PROBABLY HIS CENTRAL MESSAGE DURING MEETING: U.S. SHOULD AVOID FORMING IMPRESSIONS OR DRAWING CONCLUSIONS ABOUT IRAN BASED ON THE RUMORS BEING FLOATED IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE BY IRANISMS WHO HAD FLED DURING THE REVOLUTION. ARDALAN SAID THESE PEOPLE-- "ANTI-REVOLUTIONARIES" -- WERE TRYING TO UNDERMINE IRAN'S CREDITWORTHINESS BY SPREADING LIES. ARDALAN EMPHASIZED THAT "WE ARE GOING TO PAY EVERY PENNY WE OWE."

M. REFERRING TO ARDALAN'S COMMENTS ON "IMAGE," CHARGE EXPRESSED REGRET OVER EXPULSION OF NEW YORK TIMES CORRESPONDENT YUSSEF IBRAHIM. CHARGE SAID THIS KIND OF ACTION CANNOT CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE. THE PICTURE OF THE REVOLUTION WILL BECOME LESS BALANCED IF IRAN CONTINUES TO EXPEL JOURNALISTS. ARDALAN TOOK NOTE OF THESE REMARKS BUT OFFERED NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. SAYING
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ONLY THAT IT SHOULD BE RAISED WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS.
9. ALTHOUGH MEETING WAS SOMEWHAT SHORT ON SUBSTANCE, IT
WAS VERY CORDIAL IN TONE. THE MINISTER CONVEYS A PROPER
SOCIAL IMAGE AND DOES NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING
A FORCEFUL PERSONALITY. WE SUSPECT THAT HE LOOKS TO HIS
ARTICULATE AND ENERGETIC DEPUTY, IBRAHIM-ZADEH, FOR
DIRECTION. ZADEH, FOR INSTANCE, SOUNDED MORE POSITIVE ON
THE WORK OF THE BANKING COMMITTEE AND ON THE RESTRUCTURING
OF THE BUSINESS COUNCIL.

10. COMMENT: MEETING ENDED ON A PERSIAN NOTE. AS WE
WERE TAKING OUR LEAVE, IBRAHIM-ZADEH DREW DEPTOFF ASIDE.
HE SAID HE HAD SOME FRIENDS. THEY NEEDED VISAS. COULD
WE DO ANYTHING FOR THEM... END COMMENT. LAIGH
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TEHRAN 27555/21

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 27555 R: ECON 2 POL ICA

E.O. 3DS 4/13/85 (TAYLOR, CLYDE D.) OR-5
TAGS: ECON, ECON, IR
SUBJ: MINISTER ALI ARDALAN AND ECONOMIC POLICIES

REF: TEHRAN 2755

1. (C) SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING IS BASED UPON AN APRIL CALL ON MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND FINANCE DR. ALI ARDALAN, OTHER CONTACTS AND ARDALAN'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS. ARDALAN, AN OLD SCHOOL LAWYER/ECONOMIST AND NATIONAL FRONT MEMBER, ESPOUSES A MODERATE COURSE IN ECONOMIC POLICY. HE WANTS GOOD ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE U.S. AND OFFERED HIS OFFICE AS LIAISON POINT. U.S. INVESTMENT IS WELCOMED BUT ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. HE IS OPEN TO TAX REFORM, WITH LOWER EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS AS WELL AS INCENTIVES TO SETTLE OLD INVESTMENT DISPUTES. RESPECT FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY WILL BE MAINTAINED, BUT HE IS PUZZY CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN CONTRACTS MADE WITH THE OLD REGIME. HE SEEMS TO RECOGNIZE THE DEFICIENCIES IN INDUSTRY AND THE DILEMMA POSED BY THE CONFLICTING DESIRES TO GET THE COUNTRY BACK TO WORK AND YET RE-ORIENTATE THE ECONOMY'S STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY. MORE THAN ANY OTHER MINISTRY, HE HAS RETAINED MUCH OF THE PREVIOUS MANAGEMENT TEAM, WITH FOUR OR HIS FIVE UNDER-SECRETARIES BEING HOLDOVERS. ARDALAN IS A WELL-INTENTIONED GENTLEMAN, BUT HIS PROCLIVITY TO DISCUSS ONLY AND NOT ENACT POLICY IS UNFORTUNATE AT A TIME WHEN IRAN NEEDS DIRECTION IN ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND NEW POLICIES. THE SUMMARY

2. (ICU) ACTING ECONOMIC COUNSELOR CALLED ON MINISTER ARDALAN APRIL 11. MOST OF THE ONE HOUR WAS DEVOTED TO U.S./IRAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY PROBLEMS OF CONTRACT RESOLUTIONS, U.S. BUSINESS TRAVEL AND THE REVOLUTIONARY INTERLOOPERS AND HOW THEY AFFECT IRANIAN BUSINESSES IN THE U.S. (RECEIVED THE MINISTER'S ADVISOR, ENGLISH-SPEAKING, EX-UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ECONOMICS PROFESSOR DR. ABRAHIM-ZADEH AT-TEMPTING TO A THIRTY AND UNIDENTIFIED GENTLEMAN MAY HAVE BEEN ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE). SECOND, USING PSN ECONOMIC ADVISOR FACILITATE AS TRANSLATOR, CONVEYED SEVERAL FIRST-OFFICIAL CONTACT MEETINGS AND CONSPIRACIES TO ARDALAN. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR HIS EFFORTS IN RESOLVING THE U.S. FEDERAL RESERVE/IRANIAN OF IRAN BONA FIDES PROBLEM IN FEBRUARY AND HIS EFFORTS ON JOI EXTERNAL DEBT OBLIGATIONS. ARDALAN'S ADVISOR'S EXPRESSED DESIRE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM HARMONIOUSLY IN AREAS OF ECONOMIC AND BILATERAL COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES, ARDALAN

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THE U.S. DESIRED TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS CAUSED FROM
THE PREVIOUS REGIME AND DEVELOP/CONTINUE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL
COMMERCIAL TIES.

Y. (LOU) EMROFF, AFTER DESCRIBING IN DETAIL VARIOUS
PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE "NORMALIZATION" OF BILATERAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS, SOUGHT FROM ARDALAN INFORMATION
AND ADVICE ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED. ARDALAN SAID, AS RE-
PORTED IN BUREAU, THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE ACTIVITIES
OF SUCH AS SOURRI AND HACHEMI IN THE U.S., BUT HE PLEADED
FOR U.S. UNDERSTANDING AND PATIENCE ON U.S. PART, REMINDING
THAT THE REVOLUTION WILL CONTINUE TO AFFECT IRAN'S BE-
HAVIOR FOR SOME TIME, DESPITE BEST EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE
ITS INSTITUTIONS ON MORE NORMAL PATTERNS. EMROFF
SAID CBI GOVERNOR MCWILLI, RESPONDING TO AMERICAN BUSINESS-
MEN'S PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATING WITH IRANIAN ENTITIES,
HAD SUGGESTED TO MFA MINISTER SANJARI THE EARLY ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF A BUSINESS CONTACT OFFICER IN IRAN'S
WASHINGTON EMBASSY (SEE TEHRAN 0000). ARDALAN, PROBABLY
MORE AWARE OF THE REALITIES AT THAT TIME, NEITHER
ENDORSED OR REJECTED THE IDEA; HE SAID IT IS TOO EARLY
TO EXPECT SOMETHING EFFECTIVE, THAT WE SHOULD LIVE THEM
OUT FIRST. HE DID OFFER HIS OWN OFFICE AS A POINT OF
CONTACT IN CASES WHERE U.S. FIRMS WERE NOT ABLE TO
COMMUNICATE EFFECTIVELY WITH IRANIAN AGENCIES AND IN
WHICH AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN NEEDED ASSURANCES CONCERNING
THEIR SAFE ENTRY AND EXIT FROM IRAN. HE SUGGESTED THAT
THE EMBASSY UTILIZE THE IRANIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
INDUSTRY AND MIN. S IN RESOLVING COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS
BETWEEN U.S. AND IRANIAN PRIVATE FIRMS. (DR. IBRAHIM-
ZADEH AT THIS POINT SAID THAT THE MINISTER WAS OFFERING
TO SET UP A SPECIAL DEPARTMENT AS A CONTACT POINT ON
U.S. ECONOMIC CONCERNS. BUT TRANSLATOR DID NOT HEAR
THIS AND THE IDEA SEEMS A BIT EXCESSIVE. EFFORTS TO
FRANCH IBRAHIM-ZADEH, SUBSEQUENTLY HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL.)
DR. IBRAHIM-ZADEH SAID THAT WHILE THE MINISTRY WOULD DO
ITS BEST TO INSURE THE SAFE MOVEMENT AND DEPARTURE OF
AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN, WE MUST ANTICIPATE THAT FOREIGNERS
WHO WERE PRONE TO ILLEGAL TRANSFERS OR FRAUDULENT SCHEMES
WOULD, IF THEY RETURNED, FACE THE PROSPECT OF IRANIAN
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ACTION. LASTLY, CONCERNING U.S./IRAN RELATIONSHIPS, ARDALAN SAID IRAN WOULD WELCOME NEW INVESTMENT, ALTHOUGH THE MERITS OF EACH WOULD BE EVALUATED, BUT BASICALLY UNDER POLICIES OF THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT (E.G., CONCERNING EQUITY PARTICIPATION CEILINGS).

4. (LOU) ARDALAN EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER IRAN'S IMAGE ABROAD AND ASKED FOR HELP IN ERADICATING FALSE IMAGES AND INFORMATION SO AS TO ADVANCE A RETURN TO NORMALCY PERHAPS ANTICIPATING A COMMENT FROM EMOFF CONCERNING THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS AND EXECUTIONS, ARDALAN SAID HIS SON CALLED HIM THAT MORNING FROM ABROAD AND SAID THAT THE FOREIGN PRESS WAS MAKING A BIG THING ABOUT THE ROVEYDA EXECUTION. ARDALAN ASKED, "WHAT IS THE BIG COMMOTION? EVERYONE KNEW HE WOULD BE EXECUTED SOME TIME." EMOFF COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. AND WESTERN PRESS WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED THAT HIGH OFFICIALS OF THE PREVIOUS REGIME WOULD BE CHARGED AND TRIED FOR VARIOUS MATTERS, BUT WE EXPECTED FROM A REVOLUTION WHICH PRO-FESSED ABHORANCE OF THE PREVIOUS REGIME'S LACK ADHERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES TO FOLLOW DUE PROCESS IN THESE TRIALS. TO THIS, ARDALAN ONLY REITERATED THAT WE MUST BE PATIENT, THAT REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR IS STILL RUNNING ITS COURSE.

5. (LOU) MINISTER ARDALAN, IN RESPONDING TO EMOFF'S APPRECIATION FOR EFFORTS TO CATCH UP ON OVERDUE PUBLIC DEBT SERVICE, SAID ALL GOI EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE THROUGH MARCH HAD BEEN MET BY NO RUZ (MARCH 21) AND THAT OBLIGATIONS FALLING DUE IN APRIL WERE ALREADY BEING PROCESSED. COMMENT: WE CAN BUT CONCLUDE THAT ARDALAN IS ILL-INFORMED. WE ARE AWARE FROM U.S. BANKERS OF PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT YET UNPAID FROM EVEN JANUARY, E.G., INDUSTRIAL CREDIT BANK. ARDALAN MIGHT BE CORRECT AS FAR AS GOI DIRECT AND GUARANTEED DEBT, BUT IS LIKELY THAT EVEN SOME OF THE LATTER IS STILL OVERDUE.

6. (U) ARDALAN ANNOUNCED APRIL 5, THAT A NEW TAX SYSTEM BASED ON ISLAMIC JUSTICE WOULD BE DECLARED SHORTLY. HE DESCRIBED THE NEW TAX PHILOSOPHY AS REFLECTING THE ONENESS OF GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE. THUS, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT HAVE TO PURSUE PEOPLE FOR TAX AS BEFORE; PEOPLE WILL WILLINGLY PAY THEIR FAIR AND REASONABLE TAXES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR INCOME. HE SUGGESTED THAT TAXES ON EMPLOYEE SALARIES WILL BE LOWERED AND EXEMPTIONS FROM INCOME TAXES BROADENED. TAXES ON PROPERTY (LAND AND DWELLINGS) WILL REFLECT THE RECENT DECLINES IN VALUE AND MAY BE LOWERED IN RATE BY AS MUCH AS 30 PERCENT. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL APPROVED FACILITIES BY WHICH SOME 162,000 PENDING TAX CASES INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS AND CORPORATIONS UP TO YEAR 1345 (1966/67) CAN BE RESOLVED.

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WE SAID THAT THESE CASES, WHICH INVOLVE AMOUNTS NOT EXCEEDING RAIS 500,000 (ABOUT \$7,000), CAN BE SETTLED BY PAYING THE AMOUNT BELIEVED OWED AND THE PERSON/FIRM WILL BE GIVEN A TAX CLEARANCE. THE SAME POLICY APPLIES TO THOSE HAVING DISPUTED CASES NOT EXCEEDING RAIS 100,000 SINCE 1345. THOSE WHICH THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS ONE MORE THAT THE MAXIMUM AMOUNTS MENTIONED CAN SETTLE WITH A 20 PERCENT DEDUCTION FROM THE AMOUNT CLAIMED, WITH FOREGIVENESS OF FINES AND OTHER CHARGES. COMMENT: IRAN'S TAX SYSTEM IS BURIED IN YEARS OF UNSETTLED CLAIMS. FEW CORPORATIONS ARE MORE CURRENT THAN TWO OR THREE YEARS PAST. APART FROM PUBLIC SECTOR INDIVIDUALS WHOSE TAXES ARE WITHHELD, FEW INDIVIDUALS OR FIRMS MADE EFFORTS TO PAY TAXES SINCE SEPTEMBER 1979, FIRSTLY BECAUSE OF STRIKES IN THE TAXATION DEPARTMENT OF THE MEAF AND SECONDLY IN THE BELIEF THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE REVOLUTION WOULD AT LEAST PARTIALLY REMOVE THEIR OBLIGATIONS. ARDALAN'S PROGRAM CONCERNING OLD CLAIMS IS A GOOD STANT IN CLEARING THE DECKS, WHILE PRESERVING SOME INTEGRITY TO TAX OBLIGATIONS. HIS EXPECTATION OF THE 'IRRESISTABLE URGE TO PAY TAXES' ESCAPES THE WESTERNER'S PERCEPTION OF THE EAST, MUCH LESS OF THE WESTERNER'S RELATIONSHIP TO GOVERNMENT. IT IS TRUE THAT IN THE TIME OF MOSSADEQ IRANIANS WERE RELATIVELY WILLING TAX PAYERS, BUT WE DOUBT THAT THE PROFESSION OF TAX COLLECTOR LIST WITH THE SHAH.

7. (LOU) ARDALAN REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED THAT THE PGOI HAS NO INTENTION OF NATIONALIZING COMPANIES NOR INFRINGING ON PRIVATE PROPERTY. STOCKS OF COMPANIES WILL REMAIN IN THE SAME PREVIOUS NAMES. HE SAID THAT MOST COMPANIES ARE BANKRUPT AND THEIR DEBTS TO GOVERNMENT EXCEED THE LEVEL OF THEIR ASSETS. THUS, SHAREHOLDERS OF THESE COMPANIES SHOULD NOT EXPECT ANY DIVIDENDS FOR SOME TIME. HE SAID THAT BANKS WERE IN A MISERABLE STATE BECAUSE OF STRIKES AND ECONOMIC INACTIVITY AND THAT HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF THE CBI ALL OF THEM WOULD HAVE COLLAPSED. SOME BANKS, HE SAID, HAD LOANED MORE THAN THEIR CAPITAL.
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HE SPOKE OF CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE BEING RENDERED, BUT CAUTIONED AGAINST EXPECTING AN EARLY RECOVERY. COMMENT: ARDALAN HOPEFULLY WAS MISREPORTED CONCERNING THE BANK'S. AT LEAST ONE, NELLI, IS CREDITED BY ITS PRESIDENT (SHORAKA) AND FOREIGN BANKERS AS NOT HAVING BEEN BANKRUPT. THE ACCUSATION THAT SOME BANKS LOANED IN EXCESS OF THEIR CAPITAL DEFIES MONETARY THEORY AND NEEDS NO COMMENT.

8. (C) ARDALAN'S PUBLICLY EXPRESSED POLICY CONCERNING RESPECT FOR CONTRACTS WITH FOREIGNERS MADE BY THE PREVIOUS REGIME IS FUZZY AND HIS IMPRECISE STATEMENTS TO EMBOFF PROBABLY REFLECT THE FACT THAT THE PGOI WILL NOT BE CLEAR ON THE ISSUE UNTIL IT HAS MARSHALLED STAFF AND STUDIED AND EVALUATED THOSE CONTRACTS. THE PRESS REPORTED ARDALAN SAYING, CONCERNING SUCH CONTRACTS, THAT MOST OF THE NON-ESSENTIAL ONES WILL BE CANCELED, BUT ALL CONTRACTS, HOWEVER, WILL BE STUDIED AND REVIEWED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY ARE ESSENTIAL OR NOT. SINCE THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT AT PRESENT IS IN AN EXCEPTION SITUATION, THE SELLING COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT EXPECT ANY COMPENSATION. HE SAID HE WOULD EXPECT THAT COUNTRIES PARTY TO CONTRACTS WOULD UNDERSTAND IRAN'S PROBLEMS AND ITS NEED TO REVIEW CONTRACTS; IN THE MEANWHILE THEY SHOULD NOT DEMAND COMPENSATION. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE AND HOPE THAT THE LATTER STATEMENT IS THE GOVERNING ONE ON THIS ISSUE AND THAT AFTER THE BUREAUCRACY RETURNS TO WORK, REVIEWS AND EVALUATES THE STATUS OF CONTRACTS, THAT LEGITIMATE CLAIMS WILL BE PAID EVEN IF THE CONTRACTS ARE CANCELED.

9. (LOU) ARDALAN GIVES EVIDENCE OF RECOGNIZING THE DEFICIENCIES IN INDUSTRY AND THE DILEMMA FACED BY THE OFTEN CONFLICTING GOALS OF RESTORING EMPLOYMENT AND YET REORIENTING THE ECONOMY'S STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY. AN EXAMPLE IS HIS COMMENT THAT THE NATIONAL IRANIAN STEEL COMPANY IS A NON-ECONOMICAL INDUSTRIAL UNIT WITH A MONTHLY LOSS OF MORE THAN RIALS 2.5 BILLION. ITS MILL, THE SOVIET ENGINEERED AND TECHNICALLY SUPERVISED BOF MILL OUTSIDE ISFAHAN, LAST YEAR SHOWED EXPENSES OF RIALS 60 BILLION WITH ONLY RIALS 20 BILLION IN REVENUES, A RIALS 40 BILLION OR 4567 MILLION LESS. (COMMENT: THE MILL HAS ALWAYS SHOWED A LOSS AND OPERATED WELL BELOW CAPACITY, BUT ITS PERFORMANCE WAS JUSTIFIED AS A LOSS LEADER OF THE INDUSTRY; FURTHER, LAST YEAR WOULD HAVE BEEN MOST BUSINESSES WORST YEAR DUE TO SIX MONTHS' STRIKE ACTION WHICH, AS IN THE CASE OF SUCH PUBLIC INDUSTRIES, MAINTAINING FULL PAYROLL. COUNTRY-WIDE, THE GOVERNMENT FACES THE DEMAND AND POLITICAL NEED TO GET PEOPLE WORKING AND REDUCE THE HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT RESULTING FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY STRIKES AND ECONOMIC DAMAGES. YET MANY OF THE INDUSTRIAL UNITS IT WOULD HAVE TO ASSIST IN ORDER TO

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RESUME EMPLOYMENT ARE INEFFICIENT AND OFTEN OWNED OR MANAGED BY PERSONS WHOSE TIES WITH THE OLD REGIME MAKE IT EVEN MORE UNPALATABLE TO PROVIDE RECOVERY CREDITS. THUS, THE PGOI FACES "CATCH-22" POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH REGARD TO UNEMPLOYMENT AND INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE EVEN UNDER MORE FAVORABLE, STABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.

10. (C) TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, ARDALAN HAS RETAINED MORE SENIOR OFFICIALS IN HIS MINISTRY THAN ANY OTHER MINISTER. WHILE HE HAS REDUCED THE NUMBER OF UNDERSECRETARIES FROM SEVEN TO FIVE, FOUR OF THE FIVE ARE HOLDOVERS. THEY ARE: DEPUTY MINISTER REZA GHOLI ARAB; UNDERSECRETARY AND DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT SEYED AHMAN BEHGHO (A NEW APPOINTEE); FOR ECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS UNDERSECRETARY DR. AHMAD KOOROS, WHO IS FROM ANSARY'S TIME; FOR TREASURY, SOHRAB FARZAN, FROM YEGANEH'S TIME; AND FOR TAXATION, HASSAN ALI REGAI, FROM MEHRAN'S TIME. DR. JAMSHID ASHRAFI, FORMER UNDERSECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND CREDITS, WAS OUT OF IRAN ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS WHEN THE GOVERNMENT FELL. HE WAS BURNED AND HOSPITALIZED IN LONDON AND COULD NOT RETURN. FRIENDS ARE ADVISING HIM NOT TO RETURN AND IT IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED THAT HE WOULD NOT GET HIS OLD JOB BACK. HIS DIRECTOR GENERAL REZA KHALEGHI-HAD IS THE DE FACTO UNDERSECRETARY FOR THAT BUREAU, WITH DR. KOOROS HAVING AUTHORITY TO SIGN FOR ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. THE NEW ADVISOR TO THE MINISTER, DR. IBRAHIM-ZADER, APPEARS TO HAVE SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE ON ARDALAN, INFLUENCE WHICH TO DATE APPEARS TO BE MORE REVOLUTIONARY/RADICAL THAN ARDALAN'S NATURAL BENT. HE WAS A MUCH-PUBLICIZED SPOKESMAN FOR IRAN AT THE GENEVA OPEC MEETING. WE HAVE NO IMPRESSIONS YET CONCERNING THE UNDERSECRETARIES' TENDENCIES UNDER THE PGOI. OUR LONG-TIME CONTACT DR. KOOROS, U.S. EDUCATED AND WITH AMCIT WIFE AND CHILDREN (WHO REMAIN IN THE U.S. SINCE DECEMBER), DOES NOT RETURN OUR CALLS. HE, ALONE OF THE TOP SIX IN MANAGEMENT, SPEAKS ENGLISH.

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11. (C) BIOGRAPHIC ON ARDALAN: IN APPEARANCE ARDALAN SEEMS LATE 60S AND HAS A KINDLY GRANDFATHER IMAGE. HE IS OLD-PERSIAN POLITE AND, CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS BASED ON SOME OF THE REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC HE ESPOUSED AT GENEVA, HE NEVER EVEN SLIGHTLY "TURNED THE KNIFE" ON THE U.S. DURING A ONE-HOUR DISCUSSION CENTERING ON OUR COMMERCIAL, CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS. FROM OTHER CALLERS WE ARE TOLD THAT HE IS FLUENT IN FRPNCH, BUT IF HE SPEAKS ANY ENGLISH HE KEEPS IT HIDDEN. IMF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR JANAGIR AMUZEGAR, WHO WAS A CLASSMATE OF ARDALAN AT TEHRAN FACULTY OF LAW, DESCRIBED ARDALAN TO EMBOFF AS "OLD SCHOOL." HE THINKS HE HAS NEVER LEFT IRAN. HE DID NOT RISE ABOVE THE "ASSISTANT SECRETARY" LEVEL IN THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE (UNDER JAMSHID AMOUZEGAR) BECAUSE OF HIS NATIONAL FRONT ALLEGIENCE. JANHANGIR BELIEVED HE SHOULD HAVE ATTAINED AT LEAST THE DEPUTY MINISTER LEVEL BASED ON HIS SKILLS. DIR. GEN. KHALEGHI-ROD (PROTECT) DESCRIBES ARDALAN AS HONEST, SINCERE AND A GENTLEMAN, AS DO SEVERAL OTHER OF OUR CONTACTS. BUT HE SAYS HE IS UTTERLY INCAPABLE OF COPING WITH THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS HE FACES. ACCORDING TO KHALEGHI-ROD, ARDALAN, WHO IS CHARGED WITH ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM, MERELY DISCUSSES, MAYBE AGREES WITH SUGGESTIONS, BUT SELDOM PROVIDES NECESSARY AUTHORITY OR SHOWS INITIATIVE TO EXECUTE SOLUTIONS. NAAS

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P.O. 12065: GDS 5/21/79 (NAAS, C.V.) OR-M

TAGS: ELAR, PEPR, IR

SUBJ: MEETING WITH MIN OF LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

MOROUHAR

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE)

2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH MINISTER OF LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS MOROUHAR MAY 21. WE DISCUSSED IRANIAN UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE PGOI'S PROGRAMS TO COMBAT IT, EFFORTS TO REVERSE THE COUNTRYSIDE-TO-CITY MIGRATION OF RECENT YEARS, THE ROLY WORKER COMMITTEES AND TRADE UNIONS AS WELL AS U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS. END SUMMARY

3. I BEGAN MY REMARKS BY NOTING THAT IRAN AND THE U.S. HAVE MANY INTERESTS IN COMMON AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS WOULD NOT DISRUPT MORE THAN MOMENTARILY THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. MOROUHAR SAID THAT HE HOPED, TOO, THAT THAT WOULD BE THE CASE, AND ADDED THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT IF THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS THE NATURE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, THERE WOULD BE NO SERIOUS PROBLEM IN THIS REGARD. HIS ONLY CONCERN, HE SAID, WAS THAT IRAN'S COMMITMENT TO A POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT WOULD BE MISINTERPRETED. I REPLIED THAT WHILE I HAD BEEN IN WASHINGTON IN MARCH I HAD BEEN GIVEN A SIMPLE SET OF INSTRUCTIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT UPON MY RETURN TO IRAN, I WENT TO CALL ON SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICIALS TO EXPRESS TO THEM THAT THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, THAT WE ACCEPT IT, AND THAT IT IS COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. INTERESTS WHICH ARE BASED UPON THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAN. AS FOR IRAN'S ADHERENCE TO NON-ALIGNMENT, I NOTED THAT WE HAVE CLOSE AND CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH MANY COUNTRIES WHICH FOLLOW A NON-ALIGNED POLICY AND THAT I EXPECTED THE SAME WOULD BE TRUE IN THE CASE OF IRAN. MOROUHAR CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE HOPED IT WOULD INDEED BE POSSIBLE TO PUT ASIDE THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF THE PAST.

4. I THEN TURNED TO THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT, NOTING THAT A NEW ERA IN IRAN REQUIRES NEW APPROACHES AND ASKING IF THE MINISTER COULD ENLIGHTEN ME ON THE PGOI'S POLICIES IN THIS REGARD. MOROUHAR SAID THAT AS HAD BEEN THE CASE WITH ALL POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAD LEFT A LEGACY OF ECONOMIC DISRUPTION FOR THE PGOI TO DEAL WITH. CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS HAD BEEN HALTED AND INDUSTRIES IDLED, AND CONSEQUENTLY ONE OF THE FIRST TASKS OF THE PGOI HAD BEEN TO GET PEOPLE BACK TO WORK. THUS, IT WAS DECIDED TO REACTIVATE STALLED PRO-

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RAMS, ESPECIALLY THOSE SUCH AS ROADS AND HOUSING WHICH EMPLOYED LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE, EVEN IF SOME OF THOSE PROGRAMS WERE OF DUBIOUS VALUE. EFFORTS HAD BEEN CONCENTRATED IN RURAL AREAS BOTH TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE LIVING IN THOSE AREAS TO REMAIN AND THE UNEMPLOYED IN URBAN AREAS TO RETURN TO THE COUNTRYSIDE. IN ADDITION, THE GOVERNMENT HAD IMPLEMENTED AN AMBITIOUS UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SCHEME TO EASE THE TRAUMA EXPERIENCED BY ECONOMIC DISLOCATION. FOROUSHAR CLAIMED THAT POSITIVE RESULTS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AND THAT UNEMPLOYMENT HAD BEEN REDUCED.

4. I SAID THAT I HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT CONFUSED ABOUT THE MODULI OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SCHEME BY WHAT I HAD READ ABOUT IT IN THE PRESS AND ASKED FOROUSHAR TO CLARIFY IT FOR ME. HE SAID THAT IT ENVISIONED AN ALLOWANCE OF UP TO TEN BILLION RIALS PER MONTH FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS. INITIALLY, DISBURSEMENTS WERE TO BE MADE ONLY TO THOSE WHO HAD BEEN PAYING INTO THE SOCIAL SECURITY FUND. HOWEVER, IT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DECIDED TO EXTEND THE SCHEME TO ALL INDIVIDUALS WHO CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY WERE PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED AND ARE NOW UNEMPLOYED. THE SCHEME WOULD BE CERTIFIED BY PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS OR MAY BE USED BY INDIVIDUALS. FOROUSHAR SAID THAT IN THE LAST MONTH OF FARVARDIN (MARCH 21 1979) APPROXIMATELY 400,000 RIALS HAD BEEN DISBURSED. (THE ONLY IMPLICATION OF FOROUSHAR'S STATEMENT WAS THAT THE LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN FARVARDIN REQUIRES NO MORE THAN THAT AMOUNT; WE ARE INCLINED TO CONCLUDE, HOWEVER, THAT THE LEVEL OF DISBURSEMENT WAS DETERMINED MORE BY BUREAUCRATIC CONSIDERATIONS THAN BY DEMAND FOR ASSISTANCE. (NO COMMENT.)

5. TO QUESTION ON THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE IRANIAN WORKFORCE AND THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY REGARDING THE URBAN UNEMPLOYED, FOROUSHAR GAVE A STANDARD LECTURE ON THE DEPRESSION OF IRANIAN AGRICULTURE UNDER THE SHAH DRIVING IRANIAN PEASANTS TO THE CITIES TO FIND WORK. HE SAID THAT THIS PROCESS TENDED TO FEED UPON ITSELF, I.E., AS MORE PEOPLE LEFT THE FARM, FARM INCOME FELL FURTHER AND FURTHER BEHIND THOSE OF PEOPLE IN THE CITIES. (NONE THE-

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LESS, MANY PEOPLE RETAINED TIES TO THEIR FORMER VILLAGES, AND THE GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT IF RURAL INCOMES COULD BE RAISED TO EVEN 70 PERCENT OF URBAN INCOMES, MANY OF THESE PEOPLE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO HOME. WHILE OFFERING NO STATISTICAL EVIDENCE, FOROUHAR CLAIMED THAT THE PCOI BELIEVES THAT ECONOMIC DEPRESSION IN RECENT MONTHS HAD INDEED RESULTED IN A REVERSAL OF THE COUNTRYSIDE-TO-CITY MIGRATION WHICH HAD SO DOMINATED IRAN'S RECENT HISTORY. IDEOLOGICALLY, THE GOVERNMENT'S OWN PROGRAMS, SUCH AS LOANS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED, AND ITS SUCCESS IN GETTING PEOPLE BACK TO WORK IN URBAN INDUSTRIES HAD PARTIALLY OFFSET THE GAINS IN THIS REGARD SINCE SOME INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT HAVE OTHERWISE RETURNED TO THEIR RURAL HOMES HAD BEEN TEMPTED TO REMAIN IN THE CITIES IN THE HOPE OF GETTING EITHER WORK OR GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE.

7. FOROUHAR CONCEDED THAT HIS MINISTRY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE VARIOUS WORKER COMMITTEES HAD SOMETIMES BEEN A PROBLEM FOR HIM. HE SAID THAT HE WAS "NOT IN FAVOR (WORDS HE CHOSE VERY CAREFULLY AND WENT TO SOME PAINS TO DIFFERENTIATE FROM "OPPOSED") OF WORKER INTERFERENCE IN MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS. NONETHELESS, HE BELIEVED THAT THERE IS AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR "LEGITIMATE" TRADE UNIONS, TRADE UNIONS FORMED BY THE WORKERS THEMSELVES RATHER THAN THE KIND OF SHAM ORGANIZATIONS THE GOVERNMENT UNDER THE SHAH HAD FORMERLY SPONSORED. HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD OF COURSE BE PREPARED TO OFFER PROPER ENCOURAGEMENT TO WORKERS' OWN EFFORTS.

8. IN CLOSING, I DREW FOROUHAR'S ATTENTION TO THE COOPERATIVE PROGRAM BETWEEN HIS MINISTRY AND OUR OWN DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WHICH EXISTED IN THE PAST. WHILE NOTING THAT THE PRESENT MOMENT CERTAINLY WAS NOT THE TIME TO CONSIDER RESUMPTION OF SUCH A PROGRAM, I SAID THAT I WISHED HIM TO KNOW THAT WE WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO ANY LATER REQUESTS HIS MINISTRY MIGHT HAVE FOR LIMITED, SPECIALIZED HELP WHICH WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE. FOROUHAR APPEARED TO BE GENUINELY PLEASED BY MY OFFER, AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE PRESENT UNCERTAINTIES OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WOULD SOON PASS AND BE FOLLOWED BY A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION BASED UPON THE MUTUAL INTERESTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

9. COMMENT: FOROUHAR WAS RELAXED ABOUT WHAT HE APPEARED TO REGARD AS A MOMENTARY AND MINOR IRRITANT IN IRANO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. THIS WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE POSTURE OF THE OTHER CABINET MEMBERS I MET WITH YESTERDAY WHO SEEMED TO WANT TO REASSURE ME THAT, WHILE IRAN WILL NOT TOLERATE WHAT IT INTERPRETS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, IT GENUINELY DESIRES A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH US. (FONHIM YAZDI SINCE HAS GIVEN A PRESS CONFERENCE AT WHICH HE REPUTEDLY MADE SOME VERY INFLAMMATORY REMARKS ABOUT U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS.)

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امام خمینی:

" این ننگ را ما به کجا ببریم که برخی
از اهالی مملکت حالا که آمریکا را ملت شکست
داده است باز روابط با آمریکا دارند. "

دانشجویان مسلمان بیرو خط امام

بها ۱۴۰ ریال